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Unformatted text preview: !"# ! "#!$##$%& ()* + ,-&"* + ,./$0* 1 -! ,-/*2.,3 !., % "4#*-, *4",$(5 The lack of an international framework that stipulates specific nuclear security standards poses a significant threat to international security. Ter- rorist organizations like Al Qaeda have expressed their desire to acquire and use nuclear weapons. Such actors could gain access to the necessary fissile material to produce a bomb at military or civilian nuclear sites through- out the world. 1 Significant quantities of nuclear material are stored and processed under varying degrees of security, making them vulnerable to theft. When states choose to implement weak nuclear security standards, whether because of a low threat appraisal or a lack of capacity, this vulner- able nuclear material poses a global threat. Governments around the world are aware of this problem. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540which imposes binding but vague requirements on states to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear material to non-state actorswas widely supported by United Nations (UN) member states. Countries that spoke in favor of the resolution cited the absence of existing international regulations on nuclear security and the urgent need for coordinated ac- tion. 2 However, despite widespread international support, UNSCR 1540 lacks the specific provisions necessary to reassure concerned states that all vulnerable nuclear material is now secure. With this continued vulnerability in mind, President Barack Obama announced during an April 2009 speech in Prague that the United States would lead an international effort to secure all nuclear material around the world within four years. As the country with the largest nuclear stockpile $%&( *+ ,-./0 / ( 12!2 3.(4%(50 -6 570 ,(/50. 8 9%:&; <66(./ =.-3.(> (5 9.8;05-8 ?8@0./5AB/ C--4.-D C&/-8 E;7--& -6 9%:&; (84 F850.8(5-8(& <66(./G D70.0 /70 6-;%/04 -8 F850.8(5-8(& H0&(5-8/+ E70 ;(8 :0 ;-85(;504 (5 I%&(+>-./0J3>(&+;->+ + .#$45 * 00-5 $%&( *+ ,-./0 !"" and the most advanced nuclear security technology, the United States has the resources and expertise to lead this effort. However, fulfilling the Prague promise will require the development of binding international standards on nuclear security, with a core emphasis on adequate physical protection standards for nuclear material. !" $ %&() *&+ % ,(-,!(. Physical protection of nuclear material is a core component of nuclear security. 3 According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a states physical protection system should establish conditions which would minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of nuclear material and/or sabotage and provide information and technical assistance in sup- port of rapid and comprehensive measuresto locate and recover missing nuclear material and to cooperate with safety authorities in minimizing the radiological consequences of sabotage.radiological consequences of sabotage....
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This note was uploaded on 02/01/2012 for the course POLS 494 taught by Professor Garymoncrief during the Fall '11 term at Boise State.
- Fall '11