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Unformatted text preview: Nontariff Trade Barriers and New Protectionism Chapter 9 ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 1/30 1 Introduction We discuss the definition of import quotas and the definitions of other nontariff barriers
and the new Protectionism
and Understand the political economy of protectionism
protectionism Know the definition of strategic trade and industrial policies
industrial Introduce the Uruguay Round and outstanding trade problems
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 2/30 Key Terms
• Nontariff trade barriers
Strategic trade policy
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 3/30 2 Nontariff Trade Barriers
Voluntary Export Restraints
Import License System
Foreign Exchange Control
Government Procurement Policy
Technical Barrier to Trade
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 4/30 2.1 Import Quotas & Their Effects
A quota is the most important nontariff trade
barrier. It is a direct quantitative restriction on the
amount of a commodity allowed to be imported
or exported. So we have import quotas and
Import quotas can be used to protect a
domestic industry, to protect domestic
agriculture, and/or for balance-of-payments
reasons. ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 5/30 2.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis of An Import Quota ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 6/30 2.3 Import Quota & Import Tariff
The First Difference:
With an import quota, an increase in demand will
result in a higher domestic price and greater domestic
production than with an equivalent import tariff.
When adjustment (thru any shift in DX or Sx) occurs
in the domestic price with an import quota, import quota
completely replaces the market mechanism.
With an import tariff, an increase in demand will leave
the domestic price and domestic production unchanged
but will result in higher consumption and imports than
with an equivalent import quota.
When adjustment (to any shift in DX or Sx) occurs in
the quantity of imports with a tariff, an import tariff alters
market mechanism (as an import tariff does).
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 7/30 2.3 Import Quota & Import Tariff
The Second Difference:
The quota involves the distribution of import
licenses. If the government does not auction off these
licenses in a competitive market, firms that receive them
will reap monopoly profits. In that case, the government
must decide the basis for distributing licenses among
potential importers of the commodity. Such choices may
be based on arbitrary official judgments rather than on
efficiency considerations, and import quotas tend to
remain frozen even in the face of changes in the relative
efficiency of various actual and potential importers of the
As for import tariff, the government collects it for all
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 8/30 2.3 Import Quota & Import Tariff
2.3 Import Quota & Import Tariff
The Third Difference:
An import quota limits imports to the specified level
with certainty, while the trade effect of an import tariff
may be uncertain.
Furthermore, foreign exporters may absorb all or part
of the tariff by increasing their efficiency of operation or
by accepting lower profits. As a result, the actual
reduction in imports may be less than anticipated.
Exporters cannot do this with an import quota since the
quantity of imports allowed into the nation is clearly
specified by the quota. It is for this reason, and also
because an import tariff is less "visible," that domestic
producers strongly prefer import quotas to import tariffs. ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 9/30 3 Voluntary Export Restraints These refer to the case where an importing
country induces another nation to reduce its
exports of a commodity "voluntarily," under the
threat of higher all-round trade restrictions, when
these exports threaten an entire domestic
VERs have been negotiated since the 1950s
among industrial nations to curtail exports of
textiles, steel, electronic products, automobiles,
and other products from Japan, Korea, and other
nations. These are the mature industries that
faced sharp declines in employment in the
industrial countries during the 1980s.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 10/30 3.1 Effects of VERs
They have all the economic effects of equivalent
import quotas, except that they are administered by the
exporting country, and so the revenue effect or rents are
captured by foreign exporters.
Voluntary export restraints are less effective in
limiting imports than import quotas because the
exporting nations agree only reluctantly to curb their
exports. Foreign exporters are also likely to fill their
quota with higher-quality and higher-priced units of the
product over time.
Furthermore, only major supplier countries are
involved, leaving the door open for other nations to
replace part of the exports of the major suppliers and
also from transshipments through third countries. ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 11/30 3.2 Other Regulations
Safety regulations Health regulations Labeling requirements Government
procurement policies ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 12/30 3.3 International Cartels An international cartel is an organization of
suppliers of a commodity located in different
nations that agrees to restrict output and exports
of the commodity with the aim of maximizing or
increasing the total profits of the organization.
Although domestic cartels are illegal in the US
and restricted in EU, the power of international
cartels cannot easily be countered because they
do not fall under the jurisdiction of any nation.
Conditions for its success
A few international suppliers
No close substitutes
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 13/30 3.4 Dumping Dumping is the export of a commodity at
below cost or at least the sale of a commodity at
a lower price abroad than domestically.
Dumping is classified as persistent, predatory,
Predatory dumping ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 14/30 3.4 Dumping
It is often difficult to determine the type of
dumping, and domestic producers demand
protection against any dumping.
They discourage imports and increase their
own production and profits (rents). In some
cases of persistent and sporadic dumping, the
benefit to consumers from low prices may
actually exceed the possible production losses
of domestic producers.
These restrictions usually take the form of
antidumping duties to offset price differentials,
or the threat to impose such duties.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 15/30 3.5 Export Subsidies
Export subsidies are
direct payments or the
granting of tax relief
and subsidized loans to
the nation's exporters
or potential exporters
loans to foreign buyers
so as to stimulate the
nation's exports. As
such, export subsidies
can be regarded as a
form of dumping.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 16/30 4 Arguments for Protection Are trade restrictions needed to protect domestic
labor against cheap foreign labor?
Comments: This is fallacious because even if
domestic wages are higher than wages abroad,
domestic labor costs can still be lower if the
productivity of labor is sufficiently higher
domestically than abroad. Even if this were not
the case, mutually beneficial trade could still be
based on comparative advantage.
Can they use scientific tariff to protect domestic
Comments: This would eliminate international
price differences and trade in all commodities
subject to such "scientific" tariffs.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 17/30 4.1 Questionable Arguments
Protection is needed (1) to reduce domestic
unemployment and (2) to cure a deficit in the
nation's balance of payments
Comments: Protection can reduce domestic
unemployment and a balance-of-payments
deficit. But they’re beggar-thy-neighbor
arguments for protection because they come at
the expense of other nations.
As a result, other nations are likely to
retaliate, and all nations lose in the end.
Domestic unemployment and deficits in the
nation's balance of payments should be
corrected with appropriate monetary, fiscal, and
trade policies rather than with trade restrictions.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 18/30 4.2 InfantIndustry for Protection A nation may have a potential comparative edge in a
commodity, but because of lack of know-how and the
initial small level of output, the industry will not be set up
or, if already started, cannot compete successfully with
more established foreign firms.
Temporary trade protection is then needed to establish
and protect the domestic industry during its "infancy"
until it can meet foreign competition, achieve economies
of scale, and reflect the nation's long-run comparative
advantage. At that time, protection is to be removed.
For this argument to be valid, the return in the grownFor
up industry must be sufficiently high also to offset the
higher prices paid by domestic consumers of the
commodity during the infancy period. ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 19/30 4.2 InfantIndustry for Protection 4.2 InfantIndustry for Protection Qualifications for Protection
1. It is clear that such an argument is more justified
for developing than for industrial nations.
2. It is difficult to identify which industry or potential
industry qualifies for this treatment, and experience has
shown that protection, once given, is difficult to remove.
3. What trade protection can do, an equivalent
production subsidy to the infant industry can do better.
A domestic distortion such as this should be
overcome with a purely domestic policy rather than with
a trade policy that also distorts relative prices and
domestic consumption. A production subsidy is also a
more direct form of aid and is easier to remove than an
import tariff. One practical difficulty is that a subsidy
requires revenues, rather than generating them as an
NHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS
import tariffAdoes. 4.3 Who Gets Protected?
Trade protection benefits producers and
Since producers are few and stand to gain a
great deal from protection, they have a strong
incentive to lobby the government to adopt
On the other hand, since the losses are
diffused among many consumers, each of whom
loses very little from the protection, they are not
likely to effectively organize to resist
protectionist measures. Thus, there is a bias in
favor of protectionism.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 21/30 5 Strategic Trade Policy A nation can create a comparative advantage (thru
temporary trade protection, subsidies, tax benefits, and
cooperative govt-industry programs) in such fields as
semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, and
other industries that are deemed crucial to future growth
in the nation.These high-technology industries are
subject to high risks, require large-scale production to
achieve economies of scale, and give rise to extensive
external economies when successful. Strategic trade
policy suggests that by encouraging such industries, the
nation can reap the large external economies that result
from them and enhance its future growth prospects.
Examples: the steel industry in 1950s and in
semiconductors in 1970s and 1980s in Japan, and in the
development of the Concorde in 1970s and the Airbus
from 1970s in Europe.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 22/30 5.1 Difficulties in Implementing Strategic Trade Policy
First, it is extremely difficult to pick winners and
devise appropriate policies to successfully nurture them.
Second, since most leading nations undertake
strategic trade policies at the same time, their efforts are
largely neutralized, so the potential benefits to each may
Third, when a country does achieve substantial
success with strategic trade policy, this comes at the
expense of others and so other countries are likely to
Faced with all these practical difficulties, even
supporters of strategic trade policy acknowledge that
free trade is still the best policy, after all. That is, free
trade may be sub-optimal in theory, but it is optimal in
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 23/30 5.2 Strategic Trade Policy & Game Theory
Suppose that Boeing and Airbus are both deciding
whether to produce a new aircraft. Suppose also that a
single producer would earn a profit of $100 million. If both
producers produce the aircraft, each loses $10 million.
Airbus Produce Boeing
Don’t Produce Don’t Produce － 10 0
100 － 10
0 ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 24/30 6 The Uruguay Round The aim of the Uruguay Round was to
The establish rules for checking the proliferation
of the new protectionism and reverse its
trend; bring services, agriculture, and foreign
investments into the negotiations; negotiate international rules for the
protection of intellectual property rights; and improve the dispute settlement mechanism
by ensuring more timely decisions and
compliance with GATT rulings. The agreement was signed by the United
States and most other countries on April 15,
1994, and took effectFINANCE & ECONOMICS
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF on July 1, 1995.
25/30 6.1 Major Provisions of the Accord 1. Tariffs.
6. Intellectual property.
8. Other industry provisions.
9. Trade-related investment measures.
10. World Trade Organization.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 26/30 6.2 Gains from the Uruguay Round ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 27/30 6.3 Outstanding Trade Problems 1. Some sectors, such as movies and TV programs, were not
included in the agreement, agricultural subsidies remain high, and
patent protection for pharmaceuticals remains disappointing.
2. Many of the trade problems of developing countries have either
not been addressed or liberalization has been long delayed.
3. The agreement did not make any special provision to help the
formerly centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union establish market economies and integrate them
into the world trading system after the collapse of communism in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
4. It is the tendency for the world to break up into three major
trading blocs: the European Union (EU), the North America Free
Trade Area (NAFTA), and an Asian bloc.
5. It has not dealt with labor and environmental standards, and
these may create major trade problems in the future.
Trade-related competition policies (such as subsidies and
regulations) as well as trade-related investment measures (TRIMs)
have also been inadequately dealt with in the Uruguay Round.
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 28/30 7 Discussion Questions
• What is meant by voluntary export restriction?
• What are the technical, administrative, and
other nontariff barriers to trade? How do they
• What are international cartels? How do their
oerations restict trade? What the conditions
for the success of the cartel?
• What are the different forms of dumping? What
conditions are required to make dumping
• Whay do nations subsidize exports? To what
problems do these subsidies give rise?
ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 29/30 THANK YOU ! ANHUI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 30/30 ...
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This note was uploaded on 01/20/2012 for the course ECON 3564 taught by Professor Daley during the Fall '09 term at Temple.
- Fall '09