stone sweet and brunell

stone sweet and brunell - From the SelectedWorks of Alec...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
From the SelectedWorks of Alec Stone Sweet October 2010 How the European Union's Legal System Works - and Does Not Work: Response to Carruba, Gabel, and Hankla Contact Author Start Your Own SelectedWorks Notify Me of New Work Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alec_stone_sweet/36
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
How the Legal System of the European Union Works - and Does Not Work: Response to Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla Alec Stone Sweet * and Thomas Brunell ** Abstract : In a recent paper published by the APSR , Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla claim that the decision-making of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been constrained – systematically – by the threat of override on the part of Member State Governments, acting collectively, and the threat of non-compliance on the part of any single State. They further purport to have found strong evidence in favor of Intergovernmentalist, but not Neofunctionalist, integration theory. In this paper, we reject CGH’s claims on the basis of our analysis of the same data. We show that the threat of override is not credible, and that the legal system is activated, rather than paralyzed, by non-compliance. Moreover, in a head to head showdown between the Commission (and Neofunctionalism) and the Member State Governments (and Intergovernmentalism), the Commission wins in a landslide. The data appear to provide support for the view that the ECJ engages in “majoritarian activism.” CGH most robust finding is that when Member States urge the Court to censor a defendant Member State for non-compliance, the ECJ tends to do so. In such cases, the Member States work to reinforce the Court’s authority, not to “constrain” it. In “Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice,” Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla [hereinafter CGH] (2008) make three provocative claims. First, CGH claim (436) to have developed a new methodology that solves the inference problems afflicting all prior research. Their approach involves evaluating the influence of amici briefs, filed by Member State Governments [MSGs] and the EU Commission, on the rulings of the European Court of Justice [ECJ]. Second, having analyzed the Court’s holdings on some 3,176 legal questions over an 11-year period (January 1987-December 1997), the authors declare that the ECJ has been constrained by the threat of override on the part of MSGs, acting collectively, and by the threat of non-compliance on the part of any single MSG. They summarize their findings as follows (449): “Our analysis provides systematic evidence that judges at the ECJ are sensitive to these two constraints. Moreover, these threats have a substantively large effect on judicial rulings.” Third, CGH revive a classic debate in scholarship on European integration, * Leitner Professor of Law, Politics, and International Studies, Yale Law School and Yale Department of Political Science. **
Background image of page 2
Image of page 3
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Page1 / 37

stone sweet and brunell - From the SelectedWorks of Alec...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online