{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

Source executive summary of mars climate orbiter

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: e Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board 1 Report". Lessons Learned Software should not be assigned sole responsibility for safety, and systems should not be designed such that a single software error or software-engineering error can be catastrophic. Software should be subjected to extensive testing and formal analysis (reviews) at the module and software level; system testing alone is not adequate. To facilitate reviews : software audit trails should be designed into the software from the beginning documentation should not be an afterthought. Could outsourcing have prevented the failures ? London ambulance dispatching system and Therac-25 Probably. Applying software engineering (CMM) standards from the start for these projects would have prevented most problems from occuring. Ariane 5 and Mars Climate Observer Probably not. The best people to detect and correct the errors were on hand. Both NASA and ESA already follow very stringent software engineering norms....
View Full Document

{[ snackBarMessage ]}