MIT24_120s09_lec07 - MIT OpenCourseWare http:/

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MIT OpenCourseWare 24.120 Moral Psychology Spring 2009 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: .
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24.120 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY RICHARD HOLTON VII Akrasia & Desire Watson’s criticisms of Davidson Two aspects of desire: being motivated v. judging best Are these both aspects of desire? What makes the second look desire like? Humberstone’s distinctions In a television documentary about a beauty contest, the winner, newly crowned, wipes away the tears and says: I never realized how much I wanted to win. Presumably she was reflecting not on how much effort she had put in—she already knew that—but on how good it made her feel to have won. ‘Wanting, Getting, Having’ Desire is a cluster concept (cf. the notion of a game). A desire can be strong along three independent dimensions of assessment: 1. How strongly does it motivate you to act? 2. How happy would you be if it were satisfied? 3. How disappointed would you be if it were not satisfied? So, according to Humberstone, there can, for instance, be two desires, of which the first is stronger on dimension 1, but the second is stronger on dimension 2. Likewise for dimensions 1 & 3, and for 2 & 3: Get job (p = .5) — very pleased
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This note was uploaded on 01/25/2012 for the course PHIL 201H1F taught by Professor Derekallen during the Fall '10 term at University of Toronto- Toronto.

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MIT24_120s09_lec07 - MIT OpenCourseWare http:/

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