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2 Defense_Budget_Priorities 2012

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Unformatted text preview:      Wedevelopedadefensestrategythattransitionsourdefenseenterprise froman range of U.S. national rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending  StrategicGuidance,January2012    INTRODUCTION  FromNewStrategicGuidancetoBudgetChoices   was drivenbythe approaching endofa decade of war, a changing technological and geopolitical landscape, and the national security  ­2017were derived from this guidance and conform to the 2011 Budget Control Ac t reduce Defense Department future expenditures by approximately $487 billion over the next decade or $259 billionover the nextfive years. Reflecting these reductions, theDepartment willrequestfundingof$525billionforFY2013,risingto$567billionbyFY2017.   Achievingthesesavingsishard,butmanageable.Itis hard becausewe havetoacceptmany changes and reductions in areas that previously were sacrosanct.  Collectively, the changes align our investments to strategic priorities and budgetary goals, but individually, each one requiresadifficultadjustment.Itismanageablebecausetheresultingjointforce,whilesmaller andleaner, willremain agile,flexible,ready,innovative,andtechnologicallyadvanced. Itwill beaforcethatis: Adaptableandcapableofdeterringaggressionandprovidingastabilizingpresence, especiallyinthehighestpriorityareasandmissionsintheAsia ­Pacificregionandthe MiddleEast,whilestillensuringourabilitytomaintainourdefensecommitmentst o Europeandotheralliesandpartners Ready,rapidlydeployable,andexpeditionarysuchthatitcanprojectpoweron arrival Capableofdefendingthehomelandandprovidingsupporttocivilauthorities Possessingcutting ­edgecapabilitiesthatexploitourtechnological,joint,and networkedadvantage Abletoreconstitutequicklyorgrowcapabilitiesasneeded Aboveall,mannedandledbythehighestqualityprofessionals DefenseBudgetPrioritiesandChoices   1    HistoricalContext  After every major conflict, the U.S. military has experienced significant budget draw downs. ThenewbudgetlevelfortheDefenseDepartmentwill rise fromFY2013toFY2017;however, totalU.S.defensespending, includingbothbasefundingandwarcosts, willdropbyabout22% fromitspeakin2010,afteraccounting forinflation.Bycomparison,the 7 yearsfollowingthe VietnamandColdWarpeakbudgetssawasimilarmagnitudeofdeclineontheorderof20to 25%.  However, there are several significant differences between the circumstances we face today andthepost ­ColdWardrawdown.Onthepositiveside,incontrasttotheendoftheColdWar when the reductions came entirely out of the base defense budget, under the new plan the basebudgetwillroughlymatchorslightlyexceedinflationafterFY2013.Thecuts overall defense spending levels are coming primarily from reduced war ­related requirements and are reflected in lower OCO budget levels.  On the other hand, while the Cold War decline, today the U.S. military is still fighting in Afghanistan, countering violent extremism in other areas, and confrontingavarietyofemergingsecuritychallenges.Moreover,thepost  ­ColdWardrawdown was preceded by a decade ­long defense build ­up that emphasized procurement and modernization, resulting in a smaller but mostly new, relatively unused, and technically superior inventory of U.S. militaryequipment.Bycontrast, notwithstandingthe large budget increases in the base defense budget over the past decade  including funding for weapons developmentandacquisition  westillhavesignificantgapsinmodernizationthatwillneedto befilledincomingyears.  In preparing this budget, we endeavored to avoid the Wewillresistthetemptationto mistakes of previous draw downs that attempted to sacrificereadinessinordertoretain maintain more force structure than the budget could forcestructure,andwillinfactrebuild afford.  Readiness suffered as a result, leading to a readinessinareasthat,bynecessity, werede ­emphasizedoverthepast hollow force, which took years of investment to decade reverse.  Our approach to readiness recognizes that  ­DoDStrategicGuidance,January2012 after a decade of focus on counter ­insurgency operations, the U.S. armed forces must re ­honeother capabilitiesneededforawiderspectrumofmissionsandadversaries.  Protectingreadinessalsorequiresresettingdamagedandwornequipmentafteryearsofwar. Thoughthisbudgetseekstomeetall ofthesecompelling(andcompeting)demands,thisisan areathatwillrequirecontinuedmonitoring. DefenseBudgetPrioritiesandChoices   2     Complete,BalancedPackage Asaresultof athoroughprocessthatwasguidedbythestrategyandthatleftnopartofthe budgetunexamined,wehavedevelopeda well ­rounded,balancedpackage. Thereis no room formodification ifweare topreservetheforceandcapabilities that areneededtoprotectthe countryandfulfillthe missionsoftheDepartmentofDefense.  A change inonearea inevitably requiresoffsettingchangeselsewhere,unbalancingtheoverallpackage . Thispackageincludes reductionsacrossthefollowingthreeareasthatformtheoutlineofthispaper. Moredisciplineduseofdefensedollars Strategicallydrivenshiftsinforcestructureandmodernization TheAllVolunteerForce  MOREDISCIPLINEDUSEOFDEFENSEDOLLARS TheDepartmentmustcontinueto 2013 ­2017,wefirst turnedto where DoD could reduce excess overhead, operations expenses, and personnel meetingthedemandsofthestrategy. costsacrossthedefenseenterprise,andachievebetter  ­DoDStrategicGuidance,January2012 buying power in our acquisition of systems and services.   As careful stewards of the DoD s leaders should take theseactions irrespectiveofbudgetpressures. Clearly,themoresavingsrealizedinthisarea, thelessspendingreductionsrequiredformodernizationprograms,forcestructure,andmilitary compensation.  Thiswasacontinuationoftheeffortbegunin2010 ,which identifiedmorethan$150billion in savings overfiveyears allocated among the three militarydepartments,thedefenseagencies, combatantcommands,andthe This leftless roomforadditional reductions tomeetthenewtargetof$259billionoverFY13 ­17.Nonetheless,wedidfindabout$60billion innewprojectedsavingsoverFY13 ­17.Examplesinclude: Moreskillfulcontractingpracticestoincreasecompetition,reducecosts,and increasebuyingpower Betteruseofinformationtechnology Betteruseofbusinessandenterprisesystems Streamlinedstaff Limitationsonofficialtravel Betterinventorymanagement DefenseBudgetPrioritiesandChoices   3    Reductionsincontractservices Deferralofsomemilitaryconstructiontoalignourfacilitiesmorecloselywiththe sizeandpostureofourfutureforce Reductionsinplannedcivilianpayraises  Beyondtheroughly$60billioninefficienciesandoverhead savings,weeliminated anumberof poorlyperformingprogramsdescribedlaterinthepaper.  The proposed force structure reductions described below also suggest the need for a correspondingreductioninthe  infrastructure.  Wecannotaffordtosustain infrastructurethatisexcesstoourneedsinthisbudgetenvironment.  Therefore,thePresident willrequestthatCongressauthorizeuseoftheBaseRealignmentandClosure(BRAC)process  withagoalofidentifyingefficientsavings thatcanbereinvestedinhigherprioritiesassoonas possible.  APPLICATIONOFSTRATEGICGUIDANCETOFORCESTRUCTURE&INVESTMENT It isnot possible to accommodatea budget reduction ofthemagnitudecalledforbytheBudgetControlAct without scaling down force structure and delaying, decreasing, or in some cases eliminating investments. The strategic guidance was written to guide these reductions ina mannerthat minimizes the risk to our ability to protect U.S. interests in an evolved national securityenvironment.  ablueprintfortheJointForcein2020, providingasetofpreceptsthatwillhelp guidedecisionsregardingthesizeand shapeoftheforceoversubsequent programandbudgetcycles,and highlightingsomeofthestrategicrisks thatmaybeassociatedwiththe proposedstrategy.  ­DoDStrategicGuidance,January2012 expertsassessedthepotentialstrategic,militaryandprogrammaticrisksassociatedwitheach  I. RebalanceforcestructureandinvestmentstowardtheAsia ­PacificandMiddleEast regionswhilesustainingkeyalliancesandpartnershipsinotherregions II. Planandsizeforcestobeabletodefeatamajoradversaryinonetheaterwhile denyingaggressionelsewhereorimposingunacceptablecosts III. Protectkeyinvestmentsinthetechnologicallyadvancedcapabilitiesmostneededfor thefuture,includingcounteringanti ­accessthreats IV. Nolongersizeactiveforcestoconductlargeandprotractedstabilityoperationswhile retainingtheexpertiseofadecadeofwar DefenseBudgetPrioritiesandChoices   4    V. Totheextentpossible,structuremajoradjustmentsinawaythatbestallowsfor theirreversalorforregenerationofcapabilitiesinthefutureifcircumstances change  I.REBALANCETOWARDTHEASIA ­PACIFICANDMIDDLEEASTREGIONS  Asia ­Pacific/MiddleEastEmphasis WhiletheU.S.militarywillcontinue ThefocusontheAsia ­Pacificregionplacesarenewed tocontributetosecurityglobally,we emphasisonairandnavalforceswhilesustaining willofnecessityrebalancetoward groundforcepresence.TheMiddleEasthasbeen theAsia ­ dominatedbygroundforceoperationsoverthelast Stateswillcontinuetoplacea decade;however,aswegraduallytransitionsecurityin premiumonU.S.andalliedmilitary Afghanistanandreestablishpeacetimegroundforce presencein andsupportof  partnernationsinandaround[the presence,thisregionwillalsobecomeincreasingly MiddleEast]. maritime.Thereforewe:  ­DoDStrategicGuidance,January2012 Maintainedthecurrentbomberfleet Maintainedtheaircraftcarrierfleetat11shipsand10airwings Maintainedthebig ­deckamphibiousfleet SustainedArmyandMarineCorpsforcestructureinthePacific,whilemaintaining persistentpresenceintheMiddleEast BudgetedtoforwardstationLittoralCombatShipsinSingaporeandpatrolcraftin Bahrain Fundeddevelopmentofanewafloatforwardstagingbasethatcanbededicatedto supportmissionsinareaswhereground ­basedaccessisnotavailable,suchas counter ­mineoperations  For these forces to remain capable, we had to invest in capabilities required to maintain our access advantages.   Consequently, we increased or protected investment in capabilities that projectpower incontestedareasandstrikequicklyfrom overthehorizon,including: Fundingforthenewbomber DesignchangestoincreasecruisemissilecapacityoffutureVirginia ­classsubmarines Designofaconventionalpromptstrikeoptionfromsubmarines Upgradedradarsfortacticalaircraftandships Improvedair ­to ­airmissiles Newelectronicwarfareandcommunicationscapabilities DefenseBudgetPrioritiesandChoices   5     Toensuresufficientresourcestoprotectthese strategicpriorities,wewill reducethenumber of ships byslowingthepaceofbuildingnew ships andbyacceleratingtheretirementof some existingships.Theseinclude: Retiring7cruisersearly 6didnothaveballisticmissiledefense(BMD)capability, andtheseventhwithBMDcapabilityisinneedofcostlyhullrepairs Slippingalargedeckamphibiousship(LHA)by1year Slipping1newVirginiaclasssubmarineoutsidetheFYDP ReducingLittoralCombatShipsby2shipsintheFYDP ReducingJointHighSpeedVesselsby8intheFYDP Retiring2smalleramphibiousships(LSD)earlyandmovingtheirreplacement outsidetheFYDP  Withrespecttotacticalairforces,weconcludedthatDoDcould,atminimalrisk,disestablishsix AirForcetactical ­airfightersquadrons(outof60)andonetrainingsquadron. Aswereduceair forcestructure,we areprotecting aircraftwithmulti ­rolecapabilitiesversusnichecapabilities. Theresultantforcewillbecapableofhandlingourmostdemandingcontingencyplans including homelanddefense.  Europe&GlobalPartnerships Wewillcontinuetoinvestin ourresponsibilitiesto the MostEuropeancountriesarenow NATO alliance.  We will adjust the posture of land producersofsecurityratherthan forces in Europe in concert with overall Army Europemustalsoevolve. transformation including eliminating two heavy  ­DoDStrategicGuidance,January2012 brigades forward ­stationed there.  DoD will nevertheless maintain NATO Article 5 commitments and ensure interoperability with allied forces by allocating a U.S. ­based brigade to the NATO ResponseForceandbyrotatingU.S. ­basedunitstoEuropefortrainingandexercises. Wewill alsoforwardstationballisticmissiledefenseshipsinRota,Spain.  Acrosstheglobewewillseektobethesecuritypartnerofchoice,pursuingnewpartnerships with a growing number of nations including those in Africa and Latin America.  Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low ­cost, and small ­footprint approaches to achieveour securityobjectives,relyingonexercises,rotationalpresence,andadvisorycapabilities.W ewill preserveourkeypartnershipdevelopmentefforts,including: llianceGroundSurveillance NationalGuardStatePartnershipProgram DefenseBudgetPrioritiesandChoices   6    FiveRegionalCentersforStrategicStudythatproviderelationship  ­building opportunitiestointernationalstudents COCOMExerciseandEngagementprogramthatfundsparticipationinexerciseswith partnernations GlobalSecurityContingencyFundinconjunctionwiththeStateDepartment SecurityForceAssistanceProgram  Additionally, thegradualdrawdownofthepost9/11warswillreleasemoreS pecialOperations Forces(SOF) capacitytopartnerinotherregions. Furthermore,thoughtheArmywilldecrease its current European footprint by two heavy brigades, it will establish and maintain a new rotational presence in Europe and capitalize on existing training opportunities with our allies andpartners. TheArmy will also align Brigade Combat Teams with each regional Combatant Command  establishing language and cultural expertise to better shape the security environment.  II.CONFRONTINGAGGRESSION  Reducedforcestructurewillresultinlesscapacityto Asanationwithimportantinterests conduct operations in multiple regions. Accordingly, inmultipleregions,ourforcesmust becapableofdeterringand the strategic guidance calls for a fresh approach to defeatingaggressionbyan  ­sizing construct that opportunisticadversaryinoneregion had shaped defense planning since the end of the evenwhenourforcesarecommitted Cold War.  If we are engaged in a major combat toalarge ­scaleoperationelsewhere. operation in one theater, we will have the force  ­DoDStrategicGuidance,January2012 necessary to confront an additional aggressor by denying its objectives orimposingunacceptablecosts.  This evolutionnotonlyrecognizesthe changing nature of the conflicts in which the U.S. must prevail, but it also leverages new conceptsofoperationenabledbyadvancesinspace,cyberspace,specialoperations,precision  ­ strike,andothercapabilities.  This strategic precept puts a premium on self ­ and rapidly ­deployable forces that can project power and perform multiple mission types.  This reinforces the need to maintain existing numbers of aircraft carriers, large ­deck amphibious ships, and bombers.  Furthermore, as the MarineCorpswithdrawsfromthegroundinAfghanistan,itwillreturntoanafloat posture,with thecapabilityto rapidlyrespondtocrisesastheyemerge.  Thesechoicesare consistentwith our strategic emphasis on the Asia ­Pacific region and the Middle East, but are applicable anywhereontheglobewhereU.S.nationalsecurityorvitalinterestsarethreatened.  DefenseBudgetPrioritiesandChoices   7    MobilityAi...
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