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Unformatted text preview: Economics 3102  Midterm Exam Winter 2011 1 NAME TA (circle one): Oscar Contreras Pablo Schenone Emil Temnyalov Discussion Session Day (circle one): Monday Friday General Instructions: • Write your name on the exam, circle the name of your TA and the day of the discussion session that you attend, and check that you have all 8 pages. • Exams must be completed in pen. Do not use pencil. • Cell phones and calculators are not permitted. • Work on scratch paper will not be graded, but everything written on the exam will be graded. If you need to change an answer, clearly cross out the part you are changing. If you need more space, you can use the back of the page, but clearly indicate that part or all of your work is on the back. Economics 3102  Midterm Exam Winter 2011 2 Section I — Multiple Choice [39 Points (3 points each)] For each of the following questions, circle the best answer and write the letter for your answer in the margin to the left of the question. There is no partial credit for this part of the test. 1. If an alternative is Pareto efficient, then: (a) A majority of the individuals must have voted for that alternative. (b) There is no feasible way to strictly increase the utility of every individual. (c) The individual with the lowest utility in society must be getting a strictly positive utility. (d) It must be some individual’s most preferred alternative. 2. Pairwise majority rule is a social welfare function for preferences that: (a) Satisfies universal domain, the Pareto criterion, and independence of irrelevant alterna tives. (b) Satisfies universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives, but violates the Pareto criterion. (c) Satisfies the Pareto criterion and independence of irrelevant alternatives, but violates universal domain. (d) Satisfies universal domain and the Pareto criterion, but violates independence of irrele vant alternatives. 3. Rankorder voting is a social welfare function for preferences that: (a) Satisfies universal domain, the Pareto criterion, and independence of irrelevant alterna tives. (b) Satisfies universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives, but violates the Pareto criterion. (c) Satisfies the Pareto criterion and independence of irrelevant alternatives, but violates universal domain. (d) Satisfies universal domain and the Pareto criterion, but violates independence of irrele vant alternatives. 4. Arrow’s theorem states that: (a) If there are three or more alternatives, then any SWFP that satisfies universal domain, the Pareto criterion, and independence of irrelevant alternatives must be a dictatorship. (b) If there are three or more alternatives, then there is no SWFP that satisfies universal domain, the Pareto criterion, and independence of irrelevant alternatives....
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This note was uploaded on 01/14/2012 for the course ECON 201 taught by Professor Witte during the Spring '08 term at Northwestern.
 Spring '08
 Witte
 Economics, Macroeconomics

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