Hacker and Pierson- Race to the Base

Hacker and Pierson- Race to the Base - THE RACE TO THE BASE...

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Unformatted text preview: THE RACE TO THE BASE When Republican Marge Roukerna of New jersey was swept into Congress on the wave of Ronaid Reagan’s victory in {980, she became one of only nine Republican women in the House of Representatives. In most other ways, however, she was emblematic of the moderate Northeastern “gypsy moths” who formed a decisive voting bloc within the congressional GOP-ma fiscal conservative who was broadly support ive of tax cuts yet favorable toward social programs and generally mod— erate on sociai issues. Ronkema made waves in the late 39805 when she spearheaded efforts to pass a family leave bill, which Congress eventualiy enacted under i’resident Ciinton in 1993. But she was no Democrat in Republican clothing. Roukema backed Reagan’s tax cuts in 19811 sup ported a balanced budget amendment, and defended the death penalty. She also was committed to climbing the internal ladder of the House to power, declaring in 1981 that the committee system was where she wouid make her biggest mark.l When Ronkema retired from Congress in 2:002, there were eighteen Republican women in the House——a modest nventy-year gain. But every— thing else had changed dramatically. Roukema was no longer one of many moderates in the Republican caucus. She was one of only a hand; ful. And far from holding a position of prominence, Roukema had seen the prize committee chair for which she was in line yanked out from under her by Tom Delay, who privately accused her of insufficient {imdraising on behaif of the Repnbiican cause. Dispiritecl by two tough ’E'EO BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES primary challenges from her rightmthe second financed law'sth by the anti~tax Club for Growth—«and facing yet another primary fight without the support of DeLay or his politics} action committee (PAC), Roukema announced her retirement. “That’s the way it’s done these days,” Roukema later said of DeLay’s strongman tactics.2 What she didn’t have to say is that it was not the way it had been done when she entered Congress. Back then, Roukema had said that being in Congress was “everything i had hoped it to be, and more.”3 Twenty~two years later, she left Congress with less power than she started with, spurned by her own party’s ieadership. Marge Roukerna experienced. firsthand the iron-fisted controi of the tough GOP operatives we have called the New Power Brokers. But as Roukeina’s experience shows, the influence of these brokers reflects a much bigger shift in the American political universe—the growing pull of the Republican base. it used to be said, as Reagan-era House Speaker Tip O’Neill put it, that “all politics is local”—that national forces mattered much less than local concerns.4 But the old-style Democrat was speaking at the end of an era. Republican Dick Armey, the uitraconservative House majority leader of the Gingrich years, much better captured con~ temporary reality when be replaced O’Neiil’s maxim with another: “The first rule of politics is: Never offend your base?” The “base” is a party’s most committed and intense supporters: the first iine of support, the leading source of money, the wellspring of ideo- logical purity. Pleasing the base has aiways been part of a politician’s job. Yet in the years that trace the are of Roukema’s increasingly frustrating congressional career, it has become a much more important part, espe— cially On the Republican side of the aisle. In the process, the Republican Party has changed fundamentally. Marge Roukema was hardly the only Northeastern “gypsy rnoth” when she came to Congress, and she often found herself allied with another now~nearwextinct political insect, the “boll weevil”%ceiitrist to conservative Democrats from the South. Like the bug exterminator he once was, Tom DeLay has been on a crusade to kill off these pesky remnants of the ancient regime. Boll weeviis stiil hang on, but they no longer form a large moderate bioc. Instead, conservative Republicans have come to dominate the once safely Democratic South THE RACE TO THE EASE and, with it, the GOP and its leadership. Meanwhile, Republican moderr ates from the Northeast have gradually retired, lost officewor reluctantiy tacked right. Marge Roukema’s unceremonious exit from Congress cap“ tures, in miniature, the more than twenry~year decline of the moderate Wing of her party. These trends have made the GOP a consistentiy and fiercely conservae rive party. Perhaps more important, they have also made it a party that is much more willing and capable of deploying its growing powers to achieve its goals. The base provides energy and intensity, but it is a pow? erfiil force without precise focus. The task of providing that focus has fallen to the New Power Brokers, who have pursued a partisan grand strategy of breathtaking ambition and scope. The relationship between the brokers and the base is symbiotic. On issue after issue, party leaders have responded not to the center of cone gressionai opinion (much less of American opinion) but to the inter ests and demands of their base, aggressively structuring agendas and alternatives to please the hard Right. Yet party leaders have done more than work with the party material they havewthey have sought to tame or weed out politicians deemed {eckiess and to elect or elevate those ' deemed loyal. The base plays a crucial role in this process of recruit ment and discipline. They certify and work for conservative candidates, : they keep conservative issues and ideas in the spotlight, and they threaten the politically wayward with excommunication. And so, elecs tion by eiection, the pull of the base grows and the sway of the center ' declines. This chapter tours the new political landscape over which die Republican base towers, tracing the roots of the ultra—Right’s growing ' sway. It begins at the ground levei, so to speak: the increased inequality _ of resources and organization between the rich, the radical, and the rest. - It then moves up from the ground to examine the intertwined transfor— mations of the Republican Party, exploring how the increasingly conser— "ative (and increasingly Southern) leadership of the G0? has reflected and refracted the growing power of the base in its successfiil quest to eshape the party it heads. The next two chapters Show how, in respond— mg to and cuitivaring this base, the New Power Brokers have audaciously 11‘i 1.12 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES pursued their conservative aims, stearnrollering their opponents and the political center in their headlong race to the base. America Unequal As we will see, the race to the base has been fueled by many forcesw—from the growing role of the parties in campaign finance to the proliferation of districts safe for one party or the other. Yet perhaps the most basic source of the base’s increasing influence is the growing polit— ical leverage of the weli off and well organized. Over the past thirty years, American politics has become more money~centered at. exactly the same time that American society has grovtn more unequalfi The resources and organizational heft of the well off and hyperconservative have exploded. But the organizational resources of middle-income Americans—whom labor unions to massemer‘nbcrship groupsmwhave atrophied. The resulting inequality of resources and organization has not been neutral in its effects. It has greatly benefited the Republican Party while drawing it closer to its most affluent and extreme supporters. “What else is new?” a siteptic might ask. Republicans have always been the party of business and the rich, and Democrats the party of the “little man.” Yet the gap between the “big man” and the “little man” is much greater than it was two decades ago. Between 1979 and 2002, the average after—tar income of the richest 1 percent of Americans more than dou— bled, increasing from around $300,000 (in 2002 dollars) to more than $630,000.7 By contrast, the average income of Americans on the middle of the economic ladder rose by a comparatively modest 15 percent, while the poorest fifth of Americans saw only a 5 percent increases Wealth is even more concentrated at the top, with the weaidiiest'l percent con- trolling nearly two—iifihs of the nation’s household wealthwhigher than at any point in American history since 1929.9 it would be condoning to conclude that this dramatic increase in eco— e United nomic inequality has had no effect on political equality in th States. Yet both common sense and a growing body of evidence suggest otherwise. Let us start with the most basic resourcewnot bills but bai« lots. As is widely known, turnout of the voting—age population in presi— dential elections has declined since the 1960s, a striking fact given that THZE RACE To THEBASE Americans are increasingly well educated and the bestieducated are most likely to vote.* In 2000, for instance, barely more half of the vot- ing-age popuiation cast a ballot. Turnout rose in the ferteptionaliy corn~ bative election of 2004.. Yet despite much celebration of the “highest turnout in history,” the proportion (rather than raw number) of people that went to the poils was essentiaily the satire as in 1992wand lower dian every presidential election between 1948 1972. Less weli known is how skewed voting is by incorine.‘ in 2000, more than 4.0 percent of those in the bottom third of thti income spectrum reported that they did not vote, compared with just percent of those in the top third.‘_O And the gap is probably growingi One recent study found that voter turnout rose by 5 percent among thd richest fifth of the population between 1964. and 2938 yet fell by 14. percent among the poor- est fifthffA perfectly middle-class voter would be richer than half of Americans and poorer than haif. In 2000, a voter in tljie middle of voters’ income distribution was richer than threevfifths of Americans. And turnout is by far the most egunlly distribuied of politicai rem sources. On the other side of the spectrum is moniey, and money has become far more important in American politics thani it was a generation ago. In 1974, the average candidate successfully challenging a sitting member of the House of Representatives spent arourid $100,000 in real terms (that is, adjusted for inflation). In 2002, the avbrage winning chal- lenger spent more than $1.5 million.” Between 1980 and 2000, the aver— age expenditure of Senate campaigns more than dodbled in real dollars and the cost or running for an open Senate seat increiased more than six« fold.13 Indeed, the midterm election of 2002 was by iar the most expen- sive offryear election in history, exceeding the 19398 midterm by an astonishing 50 percent. Whatever other effects political money has, the dramatic rise in the cost of campaigns means that canididates are reaching out to donors much more often and aggressively thain in the past. * The decline is less striking, however, when the rising numbers of U.S. residents ineligible to vote, such as exefeloos, are taken into account. bflll, in Only two presiu dentin} elections since 1972 has the share of those eligible to vbte who goto the polls exceeded 60 percentwa standard exceeded in every postwar presidential election but one up to that point. 113 I14 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES And who they are reaching out to is not ordinary Americans. If the typical voter is slightly richer than average, the typical individual contrib~ utor is vasdy richer. in 2000, an eighth of American households enjoyed annual incomes greater than $100,000. Yet these fortunate households made up 95 percent of those who gave a thousand dollars or more to political campaigns that year.“ According to research by Harvard politi4 cal scientist Andrea Campbell, the parties each directly contacted about a quarter (the Democratic Party) to a third (the Republican Party) of the wealthiest Americans in 2000, up from less than rs percent in the 19505.“ This should come as no surprise. Almost every adult has the vote. Many have at ieast a little time to commit to politics. But scant few have the resources to become big campaign givers. Across all forms of political participationivoting, campaign work, community activism, membership in a political group—contributing is the political activity most marked by economic bias. And it is preciseiy the political activity that today’s costly media-centered campaigns devour. As money has come to dominate, poi— itics has become more like the parable in Matthew 13: “For whosoever hath, to him shali be given, and he shall have more abundance.” A glimpse at the effects of this growing skew can be found in a recent study by Princeton political scientist Larry Barteis. Comparing senators’ voting patterns with the opinions of constituents in their states, Bartels found that senators {and especially Republican senators) appeared most attentive to constituents at the top of the income ladder while ignoring almost entirciy those at or near the bottom. Even moderately well~off voters were much more likely—about three times as likely, in fact—wto see their views on public policy reflected in their senators’ votes than were Americans of more modest means.16 Political inequality of this sort is a cause for concern whichever party it favors. But make no misrake: A system biased in favor of well~off voters is _- also a system biased in favor of the Republican Party. New Tar}: Timer columnist David Brooks and others have had much fun casting the battic between Republicans and Democrats as a clash of civilizations between decadent, highbrow coastal regions and the patriotic, lowbrow heardand.” Yer traditional economic divisions have not been supplanted by a cuiture ‘war between tolerant, latte—sipping progressives and patriOtiC, NASCAR— loving traditionalists. To the contrary: Class is actually an increasingly THE RACE TO THE BASE important dividing line between the parties. Since the 19505, the reiation between income and party aliegiancewuith poor and working-class voters favoring the Democratswhas become stronger, not weaker}E The obvious problem for Democrats is that the appeals that they might use to reach downscale voters are less naturally resonant with the affluent than are the Republicans’ antietax, antigovernment themes. 80 while both parties have felt compelled to mobilize higher-income citizens, the Re publicans have found the goal much more consistent with their aims. For them, the money chase reinforces their core antigovernment message. For Democrats, it blnnts the traditional populist rhetoric of the party (and potentially reinforces negative stereotypes about the party’s penchant for the permissive social liberalism of Brooks’s latte—sipping ieft). The deeper problem for the Democrats, however, is organizational. At the height of the pOSCmNCVV Deal party system of the 1950s and woos, a powcrfiii network of organizations, integrated with a locally rooted Democratic i’arty structure, represented middie~income Americans on pocketbook matters. These organizations have dramatically weakened, leaving many who once depended on them unmoored fi'orn the kinds of intermediate groups that are necessary for true influence. Little surprise, - then, that lowcrwincome Americans are only about a third as likeiy as the affluent to belong to an organization that takes a stand on public issues.19 Consider trade unions, which once represented more than one in three workers in the United States (and, indirectly, those workers’ families). Since the 19703, the proportion of workers that is unionized has plummeted, and today less than a tenth of private—sector workers belong to a union.20 Amid the ongoing debate over whether unions are good for the economy, we ' often forget that they have always been crucial political actors, helping workers identify common issues, informing them about political and policy considerations, and shaping politicai debates. No organization representing working families today has anything remotely like the same reach, influence, or Cohesion as American unions did during their halcyon years. ' The decline of unions stands out as the biggest change in the political representation of lower-income and middlenciass voters. Yet, as political scientist Theda Skocpol has shown, organized labor is certainly not the only “voluntary membership-based association” that has been in a - tailspin. As recently as a few decades ago, so-rcalled fraternal organizationsg 115 116 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES I ' for example, the Elks and Shriners—and other nationespanning voluntary federations provided important forms of civic education and political leverage to large swaths of the population. “For millions of citizens,” Skocpol explains, “federations offered ways to work togetherfito ‘comu bine’ nationally as well as locallym—and thereby had an impact on public opinion and the actions of government.”22 They were also true “cross class” associations, bringing together both the upper and lower rungs of the economic ladder to discuss common issues and pursue shared goals. Since the 19705, however, such large—scale membership organizations have been in steep decline. Meanwhile, the number of business and pro- fessional groups has exploded. Business associations haVe always had a prominent place on the political landscape. But today, they lobby and contribute as never before. And although corporate America faces orga— nized challengers on consumer and environmental issues, it is now almost the only loud voice on most economic and business issues. A report issued by the American Political Science Association in 2004, American Dm-zocmcy m an Age of Rising Inequality, noted that lessradvantaged Americans “are so absent from discussions in Washington that govern- ' ment officials are likely to hear about their concerns, if at all, from more privileged advocates who speak for the disadvantaged. ?oliticians heat 1122 most regularly about the concerns of business and the most affluent. Rising economic inequality, in short, has abetted political inequality, hardened the class divisions between the parties, and bolstered the GOP in particular. For wellwof£ Americans, the political world is increasingly their oyster: They vote in high numbers, contribute with abandon, and happily watch as politicians compete for their favor. For less wellvoff Americans, the political world looks ever more forbidding. Largely neg- lected by the parties, reliant on the media and candidates for basic infor— mation, they have to work ever harder just to have their voices heard. And as the political influence of business and the well off has grown, the political influence of the Republican Party has grown, too. Southern Comfort If Republicans have benefited from the growing clout of their most affluent and ideologically committed supporters, they have also 'n-ns Rhee To THE EASE benefited horn a great geographic shift in the electoral roots of the par» ties. Although the New Deal coalition that ruled Congress with only brief interruptions through the I97OS was popularly identified with the Northern working class, its geographic backbone was the solidly Demo- cratic South. Onemparty rule in the South not only ensured large conv gressional majorities for the Democratic Party; it also placed. Southern Democrats at the pinnacles of congressional power by virtue of a senior" ity system that favored long~serving members of Congress who haled from safe, one—party districts. Today, however, the solid Democratic South is dead and buried, re- placed with a less solid but even more influential Republican South. Ben ti'veen I974- and 2004, the party breakdown of House members from the eleven former states of the confederacy reversedw—from two~thirds Democrat to almost two-thirds Republican.” As everyone who follows politics knows, this massive transformation is the key to understanding the Republican Party’s capture of Congress in the 19905. It is less well recog« nized as one of the chief reasons why American politics has shifted so sig- nificantly to the right. Southern Democrats of yore were certainly conservauve compared with. their Democratic brethren. Yet on every issue but'racc relations, they were usually more liberal than are today’s Southern Republicans. The increasing Republicanism of the South is the most im- mediate cause of the increasing conservatism of the Republican Party. To be sure, while the South was heading into the Republican fold, the rest of the nation was not standing still. In the Northeast—to cite the major countervailing Hendewmoderate Republicans have faced increas— ingly tough sledding. And of ammo, the Democratic Party has also been transformed by the decimation of its conservative Southern wing. Yet the big story is the right turn of the GOP. Sean Theriault of the University of Texas has examined, seat by seat, the ideological shift of Congress over the past thirty yearsEEAnd what he has found offers a - striking window into the Southern—led transformation of the GOP. The single leading Cause of the rightward shift of the Republican Party, Theriault finds, is the replacement of moderate Southern Democrats by conservative Republicans. Indeed, virtually all of the divergence of the parties caused by crossrparty replacement (Democrats replacing Republicans, and vice versa) is accounted for by the replacement of i [-7 118 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES Southern Democrats by Republicans. Moderate Republicans have indeed lost to Democrats in the Northeast, but this has had only a marginai effect on the average position of the two parties. The crosswparty replacement of Democrats by Republicans in the South, moreover, is not the only cause of increased Republican conser~ vatism. Almost as important, Theriault’s research shows, is the repiacee ment of Republicans by Republicans. When Republicans defeat or suc- ceed other Republicans, they are generaliy much more ideologically extreme than their predecessors. This is considerably less true, it turns out, among Democrats. Perhaps the biggest finding, however, is that Republican members of Congress generally head right once in office. Such “adaptation” (as Theriauit cails it) has been a major canse of the increasing ideological extremism of the Republican Party, nearly equaling the repiacement of existing members of Congress in its aggregate effect. Again, the same is not true of the Democratic Party. The bulk of congressional adaptation, notes Theriault, “occurs within Repnbiican Party members” as they match steadily rightward over their careers. in short, Democrats and Republicans have polarized, but at pro— foundly different paces and-for profoundly different reasons. Democrats as a whole have cleariy grown more liberai. But this is almost entireiy because of the loss of their most conservative Southern members. Outside the South, Democrats are roughly as liberal, on average, as they were thirty years ago. The typicai Republican politician, however, is much more fiercely and consistently conservative than the GOP staiwarts of thirty years ago—both in the South and outside it. The Republican Party has been transformed across the board. It has not simply added a new conservative Southern Wing. it has undergone a topvtorbottom makeover that has exerted a strong rightward pull on Republican districts and Republican politicians throughout the country. And if the typical Republican politician is different, the typical Rem publican leader is an entirely new creature. Repubiicans in Congress used to be split down the middle between their moderate wing and their more conservative members. As a result, their leadership was usually drawn from the center and, often, the Northeast and Midwest. Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania and House Minority THE RACE TO THE BASE Leader Gerald. Ford of Michiganm—bland, careful legislators with middle— ofmthe—roati vicwsiwere quintessentiai Republican ieadcrs of the 19705. The current leadership of the House and Senate is, of course, scarcely biand or middleeofvthe-road. it is superconservative and mostly South ern. Texan Tom DeLay is second in command behind Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert. A Midwesterner, Hastert succeeds the. great Southern firebrand of the modern GOP, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich of Georgia. DeLay, for his part, succeeds another Texan, the previously mentioned Dick Armey. I The Senate has been siower to succumb to the Southern juggernaut. But in 1994, Trent Lott of Mississippiwwilo in 2002 gained infamy for his praise of Strotn Thurmond’s 1948 presidential run on the arch segregationist “Dixiecrat” ticket—wtook the number-two GOP position by just one vote from moderate Alan Simpson of Wyoming, the chosen candidate of Republican Chieftain Bob Dole. He then rose to the top spot, before the furor over his comments about Thnrmond derailed his bid to maintain his ieadership post. His successor, however, is an— other Southerner: Bi‘il Fn'st of Tennessee. Frist is backed up by Mitch McConneil of Kentucky. And, of course, there is Texan George W. Bush in the White House. It is nearly a Southern clean sweep. On most maps, the South doesn’t sit atop the nation. But for a decade now, it has sat atop our nation’s political hierarchy. Does this make a real difference? The leadership, after all, can’t lead without the snpport of its followers. Among professionai students of Congress, sharp disputes center on the role of party ieaders. Do they simply do the bidding of party members, or do they pnsh party mem— bers to adopt positions different from those they would have embraced otherwise?” Without delving too far into the debate~which we take up in the next chapterwwe can say that it does matter immensely what party leaders want and do. Little noticed by most Americans, 21 major shift has taken place in Congress over the past two decades. Power is much more centralized, and that centralized power is used much more aggressively. The Southern right—wingers are not simply titular heads of their party; they are increasingly running the show. What is more, it is a profound mistake to assume that party leaders have power only to the extent that they press members of Congress to [15! £20 BROKER CHECKS AND BALANCES depart from their own personal ideologies. Perhaps the most important ways in which the GOP elite shapes what Republican members do have nothing to do with changing members’ minds. They have to do with selecting the issues on which members take a stand (“agenda setting?) and selecting the politicians who are taking the stand (“recruitment”). indeed, perhaps the most important reason why rank-and-file Re» publicans are so much more favorable toward conservative projects is the GOP’s increasing abiiity to recruit and certify politicians before they en— ter office. if today’s Republican leaders rareiy have to twist the arms of the unfaithfill, that’s in crucial part because they have worked so hard to ensure that only the faithful are there in the first place. But, of course, these eiites do not act aione. Their influence rests on the powerful. organizational supports that they can marshal to their causes. The foundations of this Republican base incinde the true grass— rootswthe Christian Right, the small business lobby, the NRA, and other widely federated conservative organizations with strong local ties. Above the grassroots lies the elite interest groups and political action commit tees that do so much of the day-to-day lobbying and filndraising in Washington and the hinterlands. Inside the Beltway, they are flanked by the growing assemblage of conservative think tanks that have become a fixture on the Washington political landscape since the 19705, such as the Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation, and American Enterprise Institute. These organizations and groups do not always see eye to eye, much less speak in perfect unison. But for more than a decade, the New Power Brokers have workedeand, against me backdrop of America’s fragmented constitutional structure, have proved remarkably ablefito tie together this loosely knit network of conservative activists and institu— tions and direct it toward nationally determined and carefuily delimited ends. (For those who want to know more about how they actually do this, we can only urge patience: Much of Chapter 5 is devoted to explain ing the brokers’ snrprising success.) The goal of these complex activities is ultimately simple: to encourv age the right turn of the GOP through eiectoral replacement and idev ological adaptation. But the story of how the base and the brokers have replaced moderates with loyalists, and frightened many of the moderates who remain into submission, is a rich tale filied with tur— THE RACE TO THE BASE moil, tragedy, and triumph. To start the story, we need to head northwto the comfortable New Iersey suburbs where the conservative base and GOP elite waged what seemed a long-odds campaign for Republican purity, and won. Ronkema’s Last Stand If you want to understand the power of today’s right—wing ner~ work, you need go no farther than Marge Roukerna’s old congressional district, the New jersey Fifth. it is an unlikely destination for those inter~ ested in understanding the pull of the Republican base. Stretching from well-off Bergen County into northernmost New Icrsey, it has “the Well— settled look of so many northeastern suburbs, with touches both of afflu— ence and smallstown homincss, crisscrossed at its edges with limited access highways lined with shopping centers?” Although it was one of oniy two New Iersey districts won by George W. Bush in aooo, its con— stituency is scarcely a model of hard—right conservatism, as moderate Roukema’s long tenure suggests. Indeed, many believed Roukerna’s de- parture wouid put the district in the Democratic column, which makes what actnaliy happened ail the more revealing of the base°s sway.” Scott Garrett, the Repubiican who now represents the Fifth District, could not be more different from Marge Roukema. A former trial iawyer, he began his political career in the New Eersey Statehouse in the late 19803 and quickly becameknown as its most conservative legislator. Whereas Roukema was a pragmatic supporter of tax hikes to rein in the deficit, Garrett ioudly proclaimed to have never voted for a tax increase of any kind. (In 2.003 he received the “Hero of the Taxpayer” Award from Americans for Tax Reform. The award is givrzn to members that side with ATR’s anthrax agenda on at least 35 percent of key votes; Garrett voted with the organization 100 percent of the time.) Whereas Roukema was a social moderate who supported abortion rights and gun control, Garrett was a social conservative who opposed both. He was also fierceiy and government in outlook, going so far as to vote against radon testing in daycare centers and minimum hospital stays for women who had just had mastectomies because government sh0uld not regniate private enterprise.28 I 122 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANGE$ It hardly takes a poiitical scientist to spot the differences between Garrett and Roukema. The uprand~coming conservative made them crystal clear by running against the veteran congresswoman not once but twice, savaging her for her social iibcralism and her iessethanvrcligious commitment to taxlcutting. Garrett’s runs Were lavishiy financed by the Club for Growth, another anti-tax organization, which often targets moderate Republicans for defeat. When Rouicemawtwice nearly beaten by Garrett, lacking the support of Tom DeLay and the rest of the Republican leadership, tired of the political grind and, it turned out, sick with cancermmfinaily stepped aside, the Club for Growth was there to heip out Garrett again, spending heaviiy in the Republican primary to tar his two major opponents (one Was “backed by liberai groups like the Sierra Ciub,” according to a siick club ad; the other was “a deyear Trenton insider who voted to raise taxes 23 times”).19 The Nationai Rifle Association pulled out all the stops on Garrett‘s behalf as weil, and per— haps most crucial, so did the Republican Party. Issue ads financed by the Republican National Campaign Committee flooded the airwaves in the final days of the campaign. Perhaps the most devastating suggested that Garrett’s Democratic opponent was antiAAmerican for warning against “jingoistic patriotism” in the wake of 9/11}0 For ail the idiosyncrasies of New Jersey politics, Scott Garrett’s road to a congressionai seat that is now considered safe for the foreseeable future is not unusual. Indeed, occurring in a relatively moderate Republican dis- ' trict, Garrett’s journey understate: the power of the Republican hase in the growing number of districts that are locked up for the party. Tracing the circuitous path by Which a modern ideologue came to replace an old- , styie centrist reveals three great lessons about how the Republican base has come to dominate the selection of GOP foot soldiers in Congresa Primary Colors The first lesson is that primaries matter. Garrett softened up ‘ Roukcma before her retirement with two near misses that forced the sit— ting congresswomen to spend all her campaign funds (thus angering the Republican House leadership, which criticized her for failing to give money to other GOP candidates). Even though Roukerna managed to THE RACE TO THE BASE hold him at bay, his challenges pushed her to the right during her time in office, and they were the key reason for her exit from Congress. Garrett then outfianked two moderate primary opponents (who split the centrist Republican vote) by appealing directly to the most conservative members of his primary constituency in a typically low~turnout primary in which the most ideologically enthused disproportionately came out. What Garrett knew, and his opponents underestimated, is that in pri— maries, the base ruies. Primary contests have become more important than they once were not because they are more commonmthey aren’twbut because more and more congressionai districts are safe for one party or the other. Mark Gersh, the Washington director of the National Committee for an Effective Congress, puts the point bluntly: “No matter how the voters feel, about 90 percent of the districts are now preordained to go to a certain party?“ In 2004., fewer than go House races (out of 4.35) were won by 55 percent of the vote or less, compared with 96 races a decade earlier. The issue is not just that incumbents cannot be beat. Even so called open races, in which no incumbent is on the ballot, have become strikingiy uncompetitive—and they have become most uncompetitive when they favor Republicans. Only four of twenty open seats won by Republicans in 2004. were won with 55 percent or less of the vote, a modern low. And in those races, Democrats were outspent almost fife teen to one, strongiy indicating that they knew they would lose.32 Increasingiy, the greatest electoral challenge facing most congressional officeholders and aspirantswespeciaily Repubiican officeholders and aspirantsm—comes not from the other side of the party aisle but from within their own party. Why are districts becoming so much. safer for the party holding them, particularly on the Republican side? One reason is that the regional bases of the parties have sorted out, as the durable electoral map forged in con flicts over Reconstructioanemocrats in the South, Republicans in the Northmhas finally yielded to contemporary political realities. Another is the development of “majorityminority districts” that allow black and Hispanic voters to elect biack and Hispanic politicians but which, by cramming Democratic voters into majority«minority districts, usually make adjoining districts more Republican.33 But a third crucial reason is 123 124 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCE-Ts explicit partisan gerrymandering, which Republicans haVe aggressively engaged in over the past decade. Partisan gerrymandering has always been a weapon of the parties. But it has become a much more lethal weapon. Due to the hardening of para tisan allegiances, voters’ leanings are more easily predicted than they once were. At the same time, the technology for drawing partisan districts has become vastly more sophisticated. These enabling factors have inter— sected with the growing influence of the GOP in Statehouses and the fed eral capital to produce a series of concerted and mostly successful. attempts by Republicans to redraw districts in their favor.“ The most brazen of these efforts was spearheaded by none other than Tom DeLay in his home state of Texas. Before the election of 2002, Delay created a political action committee, Texans for a Repubiican Maiority (TRMPAC), to promote the election of a Republican state leg-- islarnre. ('EIUK/iPAC has since become embroiled in scandal, with three of its top fundraisers under indictment for illegally fianneling corpo- rate funds to Republican candidates.) Once Republicans won the state~ house, it became clear that the PAC’s name referred not just to state Republicans but to the congressional GOP as well. Urged on by DeLay and Kari Rove (who frequently conferred with Texas’s GOP lieutenant governor), Texas Republicans managed to squeeze through a controvern sial, off—year redistricting plan. The new district map was a Republican fantasy come to life. As long as the Republicans captured at least 4.5.9 percent of the statewide vote, they held the Statehouse and won a major~ ity of congressional districts. If they carried 51.9 percent of the statewide vote, they would win nearly 70 percent of Statehouse seats, and twenty- two of thirty—two congressional districts.g5 Not surprisingly, Republicans cleaned up in 2004.: Four congressionai Democrats, ail placed in new dis- tricts, Were defeated for reelection while every Republican incumbent and almost every Republican opcn~seat candidate won handily. These four seats, plus two others picked up in the state, turned out to be a boon to the congressional GOP. Without them, Republicans would actually have lost seats in Congress. With them, they strengthened their conser— vative majority. Partisan gerrymandering has become an increasingly useful way of protecting incumbents and encouraging ideological conformity in the THE RACE TO THE BASE House. And although Democrats have shown little reluctance to engage in the practice when they have had the power to do so, they have not had the power to do so often. As noted in Chapter I, the effects are displayed in the contemporary congressional map. In the razor~close eiection of 2000, Bush narrowly lost the popular vote to Al Gore. In the process, he ' carried 227 of the nation’s 435 congressional districtsflwell more than a majority. But the 227 total is nothing when compared to what Republicans soon engineered. The 2002 district map would have given Bush 237 districts with the same vote he received in zooo. The 2004. map would have given him 239 districts, or almost 55 percent?6 As it was, Bush actually won 255 congressional districts in the election of 20o4—almost 59 percent, compared with his popular vote share of less than 52 percent of the two-parry (Democratic—Republican) Vote.” Nationwide, huge numbers of reliable Democrats are squeezed into a handful of districts (what gerrymandering specialists cail “packing”), while Republican leaning districts are more likely to feature small (but comfortable) GOP majorities... In the lead-up to the eiection of 2004., the political scientist Michael P. McDonald estimated that Bemocrats would need to pickup a stunning 57 percent of the congressiOnal vote to control Congress.38 The story is different in the Senate. Here, because state boundaries are fixed, gerrymandering is not an option, perennial tongue—inrcheelc pro— posals for dividing California into multiple states notwitl’istanding.39 Nor do incumbents in the Senate enjoy the same overwhelming advantages as incumbents in the House do. But Senate ciections still feature many of the same distortions that plague House ones. To begin with, Senate elections are closely following the House trajeca tory in one crucial respect: They are becoming less competitive, making primariesmand the party base—more important. Though still more con— tested than House races, the reeiection rate of Senate incumbents has risen substantially-affront an average of 72 percent in the 19705 to over 90 _ percent in the 19905. in 2004., only one incumbent, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota, went down to defeat.‘*0 Furthermore, because senatorial aspirants need to raise such large sums of money, the party base is crucial for candidates without independent wealth. In Senate elections, money flows freely from outside state lines, emanating from top ideological and interestAgroup supporters and the [as 126 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES parties themselves. Consider Tom Daschle’s victorious opponent, con- servative Republican John Thune. His top two contributors were Senator Majority Leader Bill Frist’s “Volunteer PAC,” which gave over $132,000; and the anti~tax watchdog group, the Club for Growth, which gave over $13r,ooo. (In 2004., Volunteer PAC raised more than $4.3 million to filfld Republican candidates.)"'I In short, congressional seats are increasingly safe for one party or the other more often, the Repubiican Parry. No longer do the parties truly compete to capture the broad battieground of American politics; Instead, skirmishes are fought over small stretches of stiil—contested territory, which the winning side immediately tries to take out of contention for the future. This development has had many effects. But the most obvious impact is to make the processes that precede general elections more importantfinot just the selection and recruitment of candidates but also the all~important primary stage in which parties select their standardwbearers. The impact of primary-centered elections is felt in ways bigr and small, visible and hidden. The biggest impact is ideological extremism. When candidates Worry less about reaching out to swing voters in the general election and more about pleasing mobilized partisan voters in low— turnout primaries, they have a very ciear directive: please the base. The political scientist Barry Burden estimates that a credible primary chal~ lenge pulls a typical congressional candidate ten points toward the ideo— logical poles on a scale of zero to one hundredfL2 The greater. the threat posed by primaries, the greater the pull of the poles, and the more incen— tive candidates have to tack toward the extremes. Indeed, they may end up winning only because they move sharply from the center. For this reason, it is a mistake to dismiss the threat of wed-financed primary chailenges simply by noting that incumbents rarely iose to primary oppo- nents. Even when serious primary challenges faii, their targets are usuaily driven closer to the base. Indeed, even when a primary challenge does not materialize, the fact that one might occur can effectiveiy puil candidates toward their base. Like a tax audit, a primary challenge is a rare but potentiaily devastating event that conditions behavior even when it doesn’t take place. The effect ofprimaries, therefore, can be almost invisible. Yet that does not make the effect any less real. The crucial issue is where candidates see the greatest THE RACE TO THE BASE electoral threat arising: in their own party or outside it. The moderate Republicans who looked over their shonlders when considering Clinton’s impeachment knew what Congressman Jim Leach told Warbingmn P05: columnist E. I. Dionne, It, in 2004.: “Because congressional districts are increasingly drawn to guarantee victory for one party or the other, incum» hents worry mostly about primary chalienges h‘om ideological hard liners.“3 When the greatest risk comes from within the party, the call of the swing voter is drowned out by the cries of the base. Base Brawl This brings us to the second lesson. of Scott Garrett’s seemingly improbable §onrncy to Victory: Activist groups within the GOP now play a distinctively important role in certifying conservative candidates and bringing out voters on Election Day. Garrett is a darling of con- servative advocacy groups. Endorsed by the National Rifle Association, he received an “A” grade for his prokgnn voting record (the Coalition to Stop Gen Vioience gave him a score of zero). The conservative Christian organizations the Christian Coalition and Family Research Council each gave him scores of 100 percent (Planned Parenthood gave him a Score of zem).M While Garrett’s more moderate opponents in the New Iersey primary warred with each over for the allegiance of cen- trist Republicans, many of whom stayed home on primary day, Garrett swept past them with the support of iocal conservatives, who tinned out enthusiasticaliy. Democrats have long been viewed as the party of singlerissue organ} zations demanding fealty to particular causes: environmentalism, the right to choose, civil rights, support for organized labor. Yet as the grass roots on the Left has wilted, the grassroots on the Right has flourished. And as the conservative grassroots has grown, its role in Repubiican pol- itics has dramatically expanded. The Christian Coalition, the Nationai Rifle Association, the National Federation of Independent Business, and other widespread, localiy rooted organizations that back Republican cane didates do not just say which candidates deserve the label “conservative.” They are also unrivaled organizers of get—ot':t~the—vote campaigns and iocal political drives. Woody Allen’s quip that 90 percent of success in hfe 127 128 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES .is showing up rings true in the low—turnout world of American elections. The activist base of the GOP shows up. The Christian Right is a case in point. Momentarily noticed by the punditocracy after the Republican sweep in 1994, its main organization“— the Christian Coalitionehas since lost ground. Denied tax—exempt status, the group’s dcihacions have plummeted. its membership, which is often claimed to be as large as two million, is probably less than half that. Antidiscrimination lawsuits have recently plagued the organization. And yet, a study conducted in 2002. by the nonpartisan magazine Campaign; and Elections concluded that, if anything, Christian conservatives are now monger politically than they were in 1994..“ In 1994, for example, Campaigns and Elections classified (based on hundreds of interviews with politicos) eighteen state Republican Party organizations as strongiy under the control of Christian conservatives and thirteen as moderately so—for a total of thirty-one state Republican Parties significantly shaped by the Christian Right. By 2002, the first number (that is, strong states) had not changed, but the second (that is, moderate states) had doubledvfor forty-four state parties in the Chris— tian conservative fold. Christian groups looked weaker in part because they were stronger; insinuated deeply into party organizations, they no longer needed to mobilize as often or as Widely as they once had. As Campaigns and Election: concluded, “The influence of Christian conser~ vatives Within the GOP has made them less visible, distinctive and independent, but it has also made them a critical component of the Republican coalition?“ The story of the Christian Right is the story of many conservative activist groups. The strength of today’s conservative activists is based in part on local roots—win their ability to influence internal party organiza— tion and low—turnout elections at the state and local levels. Yet, increas- ingly, the power ofconservative activists is nationally oriented, avowedly focused on putting conservative Republicans into federal office, and, indeed, explicitly coordinated by Republican leaders. initially, many con- servative-groups entered the political fray quietly and almost exclusively at the local level, organizing in churches to shape school boards and local party organizations. Ralph Reed, the baby—faced executive directOr of the Christian Coalition, once said that the “first strategy, and in many ways THE RACE: TO THE BA$E the most important strategy, for evangelicals is st~3crecy.”“‘7 Conservative groups were reluctant to flex their muscles nationally for a number of tea— sons—not least their distrust of government and politics. But as conser— vative groups have become more deeply integrated into the national GOP, that reluctance has all but vanished. As conservative activism has shifted toward national politics, it has also fOCused increasingly on the recruitment and certification of aspirants to elected office and the monitoring and punishment of politicians once they are elected. Ideological “box scores” are a revealing indicator of the trend. A few decades ago, only a handful of prominent conservative groups (notably, the American Conservative Union, or ACU) assembled ideological issue scores based on members of Congress’s recorded votes on hot-button topics. Today, the ACU’s scores compete with those of such conservative watchdogs as the. Nations} Tax Limitation Committee, Americans for Tax Reform, the National Taxpayers Union, Citizens against Government Waste, the Republican Liberty Caucus, the Chris“ tian Coaiition, the Eagle Forum, the Campaign for Working Fam— _ iiies, the Famiiy Research Council, and the subtly named Center for Reclaiming America. These groups range in size and clout. But even the smallest can often exert considerable power when it can credibly claim to be the arbiter of whether a candidate or elected official is a true believer in a central conservative cause. ' Perhaps no two groups better illustrate the rise of recruitment and cer» tification on the right than the two anti—taut organizations we met in Part I: Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform and Stephen Moore’s Club for Growth (CfG). Each, it bears emphasis, is a recent creation. ATR began as a Reagan White House operation headed by Norquist in the midsgfios. Pounded with backing from conservative think tanks, media figures, and financial interests, the Club for Growth started only in Igogfian astonishing fact, given its current significance. These two groups share three key characteristics that increasingly define the organizational base ofthe GOP: they are radical; they focus on guiding and disciplining Republicans in Congress, not mobilizing large numbers of citizens; and they are effective. Norquist, whom we have already met, is about as pure an example of a conservative ideologuc as one could imagine. Meanwhile, Moore (who gave way to Pat Toomey 123 €30 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES after Toomey’s narrow primary loss in 2004. to moderate Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania) is an ardent devotee of supplyeside economics and a libertarian. Before founding CfG, he trained on the policy circuit of the hard Right, working at the Heritage Foundation, on Republican Dick Armey’s staff, and at the ultraconservative Cato Institute. As their founding stories attest, both ATR and CK? are elite rather than mass operations. They have small memberships, and they have been heavily reliant on large donations (including, in ATR’s case, sizable con tributions from the Republican Party). The “mass” element of_these influential organizations, such as it'is, largely consists of electioneering, rather than grassroots mobilization. But that electioneering can be pow- erful. During the midterm elections of 2002, as noted in Chapter 2, the CfG doled out $10 million in contributions, maddng it the leading source of campaign funds for Republicans outside the GOP itself."8 In 2004., the club’s even more aggressive spending included a staggering $3.3 million contribution to a single primer r campaign, in which it backed Toomey in his unsuccessful primary challenge from the right against Arlen Specter in Pennsylvam'afl"9 Each of these organizations, finally, has developed strategies that are well tailored to the new world of congressional elections. In particular, each has focused its energies on ensuring that turnover within the Republican Party will promote increasing conservatism. For ATR, a cen~ tral tool has been the introduction of tax pledges, in which elected offi~ cials and candidates for office pledge to “oppose any and all efforts to increase the marginal income tax rates for individuals and / or busi— messes?”O Some incumbents initially resisted these pledges. But the logic of contemporary Republican primaries is clear: Signing the ATR’s antir tax contract has become a necessary component of most Republican runs for Congress (and in many places, state office as well), Incumbents wish— ing to shore up their position have also generally signed; it not, their suc- cessors do. By the end of 2003, AIR had signed pledges from 216 House members (just two short ofa majority), 4.2 senators, and President Bush. Like ATR, the Club for Growth has focused its energies on increasing the ranlts of committed conservatives in Congress. Its preferred tech- nique is candidate recruitment for Open seats, combined with efforts to challenge moderate Republican incumbents. The CfG’s actual record is THE RACE TO THE BASE more mixed than Moore’s bragging about moderate Republicans “wet— ting their pants” (which we cited Chapter 2} suggests. While the club has had success in getting its candidates elected to open seats, it has never won a primary challenge, though it has come close several times. Still, as far as conservatives are concerned, its efforts have had salutary effects. They set moderates on notice, reinforce conservative economic. dogma, and can provide a launching pad for later campaigns—such as the suc~ cessful bid of Scott Garrett, a Club for Growth darling. Party Favors The third lesson of Garrett’s win in New Jersey is that in the elec» total arena, parties matter in a way they did not in the recent past. One big reason is money, or more precisely, the need for candidates to raise huge sums of it. Garrett won not because he personally outspcnt his gen- eral election opponent—in fact, he was outpaced in the general election after focusing his spending on the primMy-mbut because the Republican Party pulled out all the stops on his behalf. And if money is the measure, the parties are pulling out the stops as they neVer have before. In 2000, ' the two major parties raised more than $400 million (in 2004 dollars) to fund campaigns and voter outreach efforts. In 2004., the figure was almost $I.6 trillion, and the rise shows little signs of slowing. The parties are fast becoming the one indispensable source of campaign funds and advertising. In 2000, for example, six challengers managed to defeat sit— ting incumbents in the House. in nearly every one of these races, accord- ing to the political scientists Michael Malbin and Anne Bedlington, funds provided by the parties or by members of Congress working on behalf of the parties were instrumental to the incumbents’ defeat." To be sure, parties are not the onlyueor even the l-argestm—source of funds in congressional races. FAQs and individual donors have stepped up their giving at the same time that the parties have. But neither is wholly independent from the parties or partisan causes. Most PACs and big donors lean heavily toward one party or the otherwand with the Republican congressional ascendance in the mid—19905, they now lean much more often to the Republicans than the Democrats?2 The largest source of campaign fundswbetween 70 and So percent—is groups and 1 3'1 132 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCEs individuals affiliated with the corporate sector, which generally favors Republican candidates. (T he labor movement, in contrast, heavily favors Democrats but accounts for less than 10 percent of Campaign funds.) When Democrats controlled Congress, business-oriented interest groups gave grudgingly to the party of FER to preserve their access to the halls of power. But over the past decade, with this impediment removed, cork porate money has headed toward its natural home, bolstering the Re- publican Party’s fundraising advantage. Campaign finance reform was, of course, designed to reduce the huge flows of unreguiatcd contributions (so—called soft money) into the par— ties’ coffers, and it certainly has eliminated one big loophole that allowed large contributors to give tothe parties. But, as the record fundraising totals of 2004. suggest, the role ofbig-ticket partisan contributors and the parties remains massive. What is more, many ofthe dollars that were once raised in soft money have shifted into nominally “independent” organi— zations closely affiliated with one party or the other, effectively circumm venting the soft-money ban contained in the recent campaign reforms while strengthening the pull of deep~pocketed, singlevissue groups like the Club for Growth. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the power of the party in the electorai arena is the seemingly strange practice of intercandidate giv— ingwin which members of Congress are contributors as well as cam— paigners. In the early 19705, the party leadership in Congress ran small campaigmfinance operations. But members of Congress jealously boarded their own funds, establishing huge “war chests” designed to deter potential challengers. In 1978, a bit more than $1 million (in 2000 dollars) was spent by members of Congress and their PACs to help elect other candidates. In 2000, the figure Was over $20 million. And although both parties now play the intercandidate game, Republicans play it much better. in 2000, Republican members of Congress and their PACs con— tributed 50 percent more to fellow candidates than did Democrats. Among the top twenty givers to other campaigns in 2004., ad} but four Were Repubiicans. The most influential type of intercandidate giving comes not from run— ofrthe»mill partisans but from the members of Congress with the most at stake in controlling or capturing a congressional majority, namely, party THE RACE TO THE EASE leaders. House Majorin Leader Tom DeLay—despite being under the cloud of thirtyrtwo Texas indictments centered on the possible illegal use of corporate fiinds by his PACwspent nearly $1 million to fund other candidates in the 2004 election, barely outpacing House Speaker Dennis Hasrerr. Between 1990 and 2002, spending by party leadership PACS on both sides of the aisle increased nearly 600 percent: from a little more than $3.5 million (in .2002 dollars) to more than $24. million. Of that total, more than $14 millionmor about no percentwwas spent to elect Republican candidates?3 And not just any Republican candidates. DeLay, as one unflattering recent biography notes, has indeed “spent millions to elect Republicans to the House. But he has also worked (and spent his PAC money) to eliminate Republicans Who refuse to get in harness when he needs them?” (One such Republican Was Marge Roukema: Scott Garrett was the happy recipient of DeLay’s support and funds.) The GOP leadership has mo goals, not always in complete harrnonyficlecting a maiority, and electing a conservative majority. In pursuit of the former, it has some times sided with moderates wh0se defeat risked the loss of a seat. But when, as is increasingiy the case in a world of safe seats, the GOP leader~ ship can demand consistency with conservative principles without creat- ing a serious threat of general election defeat, it has proved willing not iust to campaign on conservatives” behalf but to put its money where its mouth is. Brave New World For the moderate Republicans of days gone bywmen and women like Marge Roukemawthe growing influence of the base is an unweicorne development. But for the new breed of conservative Re~ publican legislators like Scott Garrett, it is the key to their astonishing aseent in American poiitics. The transformation of the Republican Party from a motley collection of gorslow conservatives and traditional antistaa Lists into a formidable juggernaut of committed rightoving true believers has been gradual—punctuated by bursts of energy and activity, but driven forward by persistent, slogging progress through election after election. But it is a change that has upended American politics, making :33 134 BROKEN CHECKS AND BALANCES the call of the base within the GOP louder and more irresistibie than ever before. I Beneath this change, we have seen, iie tectonic shifts in the American political landscape, fueled by the huge and growing inequality of resources and influence in the United States. But the overarching force that has turned these deep shifts into enhanced power for the Right is the transformed identity of the Republican Party. Slowly but seemingly inex- orably, the GOP has built a powerful foundation of support in the South and among conservative groups. It has augmented the grassroots.mobi- lization of its most committed supporters with a massive partyeoriented fundraising machine and energetic conservative policy network. And it—m and its affiliated groups—have greatly stepped up their monitoring and enforcement of politicians deemed less than faithfui to the party cause. Taken separately, these shifts may seem small. Cumulatively, they have been profound. In a decentralized politica} system where efforts at coor— dination seem perpetually prone to failure, the GOP has managed to make the Republican hase the one thing that all Repuhiicans have to worry about. To be sure, there are still Republicans who refuse to race to the base. But they are getting scarcer. With most Repubiican-occupied seats safely in the hands of the GOP, the pressures posed by the Right weigh heav- ily on the minds of even the most moderate of Republicans. More impor— tant, oldestyle moderates cannot hang on forever. They have their own funds, their own state and iocal organizations, their own constituent- politician relationships. But when they move aside or go down to defeat, the field is open for someone else within the party to step in. That some— one, as we have seen, will almost always be farther to the right and more partisan than the politician replaced. Like a giacier Whose slow movement belies the violence with which it can rip through its surroundings, the gradual transformation of the Repubiiean Party has fundamentally altered the terrain of American po§~ itics. The creatures that now dominate this transformed iandscape also helped create it: the New Power Brokers of the Republican Party. It is to these brokers and their coordinated efforts to transform American governance that we now turn. And because the increasin y cof na'te "e ‘6" a - .. elites are SO Brokersmmen T De colorful ties. 9: worlds brins ’ They broker, MM PUBLICAN MACHlNE ir than ever, American poiitics is being driven from the top. central to of« _ _ top: the Brokers in American politics. The New Power ay, r n ' ' - - , in—rem We”?"NW-“W'P‘w'rw%wwamm " 15 not pin a story at out iii't’é‘F”§‘sti" ‘ " ' ' _a_ _ chow power is exercised are ultimately grounded inanekeiealwnisnmti‘onseandfproee ~ ‘5 12:1“ growing new: the New Power Brokers reflects the transformed Amercan polit- ic "a e ‘eiast'chapter ' . particniar, the grow ing power of the conservative GO? in flmmwamm-tfimtww" Wfiepubhcan Party. Tb W aan - C New Fower Brokers 4 u"'e« ._.- ._.I most Americ econd they are owerf arily because they hol pOsitions a “if , «but/because of their stratEg t the top of 'iflgfianizedienns Esta ve rework mum. first: woricis of politic1ans and actmsts. Each of these my} __ _ a , WW...» . ,. , “stamina on brrs do precisiiiy'what theirfiame impliesi r b1otnnfiéfinaeem. . ' and men ch iiiiihgii a.» . . 1' . i "stress ...
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Hacker and Pierson- Race to the Base - THE RACE TO THE BASE...

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