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Unformatted text preview: Problem Set 5. Ben Polak Econ 159a/MGT522a Three questions due October 24, 2007 (N.B. This is after the midterm.) 1. Evolutionary Stability and Weak Domination (Osborne). Suppose that the pure strategy s & is evolutionarily stable. Is it possible that there is some other pure strategy that weakly dominates s & ? Is it possible that there is some other pure strategy that is not weakly dominated by s & ? Brie&y explain your answer. 2. Evolutionary Stability and Pareto Ranked Equilibria (adapted from Osborne). Con sider the following symmetric twoplayer game. Each player can ‘demand’ an amount 1, 2 or 3. If both players demand the same amount then they each get that amount. If they demand di¡erent amounts then the player who demands less gets the amount demanded by the player who demanded more, and the player who demands more gets 1/4 of her demand. That is, u 1 ( s 1 ; s 2 ) = 8 < : s 2 if s 1 < s 2 s 1 if s 1 = s 2 s 1 4 if s 1 > s 2 ....
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This note was uploaded on 02/13/2012 for the course ECON 159 taught by Professor Benjaminpolak during the Fall '08 term at Yale.
 Fall '08
 BENJAMINPOLAK
 Game Theory

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