Harvey 2005_A Brief History of Neoliberalism-1

Harvey 2005_A Brief History of Neoliberalism-1 - A Brief...

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Unformatted text preview: A Brief History of Neoliberalism David Harvey “10.05 OXFORD- UNIVERSITY PRESS Introduction to proclaim the emergence of a new kind of ‘information society’). These technologies have compressed the rising density of market transactions in both space and time. They have produCed a particur larly intensive burst of what I have elsewhere called ‘time—space compression’. The greater the geographical range (hencethe . emphasis on ‘globalization’) and the shorter the term of market contracts the better. This latter preference parallels Lyotard’s famous description of the postmodern condition as one where ‘the temporary contract’ supplants ‘permanent institutions in the pro— fessional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family and international domains, as well as in political affairs’.‘ The cultural consequences of the dominance of such a market ethic are legion, as I earlier showed in The Condition afPastmodemity.3 - While many general accounts of global transformations and their effects are now available, what is generally missing—and this is the gap this book aims to fill—is the political—economic story of where neoliberalization came from and how it proliferated so com— 7 prehensively on the world stage. Critical engagement 'with that story suggests, furthermore, a framework for identifying‘and con— structing alternative political and economic arrangements. I have benefited in recent times from conversations'with Gerard Duménil, Sam Gindin, and Leo Panitch. I have more long— standing debts to Masao Miyoshi, Giovanni Arrighi, Patrick Bond, Cindi Katz, Neil Smith, Bertell Ollman, Maria Kaika, and Erik Swyngedouw. A conference on neoliberalisrn sponsorcd'by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Berlin in November 2001 first sparked my interest in this topic. I thank the Provost at the CUNY Graduate Center, Bill Kelly, and my colleagues and students prir marin but not exclusively in the Anthropology Program for their ' interest and support. I absolve everyone, of course, from any responsibility for the results. gagg-iumeWMammy-maway-naewmyxaye-{wWJWm-w-WMMMWMV -.- l Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . For any way of thought'to become dominant, a conceptual appar— atus has to be advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts to our values and our desires, as well as to the possibilities inherenf 1n the social world we inhabit. If successful, this conceptual appar» atus becomes so embedded in common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question. The founding figures of neolib— eral thought took political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as ‘the central values of civilization’. In so domg they chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and seductive ideals. These values, they held, were threatened not only by fasc1sm, dictatorships, and communism, but by all forms of state intervention that substituted collective judgements for those of individuals free to choose. Concepts of dignity and individual freedom are powerful and appealing in their own right. Such ideals empowered the dissident - movements in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union before the end of the Cold-War as well as the students in Tiananmen Square. The student movements that swept the world in 1968~—from Paris and Chicago to Bangkok and Mexico Citymwere in part animated by the quest for greater freedoms of speech and of personal choice. More generally, these ideals appeal to anyone who values the ability to make decisions for themselves. The idea of freedom, long embedded in the US tradition has played a conspicuous role in the US in recent years. ‘9/11’, was 1mmediately interpreted by many as an attack on it. ‘A peaceful world of growing freedom’, wrote President Bush on the first anniversary .of that awful day, ‘serves American long—term inter— ests, reflects enduring American ideals and unites America’s allies.’ ‘Humanity’, he concluded, ‘holds in its hands the opportunity to 5 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . offer freedom’s triumph over all its age—oldqfoes’, and ‘the IJnited States welcomes its responsibilities to lead in this great missmn . This language was incorporated into‘the US lfational Defenfie Strategy document issued shortly thereafter. ' Freedolmlflis1 t e Almighty’s gift to every man and woman in this world , eblater said, adding that ‘as the greatest power on earth we have an o iga— tion to help the spread of freedom’.1 ‘ I I When all of the other reasons for engaging in a pre—emptive war against Iraq were proven wanting, the president appealed to the idea that the freedom conferred on, Iraq was in and of itself an adequate justification for the war. The Iraqis were free, and that was all that really mattered. But what sort of freedom is envis— aged here, since, as the cultural critic Matthew Arnold long ago thoughtfully observed, ‘freedom is a very good horse to ride, but to ride somewhere’.2 To what destination, then, are the Iraqi people expected to ride the horse of freedom donated to them by force of arms? I . ' The Bush administration’s answer to this question was spelled out on 19 September 2003, when Paul Bremer, head of the Coali— tion Provisional Authority, promulgated four orders that included ‘the full privatization of public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits . . . the opening of Iraq’s banks to foreign control, national ' treatment for foreign companies and . . . the elimination of nearly all trade barriers’.3 The orders were to apply to all areas of the economy, including public services, the media, manufacturing, ‘ services, transportation, finance, and construction. Only oil was exempt (presumably because of its special status as. revenue pro— ducer to pay for the war and its geopolitical Significance). The labour market, on the other hand, was to be strictly regiilated. Strikes were effectively forbidden in key sectors and the-right to unionize restricted. A highly regressive ‘flat tax’ (an ambitious tas— reform plan long advocated for implementation by conservatives in the US) was also imposed. I ‘ These orders were, some argued, in Violation of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, since an occupying power is mandated tq guard the assets of an occupied country andnot sell them off. Some Iraqis resisted the imposition of what the London Economist 6 n ’P-w-wr‘q—EP-‘wn"M‘WW‘N‘P‘IN Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . called a ‘capitalist dream’ regime upon Iraq. A member of the US— appointed Coalition Provisional Authority forcefully criticized the imposition of ‘free market fundamentalism’, calling it ‘a flawed logic that ignores history’.5 Though Bremer’s rules may have been illegal when imposed by an occupying power, they would become legal if confirmed by a ‘sovereign’ government. The interim gov— ernment, appointed by the US, that took over at the end of June 2004 was declared ‘sovereign’. But it only had the power to con— firm existing laws. Before the handover, Bremer multiplied the number of laws to specify free—market and free—trade rules in minute detail (on detailed matters such as copyright laws and intellectual property rights), expressing the hope that these institutional arrangements would ‘take on a life and momentum of their own’ such that they would prove very difficult to reverse.6 According to neoliberal theory, the sorts of measures that Bremer outlined were both necessary and sufficient for the ore ation of Wealth and therefore for the improved well—being of the population at large. The assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal thinking, and it has long dominated the US stance towards the rest of the world.7 What the US evidently sought to impose by main force on Iraq-was .a state apparatus whose fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions for profit— able capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital, I call this kind of 'state apparatus a modifiers] state. The freedoms it embodies reflect the interests of private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial cap— ital. Bremer invited the Iraqis, in short, to ride their horse of freedom straight into the neoIiberal corral. The first experiment with ncoliberal state formation, it is worth recalling, occurred in Chile after Pinochet’s coup on the ‘little September llth" of 1973 (almost thirty years to the day before Bremer’s announcement of the regime to be installed in Iraq). The coup, against the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende, was promoted by domestic business elites threatened by Allende’s drive towards socialism. It was backed by US corporations, the CIA, and US Secretary of State Henry Kiss— inger. It violently repressed all the social movements and political 7 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . organizations of the left and dismantled all forms of popular organization (such as the community health centres in poorer neighbourhoods). The labour market was ‘freed’ from regulatory or institutional restraints (trade union power, for example). But how was the stalled economy to be revived? The policies of import substitution (fostering national industries by subsidies or tariff protections) that had dominatedLatin American attempts at eco— nomic development had fallen into disrepute, particularly in Chile, where they had never worked that well. With the whole world in economic recession, a new approach was called for. ' A group of-economists known as ‘the Chicago boys’ because of their attachment to the neoliberal theories of Milton Friedman, then teaching at the University of Chicago, was summoned to help reconstruct the Chilean economy. The story of how they were chosen is an interesting one. The US had funded training of Chil— ean economists at the University of Chicago since the 19505 as part of a Cold War programme to counteract left»wing tendencies in Latin America. Chicago—trained economists came to dominate at the private Catholic University in Santiago. During the early 19705, business elites organized their opposition to Allende through a group called ‘the Monday Club’ and developed a work— ing relationship with these economists, funding their work through research institutes. After General Gustavo Leigh, Pino— chet’s rival for power and a Keynesian, was sidelined in 1975, Pino— chet brought these economists into the government, where their first job was to negotiate loans with the International Monetary Fund. Working alongside the IMF, they restructured the economy according to their theories. They reversed the nationalizations and privatized public assets, opened up natural resources (fisheries, timber, etc.) to private and unregulated exploitation (in many cases riding roughshod over the claims of indigenous inhabitants), pri— vatized social security, and facilitated foreign direct investment and freer trade. The right of foreign companies to repatriate profits from their Chilean operations was guaranteed. Export-led growth was favoured over import substitution. The only sector reserved for the state was the key resource of copper (rather like oil in Iraq). This proved crucial to the budgetary viability of the state. since copper revenues flowed exclusively into its coffers. The immediate 8 l i s ,. t i l Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . revival of the Chilean economy in terms of growth rates, capital accumulation, and high rates of return on foreign investments was short—lived. It all went sour in the Latin American debt crisis of 19.82. The result was a much more pragmatic and less ideologically driven application of neoliberal policies in the years that followed. All of this, including the pragmatism, provided helpful evidence to support the subsequent turn to neoliberalism in both Britain (under Thatcher) and the US (under Reagan) in the 1980s. Not for the first time, a brutal experiment carried out in the periphery became a model for the formulation of policies in the centre (much as experimentation with the flat tax in Iraq has been proposed under Bremer’s decrees).3 - I i The fact that two such obviously similar restructurings of the state apparatus occurred at ‘such different times in quite different parts of the world under the coercive influence of the United States suggests that the grim reach of US imperial power might lie behind the rapid proliferation of neoliberal state forms throughout the World from the mid—19705 onwards. While this has undoubta edly occurred over the last thirty years, it by no means constitutes the whole story, as the domestic component of the neoliberal ‘turn in Chile shows. It was not the US, furthermore, that forced Maru garet Thatcher to take the pioneering nEoIiberal path she took in 1979. Nor was it the US that forced China in 1978 to set out on a path of liberalization. The partial moves towards neoliberalization in India in the l980sand Sweden in the early 19905 cannot easily be attributed to the imperial reach of US power. The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism on the world stage has evidently been a very complex process entailing multiple determinations and not a little chaos and confusion. Why then did the neoliberal turn occur, and what were the forces that made ii 50 hegemonic within global capitalism? Why the Neoliberal Turn? The restructuring of state forms and of international relations after the Second World War was designed to prevent a return to. ' the catastrophic conditions that .had so threatened the capitalist order in the great slump of the 19305. It was also supposed to 9 Freedom’sjust Another Word . . . prevent the ire—emergence of inter—state geopolitical rivalries that had led to the war. To ensure domestic peace and tranquillity, some sort of class compromise between capital and labour had to be constructed. The thinking at the time is perhaps best represented by an influential text by two eminent social scientists, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, published in 1953. Both capitalism and communism in their raw forms had failed, they argued. ‘The only way ahead was to construct the right blend of state, market, and democratic institutions to guarantee peace, inclusion, well—being, and stability.9 Internationally, a new world order was constructed through the Bretton Woods agreements, and various institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Bank of International Settlements in Basle, were set up to help stabilize international relations. Free trade in goods was encour— aged under a system of fixed exchange rates anchored by the US dollar’s convertibility into gold at a fixed price. Fixed exchange rates were incompatible with free flows of capital that had to be - controlled, but the US had to allow the free flow of the dollar beyond its borders if the dollar was to function as the global reserve currency. This system existed under the umbrella protecw tion of US military power. Only the Soviet Union and the Cold War placed limits on its global reach. A variety of social democratic, Christian democratic and dirigiste states emerged in Europe after the Second World War. The US itself turned towards a liberal democratic state form, and japan, under the close supervision of the US, built a nominally demo— cratic but in practice highly bureaucratic state apparatus empowered to oversee the reconstruction of that country. What all of these various state forms had in common was an acceptance that the state should focus on full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of or, if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to. achieve these ends. Fiscal and monetary policies usually dubbed ‘Keynesian’ were widely _ deployed to dampen business cycles and to ensure reasonably full employment. A ‘class compromise’ between capital and labour was generally advocated as the key guarantor of domestic peace and tranquillity. States actively intervened in'industrial policy and , 10 ,l ‘ .1» “ma... '. wa.mszvy..m»vueww W. a... WMMWW . Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . moved to set standards for the social wage by constructing a variety of- we‘lfare systems (health care, education, and the like). This form of political—economic organization is now usually referred to as ‘embedded- liberalism’ to signal how market pro- cesses and . entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and political constraints and a regu— latory environment that sometimes restrained but in other instances led the way in economic and industrial strategy.10 State»- led planning and in some instances state ownership of key sectors (coal, steel, automobiles) were not uncommon (for example in Britain, France, and Italy). The neoliberal project is to disembed capital from these constraints. Embedded liberalism delivered high rates of economic growth in the advanced capitalist countriesduring the 1950s and 19605.“ In part this depended on the largesse of the US in being prepared to run deficits with the rest of the world and to absorb any excess product within its borders. This system conferred benefits such as expanding export markets (most obviously for Japan but also unevenly across South America and to some other countries ‘of South—East Asia), but. attempts to export ‘development’ to much of the reSt of the world largely stalled. For much of the Third World, particularly Africa, embedded liberalism remained a pipe dream. The subsequent drive towards neoliberalization after 1980 entailed little material change in their impoverished condition. In the advanced capitalist conntries, redistributivc politics (including some degree of political integration of working—class trade union power and support for collective bargaining), controls over the free mobility of capital (some degree of financial repression through capital controls in particular), expanded public expenditures and welfare state—building, active state interventions in the economy, and some degree of planning of development went hand in hand with relatively high rates of growth. The business cycle was successfully controlled through the application of Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies. A social and moral economy (some~ times supported by a strong sense of national identity) was fostered through the activities of an interventionist state. The state in effect became a force field that internalized class relations. Working—class institutions such as labour unions and political ll. Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . parties of the left had a very real influence within the state apparatus. . ‘ - By the end of the 19605 embedded liberalism began. to break down, both internationally and within domestic econom1es..Signs of a serious crisis of capital accumulation were everywhere appar— ent. Unemployment and inflation were both surging everywhere, ushering in a global phase of ‘stagflation’ that lasted throughout much of the 1970s Fiscal crises of various states (Britain, for example, had to be bailed out by the IMF in 1975—6) resulted. as tax revenues plunged and social expenditures soared. KeyneSJan policies were no longer working. Even before the Arab—Israeh War and the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates backed by gold reserves had fallen into disu array. The porosity of state boundaries withrespect to capital flows put stress on the system of fixed exchange rates. US dollars had flooded the world and escaped US controls by being deposited in European banks. Fixed exchange rates were therefore abandoned in 1971. Gold could no longer function as the metallic base of international money; exchange rates were allowed to float, and attempts to control the float were soon abandoned. The embedded liberalism that had delivered high rates of growth to at least the advanced capitalist countries after 1945 was clearly exhausted and was no longer working. Some alternative was called for if the crisis was to be overcome. One answer was to deepen state control and regulation of the economy through corporatist strategiesiincluding, if necessary, curbing the aspirations of labour and popular movements through austerity measures, incomes policies, and even wage and price controls). This answer was advanced by socialist and communist parties in Europe, with hopes pinned on innovative experiments in governance in places such as communist—controlled ‘Red Bologna’ in Italy, on the revolutionary transformation of Portugal in the wake of the collapse of fascism, on the turn towards a more open market socialism and ideas of ‘Eurocommunism’, particularly in Italy (under the leadership of Berlinguer) and in Spain (underithe influence of Carrillo), or on the expansion of the strong social democratic welfare state tradition in Scandinavia. The left assembled considerable popular power behind such programmes, coming close to power in 12 ‘1 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . Italy and actually acquiring state power iii-Portugal, France, Spain, and Britain, while retaining power in Seandinavia. Even in the United States, a Congress controlled by the Democratic Party legis— lated a huge wave of regulatory reform in the early 19705 (signed into law by Richard Nixon, a Republican president, who in the process even went so far as toremark that ‘we are all Keynesians now’), governing everything from environmental protection to occu— ‘ pational safety and health, civil rights, and consumer protection.12 But the left failed to go much beyond traditional social democratic and corporatist solutions and these had by the mid—19705 proven inconsistent with the requirements of capital accumulation. The effect was to polarize debate between those ranged behind social democracy and central planning on the one hand (who, when in power, .as in the case of the British Labour Party, often ended up trying to curb, usually for pragmatic reasons, the aspirations of their own constituencies), and the interests of all those concerned with liberating corporate and business power and remestablishing market freedoms on‘the other. By the mid—19703, the interests of the latter group came to the fore. But how were the conditions for the resumption of active capital accumulation to be restored? How and why neoliberalism emerged victorious as the single answer to this question is the crux of the problem we have to solve. In retrospect it may seem as if the answerwas both inevitable and obvious, but at the time, I think it is fair to say, no one really knew or understood with any-certainty what kind of answer would work and how. The capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization as the answer through a series of gyrations and chaotic experim ments that really only converged as a new orthodoxy with the articulation of what became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 19905. By then, both Clinton and Blair could easily have reversed Nixon’s earlier statement and simply said ‘We are all neoliberals now.’ The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism, its frequently partial and lop—sided application from one state and social formation to another, testifies to the tentativeness of neoliberal solutions and the complex ways in which political forces, historical traditions, and existing institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the process of neoliberalization actually occurred. 13 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . There is, however, one element within this transition that deserves specific attention. The crisis of capital accumulation in the 19705 affected everyone through the combination cf rrsmg unemployment and accelerating inflation (Figure 1.1). Discontent 12 _L O 00 .b. Unemployment rate (%} G) 14 _|. N) .4. 0 Inflation rate {%) 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 Figure 1.1 The economic crisis of the 19705: inflation and unemploy— ment in the US and Europe, 1960—1987 Source: Harvey, The Condition of Postmoderm'ty. l4 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . was widespread and the conjoining of labour and urban social movements throughout much of the advanced capitalist world appeared to point towards the emergence of a socialist alternative to the social compromise between capital and labour that had grounded capital accumulation so successfully in the post—war period. Communist and socialist parties were gaining ground, if not taking power, across much of Europe and even in the United States popular forces were agitating for widespread reforms and state interventions. There was, in this, a_ clear political threat. to economic elites and ruling classes everywhere, both in the advanced capitalist countries (such as Italy, France, Spain, and. Portugal) and in many developing countries (such as Chile, Mex— ico, and Argentina). In Sweden, for example, what was known as the Rehn—iMeidner plan literally offered to gradually buy out the owners’ share in their own businesses and turn the country into a worker/share—owner democracy. But, beyond this, the economic threat to the position of rulingclites and classes was now becoming palpable. One condition of the post—war settlement in almost all countries Was that the economic power of the upper classes be restrained and that labour be accorded a much larger share of the economic pie. In the US, for example, the share of the national income taken by the top 1‘ per cent of income earners fell from a pro—war high of 16 per cent to less than 8 per cent by the end of the Second World War, and stayed close to that level for nearly three decades. While growth was strong this restraint seemed not to matter. To have a stable share of an increasing pie is one thing. But when growth collapsed in the 19705, when real interest rates went negative and paltry dividends and profits were the norm, then upper classes everywhere felt threatened. In the US the control of wealth (as opposed to income) by the top 1 per cent of the popula— tion had remained fairly stable throughout the twentieth century. But in the 1970s it plunged precipitously (Figure 1.2) as asset values (stocks, property, savings) collapsed. The upperclasses had to move decisively if they were to protect themselves from political and economic annihilation. The coup in Ghile and the military takeover in Argentina, pro— moted internally by the upper classes with US support, provided one kind of solution. The subsequent Chilean experiment with 15 Freedom’s Just'Another Word . . . 50 '1 45 40 35 -l 30 25 1 20+ 15h 10 1925 1935 1945 1955 1955 1975 1985 1995 Figure 1.2 The wealth crash of the 19705: share of assets held by the top 1% of the US population, 1922—1998 S curve: Duménil and Levy, Capital Rem—gent. neoliberalism demonstrated that. the benefits of revived capital accumulation were highlylskewed under forced privatization. The country and its ruling elites, along with foreign investors, did extremely well in the early stages. Redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in fact been such a persistent feature of neoliberalization as to be regarded as structural to the whole project. Gerard Duménil and Dominique Levy, after careful reconstruction of the data, have concluded that neoliberalization was from the very beginning a project to achieve the restoration of class power. After the implementation of neoliberal policies in the late 1970s, the share of national income of the top 1 per cent of income earners in the US soared, to reach 15 per cent (very close to its pro—Second World War share) by the end of the century. The top 0.1 per cent of income earners in the US increased their share of the national income from 2 per cent in 1978 to over 6 per cent by 1999, while the ratio of the median compensation of workers to the salaries of CEOs increased from just over 30 to 1 in 1970 to nearly 500 to l by 2000 (Figures 1.3 and 1.4). Almost certainly, with the Bush administration’s tax reforms now taking effect, the concen— tration of income and wealth in the upper echelons of society is i - é - Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . Share (9/0) g. = f . . , : ' aeeeeeeeoeoeoee ’\ ’\ No \a .59 \qu 429’ .99 ,9 .9" ,9?” ,3?” ,9“) ,3? (8‘ .59 .53“ g; (be; a ,3 ,9 ,3? K Figure 1.3 The restoration of class power: share in national income of the top 0.1% of the population, US, Britain, and France, 19134998 Source: Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy, American Demarmcy m an Age afRis‘ing Inequality. continuing apace because the estate tax (a tax on wealth) is being phased out and taxation on income from investments and capital gains is being diminished, while taxation on wages and saiaries is maintained.13 7. The US is not-alone in this: the top 1 per cent of income earners in Britain have doubled their share of the national income from 6.5 per cent to 13 per cent since 1982. And when we look further afield we see extraordinary concentrations of wealth and power emerging all over the place. A small and powerful oligarchy arose in Russia after. neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ had been administered there in the 19905. Extraordinary surges in income inequalities and wealth have occurred in China as it has adopted free—market—oriented practices. The wave of privatization in Mexico after 1992 catapulted a few individuals (such as Carlos Slim) almost overnight into Fortune’s list of the world’s wealthiest people. Globally, ‘the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS have registered some of the largest increases ever . . . in social inequality. OECD countries also ‘17 Freedom’s just Another Word . . . ,v' "v . . __.—_.. 1975 1985 1995 aces — Total pay rank 10 Total pay rank 50 — — Total pay rank 100 - - — Total pay average 100 . I I The first three curves show the rise of the pay of CEOs according to thelrtrank the hierarchy of remunerations: 10th, 50th, and 100th. The other our\.rem;tio-nS corresponds to the average pay of the 100 CEOs wrth hlgher remune . Note that 1,000 means 1,000 times the average salary. 1985 1995 2005 ‘— To .0002% (top 404 in 2000) W" Tog .00005% (top 101 in 2000) Figure 1.4 The concentration of wealth and earning power in the US: CEO remuneration in relation to average US salaries, 1970— 2003, and wealth shares of the richest families, 1982—2002 S ounce: Duménil and Levy, ‘Neoliberal Income Trends’. 18 Freedom’s Just Another Word .i. . registered big increases in inequality after the 1980s', while ‘the income gap between the fifth of the world’s people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to l in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960’.“ While there are excep— tions to this trend (several East and South—East Asian countries have so far contained income inequalities within reasonable bounds, as has France—see Figure 1.3), the evidence strongly sug— gests that the neoliberal turn. is in some way and to some degree associated with the restoration or reconstruction of the power of economic elites. We can, therefore, interpret neoliberalization either as a utopicn project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization-of international capitalism or as a political project to re—establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites. In what follows I shall argue that the second of these objectives has in practice dominated. Neoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China) creating, the power of an eco—. nomicrelite. The theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has, I conclude, primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve this goal. The evidence suggests, moreover, that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizablevThis in no way denies the power of ideas to act as a force for historical—geographical change. But it does point to a creative tension between the. power of neoliberal ideas and the actual practices of neoliberalization that have transformed how global capitalism has been working over the last three decades. The Rise of Neoliberal Theory Neoliberalism as a potential antidote to threats to the capitalist social order and as a solution to capitalism’s ills had long been lurking in the wings of public policy. A small and exclusive group of passionate advocates—mainly academic economists, historians, and philosophers-“had gathered together around the renowned 19 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . Austrian political philosopher Friedrich von Hayek to create the Mont Pelerin Society (named after the Swiss spa where they first met) in 1947 (the notables included Ludvig von Mises, the econo» mist Milton Friedman, and even, for a time, the noted philosopher Karl Popper). The founding statement of the society read as follows: The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth‘s surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own, The group holds that these developments have been fostered by- the growth of a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law. It holds further that they have been fostered by a decline of belief in private property and the competitive market; for without the difiused power and initiative associated with these institutions it is difficult to- imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved.15 - The group’s members depicted themselves as ‘liberals’ (in the traditional European sense) because of their fundamental commitment to ideals of personal freedom. The neoliberal label signalled their adherence to those free market principles of neo— classical economics that had emerged in the second half of the ‘ nineteenth century (thanks to the work of Alfred Marshall, William I Stanley Jevons, and Leon Walras) to displace the classical theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and, of course, Karl Marx. Yet they also held to Adam Smith’s view that the hidden hand of the. market was the best device for mobilizing even the basest of human instincts such as gluttony, greed, and the desire for wealth and power for the benefit of all. Neoliberal doctrine was therefore deeply opposed to state interventionist theories, such as those of John Maynard Keynes, which rose to prominence in the 19305 in 20 :_ 1 me Freedom’s just Another Word . . . response to the Great Depression. Many policy—makers after the Second World War looked to Keynesian theory to guide them as they sought to keep the business cycle and recessions under con— trol. The neoliberals were even more fiercely opposed. to theories of centralized state planning, such as those advanced by Oscar ‘Lange working close to the Marxist tradition. State decisions, they argued, were bound to be politically biased depending upon the strength of the interest groups involved (such as unions, environ— mentalists, or trade lobbies). State decisions on matters of invest— ment and capital accumulation were bound to be wrong because the information available to the state could not rival that contained in market signals. ‘ This theoretical framework is not, as several commentators have pointed out, entirely coherent.l6 The scientific rigour of its neoclassical economics does not sit easily with its political com— mitment to ideals of individual freedom, nor does its supposed distrust of all state power fit with the need for a strong and if necessary coercive state that will defend the rights of private prop— erty, individual liberties, and entrepreneurial freedoms. The jurid—‘ ical trick of defining corporations as individuals before the law introduces its own biases, rendering ironic John D. Rockefeller’s personal credo etched in stone in the Rockefeller Center in New York City, where he places ‘the supreme worth of the individual’ above all else. And there are, as we shall see, enough contradictions urthe neoliberal position to render evolving neoliberal practices (vis—a—vis issues such as monopoly power and market failures) unrecognizable in relation to the seeming purity of neoliberal doc— trine. We have to pay careful attention, therefore, to the tension between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual pragmatics of neoliberalization. Hayek, author of key texts such as The Constitution of Liberty, presaently argued that the battle for ideas was key, and that it 7 would probably take at least a generation for that battle to be won, not only against Marxism but against socialism, state planning, and Keynesian interventionism. The _Mont Pelerin group gar- nered financial and political support. In the US in particular, a powerful group of wealthy individuals and corporate leaders who were viscerally opposed to all forms of state intervention and 21 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . regulation, and even to internationalism sought to organize oppos— ition to what they saw as an emerging consensus for pursuing a mixed economy. Fearful of how the alliance with the Soviet Union and the command economy constructed within the US during the Second World War might play out politically in a post~war setting, they were ready to embrace anything from McCarthyism to neo— liberal think—tanks to protect and enhance their power. Yet this movement remained on the margins of both policy and academic influence until the troubled years of the 19705: At that point it began to move centre—stage, particularly in the US and Britain, nurtured in various well—financed think—tanks (offshoots of the Mont Pelerin Society, such as the Institute of Economic Aifairs in London and the Heritage Foundation in Washington), as well as through its growing influence withinthe academy, particularly at the University of Chicago, where Milton Friedman dominated. Neoliberal theory gained in academic respectability by the award of the Nobel Prize in economics to Hayek in 1974 and Friedman in 1976. This particular prize, though it assumed the aura of Nobel, had nothing to do with the other prizes and was under the tight control of Sweden’s banking elite. Neoliberal theory, particularly in its monetarist guise, began to exert practical influence in'a var— iety of policy fields. During the Carter presidency, for example, deregulation of the economy emerged as one of the answers to the chronic state of stagflation that had prevailed in the US through— out the 1970s. But the dramatic consolidation of neoliberalism as a new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy at the state level in the advanced capitalist world occurred in the United States and Britain in 1979. In May of that year Margaret Thatcher was elected in Britain with a strong mandate to reform the economy. Under the influence of Keith Joseph, a very active and committed publicist and polem— icist with strong connections to the neoliberal Institute of Economic Affairs, she accepted that Keynesianism had to be aban- doned and that monetarist ‘supply—side’ solutions were essential to cure the stagflation that had characterized the'British economy during the 19705. She recognized that this meant nothing short of a revolution in fiscal and social policies, and immediately signalled a fierce determination to have done with the institutions and 22 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . political ways of the social democratic state that had been consoli— dated in Britain after 1945. This entailed confronting trade union power, attacking all forms of social solidarity that hindered com~ petitive flexibility (such as those expressed through municipal gov— ernance, and including the power of many professionals and their associations), dismantling or rolling back the commitments of the welfare state, the privatization of public enterprises (including social housing), reducing taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initia— tive, and creating a favourable business climate to induce a strong inflow of foreign investment (particularly from Japan). There was, she famously declared, ‘no such thing as society, only individual men and women’—and, she subsequently added, their families. All forms of social solidarity were to be dissolved in favour of indi— vidualism, private property, personal responsibility, and family values. The ideological assault along these lines that flowed from Thatcher’s rhetoric was relentless.” ‘Economics are the method’, she said, ‘but the object is to change the soul.’ And change it she did, though in ways that were by no means comprehensive and complete, let alone free of political costs. In October 1979 Paul Volcker, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank under President Carter, engineered a draconian shift in US monetary policy.” The longstanding commitment in the US liberal democratic state to the principles of the New Deal, which meantbroadly Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies with 7 full employment as the key obiective, was abandoned‘in favour of a policy designed to quell inflation no matter what the consequences might be for employment. The real rate of interest, which had often been negative during the double—"digit inflationary surge of the 1970s, was rendered positive by fiat of the Federal Reserve (Figure 1.5). The nominal rate of interest was raised overnight and, after a few ups and downs, by July 1981 stood close to 20 per cent. Thus began ‘a long deep recession that would empty factor— ies and break unions in the US and drive debtor countries to the brink of insolvency, beginning the long era of structural adjust— ment’.19 This, Volcker argued, was the only way out of the grum— bling crisis of stagflation that had characterized the US and much of the global economy throughout the 1970s. The Volcker shock, as it has since come to be known, has to be 23 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . 9 8 ' 7 B 5 4 3 2 1 0 l. mi —2 .3 _4 1965 1975 , 1985 1995 — United States —— France Figure 1.5 The ‘Volcker shock’: movements in the real rate of interest, US and France, 1960—2001 Source: Duménil and Levy, Capital Resurgem. interpreted as a necessary but not sufficient condition for neo— liberalization. Some central banks had long emphasized anti— inflationary fiscal responsibility and adopted policies that were closer to monetarism than to Keynesian orthodoxy. 1n the West German case this derived from historical memories of the runaway inflation that had destroyed the Weimar Republic in the 19205 (setting the stage for the rise of fascism) and the equally dangerous inflation that occurred at the end of the Second World War. The EMF had long set itself against excessive debt creation and urged, if not mandated, fiscal restraints and budgetary austerity on client states. But in all these cases this monetarism was paralleled by acceptance of strong union power and a political commitment to build a strong welfare state. The turn to neoliberalism thus depended not only on adepting monetarism but on the unfolding . of government policies in many other arenas. ‘ Ronald Reagan’s victory over Carter in 1980 proved crucral, even though Carter had shifted uneasily towards deregulation (of airlines and, trucking) as a partial solution to the crrsrs of stagfla— tion. Reagan’s advisers were convinced that Volcker’s monetarist 24 Freedom’s Just Another Word . . . ‘medicine‘ for a sick and stagnant economy was right on target. Volcker was supported in and reappointed to his position as chair of the Federal Reserve. The Reagan administration then provided the requisite political backing through further deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts, and attacks on trade union and professional power. Reagan faced down PATCO, the air traflic controllers’ I union, in a lengthy and bitter strike in 1981. This signalled an all— out assault on the powers of organized labour at the very moment when the Volckerwinspired recession was generating high levels of unemployment (10 per cent or more). But PATCO was more than an ordinary union: it was a white—collar union which had the char— acter of a skilled professional association. It was, therefore, an icon of middle—class rather than working—class unionism. The efiect on the condition of labour across the board was dramatic—perhaps best captured by the fact that the Federal minimum wage, which stood on‘a par with the poverty level in 1980, had fallen to 30 per cent below that level by 1990. The. long decline in real wage levels then began in earnest. 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Harvey 2005_A Brief History of Neoliberalism-1 - A Brief...

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