MIT24_120s09_lec06 - MIT OpenCourseWare http/

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MIT OpenCourseWare 24.120 Moral Psychology Spring 2009 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: .
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24.120 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY RICHARD HOLTON VI Akrasia Socrates’ Position Now surely no one freely goes for bad things or thing he believes to be bad; it’s not, it seems to me, in human nature to be prepared to go for what you think to be bad in preference to what it good ( Protagoras 358c6–d2; see also Meno 77b) (Contrast Plato’s later position, in which the human psyche is understood as partitioned: see, for instance the metaphor of the chariot at Phaedrus 246a6) The argument as presented in the Meno : bad things make one miserable; no one would do that which they believe will make them miserable. Davidson’s Presentation of the Problem P1 If an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do y and he believes himself free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally.
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MIT24_120s09_lec06 - MIT OpenCourseWare http/

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