310-2ps1 - Economics 310-2 Spring 2009 Professor Jeff Ely...

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Unformatted text preview: Economics 310-2 Spring 2009 Professor Jeff Ely Problem Set 1 Due April 6 1. Come up with an example with three alternatives of a Social Welfare Function that satisfies UD, IIA and non-dictatorship but fails Pareto. 2. Society is choosing among three alternatives, X, Y and Z . Consider the following social welfare function. Individuals express their preferences. For each alternative A , we count the number of individuals who rank A last (last-place votes.) The alternative with the most last-place votes is placed at the bottom of the social ranking. Next, we remove that alternative from the individuals rankings and for the remaining alternatives, we recount the number of last-place votes. The alternative with the most last-place votes is then put second-to-last in the social ranking. We continue in this fashion until all alternatives are ranked. There are 11 individuals divided into three groups. The preferences for individuals in the same group are the same and are given below....
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310-2ps1 - Economics 310-2 Spring 2009 Professor Jeff Ely...

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