tjir6-1_2c - Foreign Aid, Democracy and Political Stability...

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Foreign Aid, Democracy and Political Stability in Post Conflict Societies Marijke Breuning* and John Ishiyama** What is the relationship between development aid and political stability in post conflict societies? Although there has been a considerable amount of literature that empirically investigates the relationship between development aid and corruption (Tavares. 2003; Alessina and Weder, 2002; Knack, 2000; Rimmer, 2000; Svensson 1998; Ijaz, 1996), the quality of governance (Knack 2001) ethnic conflict (Esman and Herring, 2003; Herring, 2001) and post conflict economic growth (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 2002; Hamburg, 2002; Casella and Eichengreen, 1994) no study of which we are aware has examined the direct effects of both the quantity and timing of development aid on promoting political stability in post conflict societies. In this study we examine twenty-six post conflict countries across whose civil wars ended after 1980: Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Chad, Croatia, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia, Tajikistan and Uganda. The dependent variable is measured using Kauffman et al’s (2003) measure of political stability for 1996-2002. The principal independent variables are the amount of aid provided in the periods following the conflict settlement, the timing of aid as well as domestic political factors (such as the extent to which democracy has taken root) and ethnolinguistic homogeneity/heterogeneity. Several scholars have examined the impact of aid on post conflict societies. Many argue that there is good reason to believe that post conflict development aid may help promote political stability. As Hamburg (2001) notes the provision of massive aid will help populations to secure 82
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minimum standards of living and restore key infrastructures. Technical assistance is needed for institutional development, adopt new legislation, enhance the quality of governance, and support civil society and democracy. On the other hand, several scholars suggest that development aid may be deleterious to political stability. As Esman and Herring (2003) note, development aid can exacerbate conflict and instability, particularly in ethnically divided societies. Whether or not aid exacerbates conflict depends heavily on the type of aid provided. Alesina and Weder (2002) contend that development aid may promote "wasteful public corruption" and in turn have a negative impact on economic growth and ultimately political stability. Svennson (1998) contends that large amounts of aid money is counterproductive for good public policies since it promotes a form of rentierism and ultimately corruption. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have conducted some very influential work in which they
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This note was uploaded on 02/01/2012 for the course HIST 494 taught by Professor Haus during the Fall '11 term at Boise State.

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tjir6-1_2c - Foreign Aid, Democracy and Political Stability...

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