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Unformatted text preview: Dependent variable (1) Executive de facto independence (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Role of State 0.1249a (0.0322) 0.1048a (0.0352) Constraints on executive power 0.3301a (0.0778) Effectiveness of legislature 0.2763b (0.0999) Competition nominating 0.0545b (0.0178) Autocracy Political rights 0.3470 (0.2185) French legal origin Socialist legal origin German legal origin Scandinavian legal origin Ln GDP/POP1999 Constant R2 N (7) 0.0491 (0.0331) 3.1782a (0.2334) 0.3178 84 0.0634c (0.0352) 3.2040a (0.2408) 0.2872 84 a. Significant at 1 percent; b. significant at 5 percent; c. significant at 10 percent. 0.0087 (0.0401) 2.8709a (0.2586) 0.3424 73 0.0902b (0.0358) 3.3540a (0.2641) 0.2475 73 0.0867a (0.0321) 2.7457a (0.2888) 0.2640 84 0.0939b (0.0386) 3.1850a (0.2599) 0.2350 84 0.7245a (0.0916) 0.4904a (0.1071) 0.7276a (0.1363) 0.0085 (0.1733) 0.1434a (0.0270) 2.9492a (0.1955) 0.6256 85 28 Regulation and Development Development Economics, LSE Summer School 2007 TABLE VII EVIDENCE ON REGULATION AND POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES The table presents the results of running regressions for the log of the number of procedures as the dependent variable. We run seven regressions using various political indicators described in Table II and (log) GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. ...
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