final-review

final-review - CMSC 498T Game Theory Review for the Final...

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Nau: Game Theory 1 Updated 12/18/11 CMSC 498T, Game Theory Review for the Final Exam Dana Nau University of Maryland

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Nau: Game Theory 2 Updated 12/18/11 Exam Format Like the midterm: Ø Closed book Ø No electronic devices Ø One 8.5” x 11” page of notes (you can write on both sides) Cumulative, but will emphasize the material covered since the midterm The following slides give a list of the main topics that we have covered Ø I’ve crossed out some some material that won’t be on the exam During the next few days, I’ll post a note to Piazza about other things you won’t need to know
Nau: Game Theory 3 Updated 12/18/11 1. Introduction Basic concepts: Ø normal form, utilities/payoffs, pure strategies, mixed strategies How utilities relate to rational preferences (not in the book) Some classifications of games based on their payoffs Ø Zero-sum Roshambo, Matching Pennies Ø Non-zero-sum Chocolate Dilemma, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Which Side of the Road? Ø Common-payoff Which Side of the Road? Ø Symmetric all of the above except Battle of the Sexes

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Nau: Game Theory 4 Updated 12/18/11 2. Analyzing Normal-Form Games Several solution concepts, and ways of finding them: Ø Pareto optimality Prisoner’s Dilemma, Which Side of the Road Ø best responses and Nash equilibria Battle of the Sexes, Matching Pennies finding Nash equilibria Ø real-world examples soccer penalty kicks road networks (Braess’s Paradox) Complexity of finding Nash equilibria
5 Updated 12/18/11 3. More about Normal-Form Games maximin and minimax strategies, and the Minimax Theorem Ø Matching Pennies, Two-Finger Morra dominant strategies Ø Prisoner’s Dilemma, Which Side of the Road, Matching Pennies Ø Elimination of strictly dominated strategies, IESDS evolutionarily stable strategies Ø Hawk-Dove game continued on next slide …

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final-review - CMSC 498T Game Theory Review for the Final...

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