Econ 337 #6 - No Child Left Behind Read the article from...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–15. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: No Child Left Behind Read the article from Time, 01/23/2012 Share with your group what you found from the articles you collected. Specific impacts to your State? What is the States next move? Report Fiscal federalism: If we have a choice between centralization and decentralization The decentralization theorem For a local public good without economies of scale in production , it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the Pareto- efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions. Two economic arguments I. A two-person- two-commodity world Two individuals: A and B Two goods: X and Y X is a private good Y is either a private good or a public good (example: safety protection) Private: decentralized production Public: centralized production Case one: Y is a private good. MRSA=MRSB=MRT B1 A1 Case two: Y is a public good (A and B consume the good jointly) YA = YB (YA +YB =Y) MRSA+MRSB=2MRT B1 A1 (Without cost savings) It is always preferable to provide PE levels of consumption for subsets of a group than for the group as a whole. In other words, It is never in the interest of A and B to constrain themselves to consume Y jointly unless there are some cost-savings to be realized from collective consumption. When such cost-savings do exist, this implies that by consuming Y jointly, A and B can realize higher levels of consumption of Y without sacrificing any consumption of X. B1 A1 II. Barzels arguments It generates a cardinal measure of welfare gains from decentralization. In order to maximize the welfare of its constituency, the government of a jurisdiction must minimize the welfare loss due to variations in demand. Q $ P Qi Q P b a Q i i i + = Let P =MC/n =- = - = -- = n 1 i 2 i i 2 i i i i i i Q Q b 2 1 W Q Q b 2 1 Q Q b 1 Q Q 2 1 W ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( Suppose the slope of the demand curve over the relevant range is the same for all individuals....
View Full Document

This note was uploaded on 02/06/2012 for the course ECON 337 taught by Professor Jannetcheng during the Winter '12 term at Northwestern.

Page1 / 42

Econ 337 #6 - No Child Left Behind Read the article from...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 15. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online