ACH+Steps_7-8_Sirer.docx - ACH Step 7 The PRC-Taiwan Crisis Can Sirer INTL401 Professor John Patch 14 June 2020 Section I Most Likely to Occur \u2013

ACH+Steps_7-8_Sirer.docx - ACH Step 7 The PRC-Taiwan Crisis...

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ACH Step 7The PRC-Taiwan Crisis Can SirerINTL401Professor: John Patch14 June 2020
Section I: Most Likely to Occur – Limited Intervention (H2)Gathered evidence would suggest a limited intervention is highly likelyto occur between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) based on twelve specific instances of conforming evidence. Evidence drawn from H1a shows that Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) increased the alert status of Taiwan defense forces sixty-five days prior to the election in anticipation of a confrontation (H1a). This response proves that Taiwan was expecting an external intervention to occur. Although strong evidence exists in support of a direct attack (nine specific instances of conforming evidence), the United Nations Security Council agrees to address the brewing crisis twenty-five days before the election. This intercession is in large part due to the Premier of the Communist Party of China’s plea to the UN Secretary General to intervene in order to avoid military conflict. The linchpin evidence also reinforces this claim, because the PRC seems to be open and willing to involve the international community. In addition, because of fear of retaliation from the PRC, Taiwan seems to be raising its military alert status. This response disproves H1 and strengthens H2.Section II: Second Most Likely to Occur – Direct Attack (H3)The likelihood of a direct attack occurring is probabledue to eight specific instances of disconfirming evidence (nine conforming) identified in the ACH matrix. Evidence drawn for H3a shows an uptick in the PRC’s military alert level. This response is evident in recordings found in USAF Electronic Intelligence reports indicating the 96th Missile Regiment near Nanping is calibrating equipment in preparation for a CSS-6 missile launch with an impact area very close to Taiwan 30 days prior to the election. Although stronger evidence existsin support of a limited intervention (twelve specific instances of conforming evidence), a direct attack is still probable due to an Anti-Cessation Law passed by the PRC formalizing their long-standing policy to use “non-peaceful means” should Taiwan win the election and declare their independence. The linchpin evidence also reinforces this claim, because this idea proves that if Taiwan declares independence, the PRC will use this policy to openly attack Taiwan. When compared to linchpin evidence presented in H2, H1 seems probable but
unlikely given the Premier of the Communist Party of China’s plea to the UN Secretary General to intervene in order to avoid military conflict. Section III: Least Likely to Occur – Diplomatic Solution (H1)The likelihood of a diplomatic solution occurring is unlikelydue to thirteen specific instances of disconfirming evidence (five conforming) identified in the ACH matrix. Evidence drawn for H1b shows Taiwan’s current President Chen Shui-Bian maximizes the alert status of Taiwan defense forces sixty-five days

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