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Unformatted text preview: U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy 2012 Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Visit our website for other free publication downloads To rate this publication click here. Strategic Studies Institute Book U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE GUIDE TO NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES VOLUME I: THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY 5th Edition J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Editor June 2012 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. NOTICE: Further dissemination or distribution of this manuscript or quotation from it is not authorized without permission of the authors. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: . ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at . ISBN 1-58487-532-1 ii CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................................vii J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Part I: Strategic Theory 1. Why is Strategy Difficult? ..................................................................................................... 3 David Jablonsky 2. A Survey of the Theory of Strategy ....................................................................................13 J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. 3. Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model ......................................................................................................................45 H. Richard Yarger 4. The Strategic Appraisal: The Key to Effective Strategy ...................................................53 H. Richard Yarger 5. Managing Strategic Risk ......................................................................................................67 James F. Holcomb 6. Continuity and Change in War .......................................................................................... 79 J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. 7. A Theory of Victory ..............................................................................................................91 J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. 8. Toward a Strategic Theory of Terrorism: Defining Boundaries in the Ongoing Search for Security .............................................................................................107 Frank L. Jones 9. Thucydides and Contemporary Strategy ........................................................................119 R. Craig Nation 10. Eastern Strategic Traditions: Un-American Ways of War ............................................ 133 Glenn K. Cunningham Part II: Instruments and Elements of Power 11. National Power ...................................................................................................................147 R. Craig Nation 12. Strategic Communications: Wielding the Information Element of Power ................. 159 Dennis M. Murphy 13. Diplomacy as an Instrument of National Power ............................................................173 Reed J. Fendrick iii CONTENTS 14. Theory and Practice of Modern Diplomacy: Origins and Development to 1914 ................................................................................................................................. .179 Louis J. Nigro, Jr. 15. Economic Diplomacy: Views of a Practitioner ............................................................... 193 Constance Phlipot 16. Economics: A Key Element of National Power .............................................................. 205 Clayton K. S. Chun 17. Military Power and the Use of Force ............................................................................... 217 John F. Troxell Part III: Strategic Interests and Considerations 18. Applying Clausewitz and Systems Thinking to Design ............................................... 245 Glenn K. Cunningham and Charles D. Allen 19. Intelligence as a Tool of Strategy ......................................................................................257 John Aclin 20. The Airplane and Warfare: Theory and History ............................................................273 Tami Davis Biddle 21. John Warden’s Five Ring Model and the Indirect Approach to War ..........................295 Clayton K. S. Chun 22. Naval Theory for Soldiers ................................................................................................. 309 J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. 23. On the Theory of Cyberspace ........................................................................................... 325 Jeffrey L. Caton About the Contributors ........................................................................................................... 345 iv FIGURES - VOLUME I Chapter 1 Figure 1-1. The Policy Continuum  ................................................................................................4 Figure 1-2. The Remarkable Trinity  .............................................................................................. 5 Figure 1-3. The Impact of Technology  ..........................................................................................5 Figure 1-4. The Continuum of War  ...............................................................................................8 Figure 1-5. National Strategy: The Horizontal Plane ..................................................................9 Figure 1-6. National Strategy and the Vertical Continuum of War ..........................................9 Chapter 3 Figure 3-1. Strategic and Operational Art  ..................................................................................47 Figure 3-2. Comprehensiveness of Strategy ...............................................................................48 Figure 3-3. The Lykke Model  .......................................................................................................48 Chapter 4 Figure 4-1. Strategic Appraisal Process .......................................................................................54 Figure 4-2. Realms of Strategy ......................................................................................................55 Figure 4-3. Levels of Intensity  ......................................................................................................58 Figure 4-4. Strategic Factors ..........................................................................................................59 Figure 4-5. Strategic Thinking Competencies  ............................................................................61 Chapter 7 Figure 7-1. Scale of Success ...........................................................................................................94 Figure 7-2. Scale of Decisiveness...................................................................................................95 Figure 7-3. Scale of Achievement..................................................................................................95 v FIGURES - VOLUME I Chapter 17 Figure 17-1. Components of Security Policy.............................................................................. 219 Figure 17-2. Evaluations of Compellent Threats  ...................................................................... 222 Figure 17-3. Range of Military Operations  ................................................................................224 Figure 17-4. Guidelines for the Use of Force .............................................................................227 Figure 17-5. Weinburger Doctrine from Vietnam to Iraq ........................................................231 Chapter 18 Figure 18-1. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model  .......................................................248 Figure 18-2. Characteristics of Centers of Gravity .....................................................................252 Figure 18-3. Determining Center of Gravity  .............................................................................253 Chapter 19 Figure 19-1. Interaction with the Analysts  ................................................................................266 Chapter 21 Figure 21-1. John Warden’s Five Ring Model  ..........................................................................299 Chapter 23 Figure 23-1. Cyberspace as Domain and Commons..................................................................327 Figure 23-2. Kinetic versus Nonkinetic Means and Effects......................................................329 vi INTRODUCTION J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy continues to reflect the structure and approach of the core national security strategy and policy curriculum at the War College. The fifth edition is published in two volumes that correspond roughly to the Department of National Security and Strategy’s core courses: “Theory of War and Strategy” and “National Security Policy and Strategy.” Like previous editions, this one is based on its predecessor but contains both updates and new scholarship. Over a third of the chapters are new or have undergone significant rewrites. Many chapters, some of which appeared for years in this work, have been removed. Nevertheless, the book remains unchanged in intent and purpose. Although this is not primarily a textbook, it does reflect both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America’s future senior leaders. The book is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategic theory or the policymaking process. Both volumes are organized to proceed from the general to the specific. Thus, the first volume opens with general thoughts on the nature and theory of war and strategy, proceeds to look at the complex aspect of power, and concludes with specific theoretical issues. Similarly, the second volume begins by examining the policy/strategy process, moves to a look at the strategic environment, and concludes with some specific issues. This edition continues the effort begun in the fourth edition to include several short case studies to illustrate the primary material in the volume. vii PART I STRATEGIC THEORY 1 CHAPTER 1 WHY IS STRATEGY DIFFICULT? David Jablonsky Colonel (Ret.) Arthur Lykke has taught an entire generation of U.S. Army War College students that strategy at any level consists of ends or objectives, ways or concepts, and means or resources. This three‑element framework is nothing more than a reworking of the traditional definition of strategy as the calculated relationship of ends and means. Yet, the student response is always overwhelmingly favorable, with Lykke’s framework invariably forming the structure for subsequent seminar problems on subjects ranging from the U.S. Civil War to nuclear strategy. This is due, in part, to the fact that students weaned on the structural certitude of the five‑paragraph field order and the Commander’s Estimate naturally find such structure comforting in dealing with the complexities of strategy. But those students also know from their experience in the field that there are limits to the scientific approach when dealing with human endeavors. As a consequence, they can also appreciate the art of mixing ends, ways, and means, using for each element some subjective and some objective criteria of suitability, feasibility, and applicability—the essence of strategic calculation.1 The ends‑ways‑means paradigm also provides a structure at any level of strategy to avoid confusing the scientific product with the scientific process. The former involves production propositions that are logically related and valid across time and space. The search for these immutable principles over the centuries by students of war failed, because they looked at classical strategy as something like physical science that could produce verities in accordance with certain regularities. This was further compounded by military thinkers who made claims for scientific products without subjecting those products to a scientific process. Both Jomini and Mahan, for instance, ignored evidence in cases that did not fit their theories or principles of strategy.2 The strategic paradigm, then, serves as a lowest common denominator reminder that a true scientific product is not possible from the study of strategy. At the same time, however, that paradigm provides a framework for the systematic treatment of facts and evidence—the very essence of the scientific process. In this regard, Admiral Wylie has pointed out: I do not claim that strategy is or can be a ‘science’ in the sense of the physical sciences. It can and should be an intellectual discipline of the highest order, and the strategist should prepare himself to manage ideas with precision and clarity and imagination. . . . Thus, while strategy itself may not be a science, strategic judgment can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclusive, discriminatory, and perceptive.3 All that notwithstanding, the limitations of the strategic paradigm bring the focus full circle back to the art involved in producing the optimal mix of ends, ways, and means. Strategy, of course, does depend on the general regularities of that paradigm. But strategy does not always obey the logic of that framework, remaining, as the German Army Regulations Truppen-fuhrung of 1936 described it, “a free creative activity resting upon scientific foundations.”4 The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why, despite increasingly scientific approaches to formulation and implementation, strategy remains principally an art rather than a science, and why within that art the “creative activity” of blending the elements in the strategic paradigm has become progressively more difficult over the centuries. 3 FROM REVOLUTIONS TO TOTAL WAR In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, there was a growing recogniPOLICY tion of the increased complexity of strategy, summarized in Carl von Clausewitz’s warning that “there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.”5 At the tactical level, the Prussian philosopher wrote, “the means are fighting forces trained for combat; the end is victory.” For the STRATEGY strategic, however, Clausewitz concluded that military victories were meaningless unless they were the means to obtain a political end, “those objects which lead directly to peace.”6 Thus, strategy was “the linking together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements into a single whole, for the final object of the war.”7 And only the political or policy TACTICS level could determine that objective. “To bring a war, or any one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy,” he pointed out. “On that level strategy and policy coalesce.”8 For Clausewitz, this vertical continuum (see Figure 1-1) was best exemplified by Frederick the Great, who embodied both policy and Figure 1-1. strategy and whose Silesian conquests of 1741 he considered to be The Policy Continuum. the classic example of strategic art by demonstrating “an element of restrained strength, . . . ready to adjust to the smallest shift in the political situation.”9 With his deceptively simple description of the vertical continuum of war, Clausewitz set the stage for the equivalent of a Copernican shift in the strategic ends‑ways‑means paradigm. Now that paradigm was more complex, operating on both the military and policy levels with the totality of the ends, ways, and means at the lower levels interconnected with the political application at the policy level of those same strategic elements. This connection was the essence of Clausewitz’s description of war as a continuation of political intercourse (Verkehr) with the addition of other means. He explained that: We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means’ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.... The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.... War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.10 THE INDUSTRIAL AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONS This growing complexity in dealing with the strategic paradigm was compounded by two upheavals. Clausewitz was profoundly aware of one, the French Revolution; he was totally ignorant of the other, the Industrial/Technological Revolution. Prior to the French Revolution, 18th-century rulers had acquired such effective political and economic control over their people that they were able to create their war machines as separate and distinct from the rest of society. The Revolution changed all that with the appearance of a force “that beggared all imagination,” as Clausewitz described it: 4 Suddenly, war again became the business of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens. There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects.... War, untrammeled by any, conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury. This was due to the peoples’ new share in these great affairs of state; and their participation, in its turn, resulted partly from the impact that the Revolution had on the internal conditions of every state and partly from the danger that France posed to everyone.11 GOVERNMENT MILITARY PEOPLE For Clausewitz, the people greatly complicated the Figure 1-2. formulation and implementation of strategy by adding “primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be The Remarkable Trinity. regarded as a blind natural force” to form with the army and the government what he termed the remarkable trinity (see Figure 1-2). The army he saw as a “creative spirit” roaming freely within “the play of chance and probability,” but always bound to the government, the third element, in “subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.12 It was the complex totality of this trinity that, Clausewitz realized, ...
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