MIT24_120s09_lec05 - MIT OpenCourseWare

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Unformatted text preview: MIT OpenCourseWare 24.120 Moral Psychology Spring 2009 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: . 24.120 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY RICHARD HOLTON V Velleman on Intention Intention as Belief Bratman, as we saw, held that belief in ones success is not a requirement on intention. He cited various examples (the fallen tree; the bookstore visit) in support of this. But one problem with his view is that it is not obvious that it can explain how intentions can serve to enable coordination if we do not in general believe that we intend what we do intend; nor is it clear that it can explain why there is a consistency requirement on our intentions. One response to these worries is to hold that intention does entail belief. Vellemans account goes even further: not only does intention entail belief, it actually is belief, though belief of a special kind: self-fulfilling expectations that are motivated by a desire for their fulfillment, and...
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This note was uploaded on 01/25/2012 for the course PHIL 201H1F taught by Professor Derekallen during the Fall '10 term at University of Toronto- Toronto.

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MIT24_120s09_lec05 - MIT OpenCourseWare

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