v17_2006c - Engaging A Nuclear India: Punishment, Reward,...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
27 Engaging A Nuclear India: Punishment, Reward, and the Politics of Non-Proliferation 2 E NGAGING A N UCLEAR I NDIA : P UNISHMENT , R EWARD , AND THE P OLITICS OF N ON -P ROLIFERATION Richard Bruneau This paper addresses India’s claim that it is a “responsible nuclear power” and assesses recent changes in the international response to India’s nuclear status. It f nds that despite India’s outsider status with respect to the Nuclear Non-ProliFeration Treaty (NPT) and various export control regimes, it has maintained a very strong non-proliFeration record. The decisions by the United States and Canada in 2005 to renew nuclear cooperation with India have recognized this, but, in so doing, have potentially undermined the legitimacy oF the NPT. In reality, however, the primary mechanisms For in± uencing states’ decisions to cross the nuclear threshold lie outside the NPT and can be strength- ened through Indian participation. The path set by renewed cooperation with India is an uncertain one, but its pragmatic approach based on compliance behavior is likely a more credible and eFFective Foundation than the illusions oF the NPT. I NTRODUCTION “…As a responsible State with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benef ts and advantages as other such States which have advanced nuclear technology. As a result we expect that the resumption oF India’s nuclear trade and commerce with the U.S. and globally, is an achievable goal, involving the dismantling oF the Richard Bruneau is a Master of Arts candidate at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University ([email protected])
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
28 Richard Bruneau technology denial regimes which have hitherto targeted India. ... India is a responsible nuclear power with an impeccable record on nuclear non-proliferation.” –Dr. Manmohan Singh, Indian Prime Minister, 2005 India is a nuclear power. One could be forgiven for not knowing this, however, when India’s nuclear arsenal (with those of Israel and Pakistan) is the “elephant in the room” that few non-proliferation scholars seem willing to acknowledge. India’s F rst nuclear explosion in 1974 was condemned by such members of the non-proliferation regime as the United States and Canada; they sought, then, to convince it to join the non-proliferation regime as a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS). The prospect of Indian disarmament has become increasingly improbable given India’s second round of nuclear tests in 1998 and its continued refusal to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The international community has in response continued to deny ofF cial recognition of a “nuclear India” in an attempt to ensure the integrity of a non-proliferation regime founded in the NPT (NPT Review Conference 2000, Regehr 2006).
Background image of page 2
Image of page 3
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 02/01/2012 for the course POLS 494 taught by Professor Garymoncrief during the Fall '11 term at Boise State.

Page1 / 20

v17_2006c - Engaging A Nuclear India: Punishment, Reward,...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online