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Unformatted text preview: ECON 4109H LECTURE 4 Weak Dominance and Strict Dominance September 23, 2010 ECON 4109H LECTURE 4 Strict Dominance Definition In a strategic game with ordinal preferences, player is action a 00 i strictly dominates a i if u i ( a 00 i , a i ) > u i ( a i , a i ) for every profile a i of the other players actions. We say that a i is strictly dominated . ECON 4109H LECTURE 4 Prisoners Dilemma Quiet Fink Quiet 2,2 0,3 Fink 3,0 1,1 In the prisoners dilemma, Fink strictly dominates Quiet. ECON 4109H LECTURE 4 Weak Dominance Definition In a strategic game with ordinal preferences, player is action a 00 i weakly dominates a i if: u i ( a 00 i , a i ) > u i ( a i , a i ) for every profile a i of other players actions, and u i ( a 00 i , b a i ) > u i ( a i , b a i ) for some profile b a i of other players actions. We say that a i is weakly dominated ECON 4109H LECTURE 4 Weak Dominance A B A 1,1 0,0 B 0,0 0,0 A weakly dominates B ....
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 Fall '09
 Notsure

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