are150-review-questions-4 2010

are150-review-questions-4 2010 - omUniversity of...

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Unformatted text preview: omUniversity of California, Davis Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics ARE 150 Philip Martin [email protected] Fall 2010 Dist 11/3/10 Due 11/18/10 Review Questions 4-- Midterm 2 is Tuesday, November 23 Please type or write neatly, and put your discussion section, 4-5 or 5-6, on your answers. Each answer is worth one point. Note that questions 21-24 from Review questions #3 will also be covered on Midterm #2. 1. What are the major weapons or tactics available to unions to put pressure on employers (give an example of the extremes of union power). 2A. Explain the ALRA rights of striking seasonal workers to their old jobs if they strike (1) for economic reasons and (2) to protest an employer ULP. B. How do the reinstatement rights of year-round and seasonal economic strikers differ in CA agriculture? 3A. Define (1) secondary consumer boycott and (2) hot cargo clause. B. Explain the difference between the boycott and hot cargo activities permitted by the ALRA and NLRA (you may draw a diagram). 4A. Can the UFW lawfully picket a restaurant to deter customers from patronizing it even if it does not know whether the restaurant is using commodities from the farm where it has a dispute (cite a case)? B. Can the UFW boycott a grocery store that sells grapes if it does not represent the grape workers on whose behalf it is picketing (cite a case)? 5A. What is a typical ALRB remedy for a ULP, and what is its purpose? B. What is the make-whole remedy, and how does it protect employers who bargain in good faith? 6A. Illustrate and explain how a (1) partially effective farm worker strike and (2) a consumer boycott can affect grower revenues and worker wages. B. Which tool—strikes or boycotts--is “best” for (1) employers and (2) workers? 7A. What is a demand-for-labor curve, and what kinds of demand-for-labor curves do unions want—elastic or inelastic? Why? B. What factors determine the elasticity of the demand for labor? C. What can farm worker unions do to affect the elasticity of demand for labor? 8. Illustrate and explain three possible union maximization goals? 9. If the demand for labor is L = 110 – 10w and the supply of labor is w = 5 (an employer can get an unlimited number of workers at $5 an hour), calculate employment, wages, and the union wage premium or rent at the three union maximization goals? 10A. Illustrate and compare the wage and employment equilibrium in a monopsony and a competitive labor market? B. What happens to employment if unions push up wages for a monopsonist? 11. If the supply of labor is L = W-6, and the VMP or demand for labor is L = 25W, illustrate and calculate monopsonistic exploitation (you can round fractions). 12. What is monopsonistic exploitation, and how can a monopsonist organize work and workers to increase exploitation? 13. Why might California farm worker unions gain or lose power vis-à-vis farm employers over time? Which factor(s) do YOU think are likely to be most important in shaping farm worker union power? 14A. Illustrate and explain how increasing the supply of labor via immigration affects the (1) level and (2) distribution of US national income (explain who gains and who loses if immigration increases the supply of labor in the short run). B. Why do most economists conclude that the economic impact of immigration is mostly distributional? 15A. Illustrate and explain smooth and segmented farm labor market adjustments to the removal of immigrant workers. B. Which adjustment scenario do YOU think is most likely? Why? 16. Explain the "systems approach" used to mechanize CA tomato harvesting and the difference between gross and net social returns to the UC R&D spending? What happened to UC mechanization efforts? 17. Illustrate and explain why young people are most likely to migrate. What does migration-as-an-investment theory suggest government should do to reduce unauthorized migration? 18. If stepped-up border enforcement increases the probability that an unauthorized foreigner will be caught on any entry attempt from 30 percent to 70 percent, and entry attempts are independent, what kind of migrant behavior can (1) increase apprehensions but (2) leave the number of unauthorized foreigners in the US almost unchanged? 19A. What is the purpose of a guest worker program, and what 2-Ds help to explain why such programs last longer and get larger than planned? B. What is the difference between certification and attestation guest worker programs? Which type of program do employers prefer? 20. Evaluate. "Without immigrant farm workers, lettuce would cost $2 a head." Explain the farm worker wages-food price trade off? ...
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This note was uploaded on 01/13/2012 for the course ARE 150 taught by Professor Martin during the Fall '08 term at UC Davis.

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