Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert_ Reflections of

Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert_ Reflections of

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Boston College Law School Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School Boston College Law School Faculty Papers 4-1-2005 Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic Mark S. Brodin Boston College Law School , brodin@bc.edu This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact emick@bc.edu . Digital Commons Citation Brodin, Mark S., "Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic" (2005). Boston College Law School Faculty Papers. Paper 24. http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/24
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE IN THE AGE OF DAUBERT: REFLECTIONS OF A SKEPTIC Mark S. Brodin I. Introduction "Both fields,those ofMental health and Law,. .. speak two different languages [and] have different customs and casts ofthought. .. Diag noses do not convey legal truth. Legal 'truth' and scientific 'truth' may have nothingto do witheach other."1 From its earliest use in American courts, when one Dr. Brown offered his "scientific" opinion in a Salem witch trial,2 expert testimony has posed fundamental issues for our system of adjudication. At its most basic the quandary is: How can we utilize specialists to educate a lay jury about matters beyond their ken without at the same time intruding upon the jurors' central role as ultimate factfinder? In recent years courts and commentators have focused considerable attention on one dimension of this problem—assuring some degree of "reliability" regarding the principles and methodologies underlying the expert's testimony before it is heard by the jury. For much of the twentieth century courts followed the Frye decision,3 which delegated this assessment to the practitioners in the particular field under a "general acceptance" standard.4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, * Professor, Boston College Law School. B.A.,J.D., Columbia University. This project received generous financial support from the Darald andJuliet Libby and Dr. Thomas Carney Funds. The author wishesto acknowledge the very insightful suggestions made on earlier drafts by Michael Avery, Robert M. Bloom, andJohn Garvey, and the invaluable research assistance of Meredith Ainbinder, Deshala Dixon, Jonah Goldman, Ryan Littrell, and Danielle Porcelli. 1. Lawrence Loeb, Forensic Testimony: WhatJudges Want, 24 PACE L. REV.211,211-12 (2003). 2. AndreA.Moenssensetal., ScientificEvidenceinCivilandCriminalCases 6 (1995) (citing A Trial of Witches at Bury St. Edmonds, 6 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 687, 697 (1665)); John V. Jansonius & Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 270 (1998). "The accused were found guilty and hanged. No issue seems to have been raised in that case concerning the validity of the process for determining whether one was a witch." Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 n.7 (Md. 1978).
Background image of page 2
Image of page 3
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 01/16/2012 for the course BI 200 taught by Professor Potter during the Fall '11 term at Montgomery College.

Page1 / 78

Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert_ Reflections of

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online