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LaTaC notes 09-9-12 e

LaTaC notes 09-9-12 e - Brandom Language as Thought and as...

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Unformatted text preview: Brandom Language as Thought and as Communication—Passages 1. The position which I shall ultimately delineate and defend…can…be characterized as an attempt to give a naturalistic interpretation of the intentionality of conceptual acts. [Intro—57] 2. The early sections (I-IV) stress the essentially rule-governed character of linguistic behavior…. The second, and larger part of the paper (Sections Vff.) is devoted to exploring the sense (or senses) in which language can be said to ‘express’ thought. [Intro—57] 3. [A] rule is roughly a general ‘ought’ statement. [I-58] 4. Hypothetical oughts have the form “if one wants X, one ought to do Y.” They transpose a relation of implication between a state of affairs X and a doing of Y into an implication appropriate to practical reasoning. [I-58] 5. [G]eneral categorical oughts…of the form If one is in C, one ought to do A. Notice that although this proposition is conditional in form, it is not, in the Kantian sense, a hypothetical ought; and it is as contrasted with the latter that, even though it is conditional, it is called categorical. [I-58] 6. By application and the use of modus ponens one can derive conclusions of the form S ought to do A which not only are not hypothetical oughts, but are categorical (non-iffy) statements. Notice, by contrast, that from “If one wants X, one ought to do A,” together with “S wants X” it is not correct to infer “S ought to do A.” [I-58,9] [BB: But “If one wants to do S” is itself of the form “If one is in C,” from which WS says one can detach. So what is the point here?] 7. It follows that the ‘subjects’ to which these rules apply must have the concepts of doing A and being in C. [I-59] 8. The distinction between ought-to-do’s (rules of action) and ought-to be’s (rules of criticism)…[II-60] 9. [O]ught-to-be’s imply ought-to-do’s. [II-60] 10. [C]onsider ought-to-be’s pertaining to the training of animals. These rats ought-to-be in state φ , whenever C. The conformity of the rats in question to this rule does not require that they have a concept of C, though it does require that they be able to respond differentially to cues emanating from C. Since the term ‘recognitional capacity’ is one of those accordion ba051366d3256b675230f59baa076136b64e876c.doc1 2/15/2012 Brandom words which can be used now in one sense now in another, it is a menace to sound philosophy. [II-60] 11. It is the same items (people) who are the agent-subjects of the ought-to-do and the subject-matter subjects of the ought-to-be. [II-61] 12. It is obvious…that if all rules of language, were ought-to-do’s we would be precluded from explaining what it is to have concepts in terms of rules of language....
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LaTaC notes 09-9-12 e - Brandom Language as Thought and as...

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