BBK Passages 09-10-28 b

BBK Passages 09-10-28 b - Brandom "Being and Being Known"...

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Brandom “Being and Being Known” (1960) Passages 1. I shall be defending the thesis that knowledge involves an isomorphism of the knower with the known at both the sensuous and intellectual levels … [209] 2. Now whereas the Cartesians postulated a domain of contents to mediate between the intellect and the real order, the extreme realists of the early decades of the present century expanded the real order to include all the items which had puzzled previous philosophers into the theory of contents. [210] 3. But my concern is not to elaborate the characteristic doctrines of this new extreme realism, but simply to emphasize that like the Cartesians it interpreted the difference between intellectual acts as extrinsic, a matter of having different relata. [211] 4. But what is the alternative? In general terms it is to hold that acts of the intellect differ intrinsically qua acts in a way which systematically corresponds to what they are about, i.e. their subject-matter. [211] 5. I shall be concerned to contrast two of these forms, one of them the Thomistic doctrine (to the extent that I understand it), the other a view which has its roots in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and which I am prepared to defend. [211] 6. But first some general considerations are in place, considerations common to all theories of the mental word. ( a ) We must distinguish between mental words, mental statements, mental questions, etc. ( b ) We must distinguish between varieties of mental word: names, predicates, logical words, abstract singular terms, etc. ( c ) But above all we must distinguish between mental words as acts and mental words as dispositions or propensities . This last distinction corresponds to that drawn by Thomists between the intellect in second act and the intellect in first act. The intellect is in first act with respect to a certain mental word, e.g. man , when it has this word in its ‘vocabulary’, i.e. is able and disposed to think in terms of it. When the intellect is in second act with respect to the word man , it is by virtue of actually thinking of something as a man. If the intellect is in first act with respect to this word, we shall say that it has the concept man . [211] ftnt: I shall form the names or mental words by putting the corresponding English expressions within dot-quotes. [BB: This might be his very first use of dot-quotes—and not evidently the same use he has by the 1963 AE ] 7. The three basic questions which any theory of the mental word must answer are: (1) What is a mental word? (2) How do we come by them? i.e. how do we acquire our mental vocabulary? (3 ) How are mental words related to the real order? [212] 72ffc88e4d4b1b9b48e4322731300683fb998f88 1 2/15/12
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Brandom 8. It will be useful at this point to extend to mental words the familiar distinction drawn by C. S. Peirce between word tokens and word types . In this terminology each particular act of the intellect which is informed by the nature triangular
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This note was uploaded on 02/15/2012 for the course PHIL 2245 taught by Professor Staff during the Fall '11 term at Pittsburgh.

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BBK Passages 09-10-28 b - Brandom "Being and Being Known"...

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