This preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.
Unformatted text preview: Besley & Burgess (2002) Media and Policy ◦ Incentives work best for opportunistic incumbents who respond when
it is in their interest to do so.
• By exerting effort, they distinguish themselves from dead-beat incumbents who do not respond at all. And, crucially, they are more
willing to do this when their actions are visible due to media. Incumbent wins if γ · σ · s(e, m, β ) +
no. of vulnerable votes where (1 − γ ) · v > 1
2 no. of non-vulnerable votes s(e, m, β ) = β · p(e, m) + (1 − β ) · q(e, m)
informed shocked voters informed non shocked voters γ : proportion of vulnerable citizens
β : fraction of needy in the vulnerable population
- experience a shock that can be mitigated by public action
e: Incumbent politician’s effort
m: media activity
q(e, m) informed needy
p(e, m) informed non-needy
Proposition: Effort by an opportunistic incumbent is higher if
(a) voters have greater media access (high m)
(b) there is higher turnout in elections (high σ )
(c) there is a larger vulnerable population (high γ )
(d) political competition is more intense (low b).
A larger needy population raises incumbent effort if
pe (e; m) > qe (e; m)
Development Economics, LSE Summer School 2007 51 ...
View Full Document
This note was uploaded on 12/29/2011 for the course ECO 307 taught by Professor Dublin during the Spring '10 term at SUNY Stony Brook.
- Spring '10