24-COGS11-Qualia

24-COGS11-Qualia - Qualia are the `raw feels of conscious experience the painfulness of pain the redness of red Qualia give human conscious

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Qualia are the ‘raw feels’ of conscious experience: the painfulness of pain, the redness of red. Qualia give human conscious experience the particular character that it has. For instance, imagine a red square; that conscious experience has (at least) two qualia: a color quale, responsible for your sensation of redness, nd shape uale responsible for the square appearance of adas ape qua e, espo s b e o t e squa e appea a ce o the imagined object. Qualia Mary ET Boyle, Ph.D. Department of Cognitive Science UCSD
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ualia Qualia The nature of qualia efinition used in Definition – as used in philosophy: Qualia is the term which is applied to indivisible primary feelings. ch as: the feeling of seeing Such as: the feeling of seeing green in a pear or feeling pain in one’s arm. First person – subjective in nature
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roblem of ualia : where Problem of Qualia is: where Where do qualia reside? entral to materialist/dualist Central to materialist/dualist debate Reduces the question of q consciousness to its primitives: “Where is my sensation of pain?” “Where is my sensation of een?” green?
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it my behavior? Is it my behavior? Reflexes still work even though ne may not experience pain. one may not experience pain.
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earle Searle Qualia cannot be duced to a third- reduced to a third person perspective Searle attacks materialism by arguing that the first person oint of view cannot be point of view cannot be ignored. Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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ecall, Animal Cognition Lecture… Recall, Animal Cognition Lecture…
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ranslation… Translation… I cannot know your ualia d you can not qualia and you can not know mine.
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Inverted Spectrum Thought Experiment My qualia is not necessarily like your qualia. It shows that there is no logical necessity that our subjective
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This note was uploaded on 01/10/2012 for the course COGN cogs 11 taught by Professor Maryboyle during the Spring '11 term at UCSD.

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24-COGS11-Qualia - Qualia are the `raw feels of conscious experience the painfulness of pain the redness of red Qualia give human conscious

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