A Military History of the New World Order and the Emergence of the U.S. Hegemony
In this paper, I trace the rise of the United States (U.S.) military power and the different
military strategies the U.S. pursued in this process, outlining in particular the military-economic
aspect of the role that the United States came to play in the New World Order.
In this regard, I
argue that the institutional arrangements made in the 1950s between the U.S. and Western
European countries, which are now being presented as the New World Order, lag behind the
radical economic, demographic and political shifts that have occurred since then.
As a result of
this discrepancy, I contend that the United States increasingly resorts to military force to enforce
these archaic arrangements, which do not correlate with the current state of the world.
claim that a plausible way to prevent further militarization of the world order would be to reform
the international institutional order to better represent current economic, demographic, and
Alfred Mahan’s views regarding the elements of sea power and the advantages of the
U.S. in relation to those elements sheds some light in tracing the rise of U.S. military hegemony.
His argument, which depends on the comparative advantage of sea transport, especially given the
material conditions of the 18
and early 19
centuries, is economic.
According to Mahan, sea
power is by far the most important component of military might, because the most important
trade routes are found in the seas, and the trade volume of the world consists mostly of sea trade,
or at least it did in x century, when Mahan wrote.
People choose to trade overseas as opposed to
over land, because “both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by
Moreover, historical examples, such as the rise of the British Empire, support Mahan’s