Seeing Baghdad Thinking Saigon

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Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.txt * HTML Full Text Cited References * Times Cited in this Database(1) <javascript:__doPostBack('ctl00$ctl00$MainContentArea$MainContentArea$referencebutto ncontrol$referenceButtonRepeater$ctl01$ReferenceLink','')> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Translate Full Text: Title: Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon. By: Biddle, Stephen, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2006, Vol. 85, Issue 2 Database: Academic Search Premier Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon Contents 1. NOT AGAIN <#AN0019895473-4> 2. A CATEGORY MISTAKE <#AN0019895473-5> 3. KEEP NIXON OUT OF BAGHDAD <#AN0019895473-6> 4. THE BEST PLAN <#AN0019895473-7> 5. BACK ON TRACK <#AN0019895473-8> THE GRAND DELUSION CONTENTIOUS AS the current debate over Iraq is, all sides seem to make the crucial assumption that to succeed there the United States must fight the Vietnam War again--but this time the right way. The Bush administration is relying on an updated playbook from the Nixon administration. Pro-war commentators argue that Washington should switch to a defensive approach to counterinsurgency, which they feel might have worked wonders a generation ago. According to the antiwar movement, the struggle is already over, because, as it did in Vietnam, Washington has lost hearts and minds in Iraq, and so the United States should withdraw. But if the debate in Washington is Vietnam redux, the war in Iraq is not. The current struggle is not a Maoist "people's war" of national liberation; it is a communal civil war with very different dynamics. Although it is being fought at low intensity for now, it could easily escalate if Americans and Iraqis make the wrong choices. Unfortunately, many of the policies dominating the debate are ill adapted to the war being fought. Turning over the responsibility for fighting the insurgents to local forces, in particular, is likely to make matters worse. Such a policy might have made sense in Vietnam, but in Iraq it threatens to exacerbate the communal tensions that underlie the conflict and undermine the power-sharing negotiations needed to end it. Washington must stop shifting the responsibility for the country's security to others and instead threaten to manipulate the Page 4
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Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.txt military balance of power among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds in order to force them to come to a durable compromise. Only once an agreement is reached should Washington consider devolving significant military power and authority to local forces. NOT AGAIN <#toc> AS IT IS in 2006, in 1969 Washington's strategy was built around winning hearts and minds while handing off more and more of the fighting to indigenous forces. From the outset of the Vietnam War, efforts to coax the Vietnamese people away from the communists and into supporting the Washington-backed government in Saigon were a crucial part of U.S. policy. "The task," President Lyndon Johnson said in 1965, "is nothing
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This note was uploaded on 01/31/2012 for the course POLI SCI 790:102 taught by Professor Roylicklider during the Fall '08 term at Rutgers.

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