File2-page54 - Besley & Burgess (2002) Media and Policy...

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: Besley & Burgess (2002) Media and Policy ◦ Incentives work best for opportunistic incumbents who respond when it is in their interest to do so. • By exerting effort, they distinguish themselves from dead-beat incumbents who do not respond at all. And, crucially, they are more willing to do this when their actions are visible due to media. Incumbent wins if γ · σ · s(e, m, β ) + no. of vulnerable votes where (1 − γ ) · v > 1 2 no. of non-vulnerable votes s(e, m, β ) = β · p(e, m) + (1 − β ) · q(e, m) informed shocked voters informed non shocked voters γ : proportion of vulnerable citizens β : fraction of needy in the vulnerable population - experience a shock that can be mitigated by public action e: Incumbent politician’s effort m: media activity q(e, m) informed needy p(e, m) informed non-needy Proposition: Effort by an opportunistic incumbent is higher if (a) voters have greater media access (high m) (b) there is higher turnout in elections (high σ ) (c) there is a larger vulnerable population (high γ ) (d) political competition is more intense (low b). A larger needy population raises incumbent effort if pe (e; m) > qe (e; m) . Development Economics, LSE Summer School 2007 51 ...
View Full Document

This note was uploaded on 12/29/2011 for the course ECO 307 taught by Professor Dublin during the Spring '10 term at SUNY Stony Brook.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online