Cases from the textbook
Chapter 33: Agency Formation and Duties
33 - 1: Granite Properties v. Granite Investment Company et Al. 220 Ill.App.3d 711 (1991)
TOPIC: Agency by implied authority
M. Yandle filed a general appearance on behalf of Granite investment even though she
was not in charge of the client but only the associate of Granite Investment's usual lawyer Rex
Carr. Moreover, she signed the document "SMY Rex Carr".
ISSUE: Had the attorney the authority to file a general appearance on behalf of the defendants ?
HOLDING: Yes, Affirmed
REASONING: Implied authority is defined as "Actual authority circumstantially proved". The
party alleging an agency relationship must prove it by preponderance of the evidence.
Longstading relationship with the law firm
Granite Investment knew Carr was on vacation
Granite Investment did not take any action regarding the matter
Granite Investment heard that Yandle was handling the situation and did not react
At the same time, Yandle signed other documents on behalf of Granite Investment
33 - 2: Rousey v. Jacoway
United States Supreme Court
544 U.S. 320 (2005)
Facts: Richard and Betty Jo Rousey stopped working and their employer required their
employer-sponsored pension plans to be taken as lump sums. The Rouseys deposited the two
lump sums into two Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Several years later, the Rouseys
filed joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the IRAs as exempt. Both the trustee and the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel agreed that the IRAs were not exempt. Multiple Appellate courts
disagreed on the issue so the case ended up in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether debtors (Rouseys) can exempt assets in their Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs) from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to Section 522(d)(10)(E).
Holding: Yes, according to the two requirements of Section 522(d)(10)(E), the Rouseys meet
both as defined below.
Reasoning: Section 522(d)(10)(E) provides that a debtor may withdraw from the bankruptcy
estate his “right to receive – (E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity,
or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor…”
Under these terms, Justice Thomas found first that the requirement of payment based “on
account of” age fit with the IRA’s requirement that accountholders incur a 10% penalty when
funds are withdrawn before the age of 59. Once an account holder turns 59, this condition is
removed, therefore the Rouseys’ right to the balance of their IRAs is a right to payment “on
account of” age. Secondly, Justice Thomas found that because the IRA’s functioned as a device
“similar” to the stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, etc., as all of which concern income that
substitutes for wages. The lack of wages between ages 59 and 70 (when the IRAs are accessible)
signifies that the IRA is a substitute for wages.