Bagwell and Staiger (2002)- Multilateral Trade Negotiations

Bagwell and Staiger (2002)- Multilateral Trade Negotiations...

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Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO By: Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2002) Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2002. “Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO”. Journal of International Economics. 63: 1- 29. Abstract: Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a first-line of defense against bilateral opportunism. 1.
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This note was uploaded on 02/03/2012 for the course POLS 5308 taught by Professor Biglaiser during the Spring '11 term at Texas Tech.

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Bagwell and Staiger (2002)- Multilateral Trade Negotiations...

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