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Unformatted text preview: Economics 3102 Spring 2009 Professor Jeff Ely Problem Set 6 Due Monday May 18 1. Let’s consider a twoplayer version of the brunetteblonde game. And lets apply some affirmative action and relabel the players. There are two women in a bar, and they spot three academics across the room. Two are mathematicians and one is an economist. So this is the 2M1E game. Each of the women would prefer to go home with the economist, but either mathematician is better than going home with no date at all. The two mathematicians are equally desirable. The two women must simultaneously decide which academic to approach. If they both approach the same one, they are rebuffed and go home alone. (Even mathematicians don’t like being the second choice.) If they approach different ones, then they will get their choice. • In this game the two players are the women at the bar. Draw a payoff ma trix representing this game. Label the actions and give payoffs that reflect the preferences described above....
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 Spring '08
 Witte
 Economics, Macroeconomics, Equilibrium, Farmer

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