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Decentralisation and NGOs Sample All Female SC/ST All Female SC/ST (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Eligible for 0.007 0.003 reservation (0.007) (0.010) Education 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.006* (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) Land owned 0.007*** 0.003 0.002 0.008*** 0.002 0.032** (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) Family political 0.122*** 0.137*** 0.068 0.095*** 0.086** 0.059 history (0.021) (0.032) (0.045) (0.029) (0.039) (0.090) Fixed effects Village Village GP Village Village GP R-squared 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.22 N 5397 2644 1245 2065 1011 436 Table 2: Individual Characteristics and Politician Selection 1. OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
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Unformatted text preview: 5%; *** significant at 1% 2.Pradhan regressions restrict sample to Pradhan and non politician households in the Pradhan's village. All regressions include control for respondent age. 3. Eligible for reservation is an indicator variable which equals one if respondent is female or SC/ST. Land ownership is the land (in acres) owned by the respondent's household. Education refers to respondent's years of education. Family political history is an indicator variable which equals one if any family member of respondent has held/holds a political position. Notes: Politician Pradhan Development Economics, LSE Summer School 2007 243...
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This note was uploaded on 12/29/2011 for the course ECO 307 taught by Professor Dublin during the Spring '10 term at SUNY Stony Brook.

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