Naming and Saying notes 09-9-26 f

Naming and Saying notes 09-9-26 f - Brandom Notes on...

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Brandom Notes on “Naming and Saying” (1962) 1. “The essay adopts the Tractarian view that configurations of objects are expressed by configurations of names.” [103] Me: But there are lots of facts that are in no sensible sense “configurations of objects.” What sort of “configurations” are involved in all the monadic properties of one object—its shape, color, mass…? Sellars asks this at [110]: “[C]ould there be a configuration of one object? “The Tractatus appreciates that logical compounds are also not to be understood as “configurations of objects” (only elementary, atomic facts are). And it is obliged to dismiss modal and normative claims, propositional attitudes, and to give an unbelievable account of probabilistic claims. WS’s strategy seems to be to treat all nonatomic claims as metalinguistic. He is a metalinguistic expressivist about claims that are not just configurations of objects. In this essay he addresses the monadic properties I asked about to begin with. 2. “Two alternatives are considered: The objects in atomic facts are (1) without exception particulars ; (2) one or more particulars plus a universal (Gustav Bergmann). On (1) a mode of configuration is always an empirical relation: on (2) it is the logical nexus of ‘exemplification’. It is argued that (1) is both Wittgenstein’s view in the Tractatus and correct. It is also argued that exemplification is a ‘quasi-semantical’ relation, and that it (and universals) are “in the world” only in that broad sense in which the ‘world’ includes linguistic norms and roles viewed (thus in translating) from the standpoint of a fellow participant.” [103] 3. The crucial passage, of course, is 3.1432, “We must not say: ‘The complex sign “aRb” says “a stands in the relation R to b”’; but we must say, ‘ That “a” stands in a certain relation to “b” says that aRb.’” [104] 4. “But the crucial point that Wittgenstein is making emerges when we ask ‘What are the parts of the statement in question the relation of which to one another is essential to its character as statement?’” [104] 5. “What Wittgenstein tells us is that while superfcially regarded the statement is a concatenation of the three parts ‘a’, ‘R’ and ‘b’, viewed more profoundly it is a two-termed fact, with ‘R’ coming in to the statement as bringing it about that the expressions ‘a’ and ‘b’ are dyadically related in a certain way, i.e. as bringing it about that the expressions ‘a’ and ‘b’ are related as having an ‘R’ between them.” [104] 6. “Indeed, he is telling us that it is philosophically clarifying to recognize that instead of expressing the proposition that a is next to b by writing ‘is next to’ between ‘a’ and ‘b’, we could write ‘a’ in some relation to ‘b’ using only these signs. In a perspicuous language this is what we would do. Suppose that the Jumblies have such a language. It contains no relation
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This note was uploaded on 02/15/2012 for the course PHIL 2245 taught by Professor Staff during the Fall '11 term at Pittsburgh.

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Naming and Saying notes 09-9-26 f - Brandom Notes on...

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