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search-c - Sponsored Search Cory Pender Sherwin Doroudi...

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Sponsored Search Cory Pender Sherwin Doroudi
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Optimal Delivery of Sponsored Search Advertisements Subject to Budget Constraints Zoe Abrams Ofer Mendelevitch John A. Tomlin
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Introduction Search engines (Google, Yahoo!, MSN) auction off advertisement slots on search page related to user’s keywords Pay per click Earn millions a day through these auctions Auction type is important
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QuickTimeª and a TIFF (LZW) decompressor are needed to see this picture.
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Solution Focus on small subset of queries Predictable volumes in near future Constitute large amount of total volume
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Sponsored search parameters Bids Query frequencies Advertiser budgets Controlled by advertisers Pricing and ranking algorithm Generalized second price (GSP) auction Rankings according to (bid) x (quality score) Charged minimum price needed to maintain rank Goal: take these parameters into account, maximize revenue
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Motivating example Bidder Bid for q 1 Bid for q 2 Budget b 1 C 1 + ε C 1 C 1 b 2 C 1 0 C 1 b 3 C 1 - C 1 - 2 C 1 Allocation Shown for q 1 Shown for q 2 Total Revenue Greedy b 1 b 3 C 1 + Optimal b 2 b 1 2C 1 - Reserve price is ε
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Problem Definition Queries Q = {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , . .., q N } Bidders B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , . .., b M } Bidding state A(t); A ij (t) is j ’s bid for i-th query d j is j ’s daily budget v i
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This document was uploaded on 01/05/2012.

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search-c - Sponsored Search Cory Pender Sherwin Doroudi...

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