sample_arg_paper

sample_arg_paper - Let us suppose that we are in a...

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Unformatted text preview: Let us suppose that we are in a discussion with a subscriber to the Divine Command Theory, who tells us, when asked how we can determine if something is good or not, that discovering the rightness of something is easy: Something is good or right if God commands it. We then ask, like Socrates of yore, Does God commands that thing because it is good, or is that thing good because God commands it? Our interlocutor answers, It is good because God commands it. Ah ha! Feeling smug at having found a profound weakness in this persons argument, we respond that of necessity then, all of morality is arbitrary. God could, at any moment, or on any whim, command that murder is good and just -- and we would have to accept it! Doesnt this go against our intuitions, that murder is bad no matter what? Without skipping a beat, our Divine Command theorist says, Ah, thats easy: God would never command that murder is wrong, because God is all-good and all-just, and therefore could never make a mistake...
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sample_arg_paper - Let us suppose that we are in a...

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