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Unformatted text preview: 17. African Americans and the New Politics of Inclusion; A Representational Dilemma? ' Kerry L. Haynie y the end of the 1970s, it was readily apparent that Afiican Americans were no longer excluded from representation in Congress. African American rep— resentatives have now become firmly rooted fixtures on the congressional land— scape. For example, in each of the last five congresses (104th—108th), they have made up at least 9 percent of the total membership of the House of Representa- tives. Notwithstanding the fact that their representation in the House falls well short of being proportionate to their presence in the population, and although they have never made up more than 1 percent of the membership in any one ses- sion of the US. Senate, their recent levels of representation in the House denote a tremendous gain in the access that African Americans as a group have to an important deliberative and policymaking institution. . From the time that they were first elected to Congress in the 18705 to the present, African American representatives collectively have been the leading pro- ponents of a legislative agenda that seeks to address the particular and sometimes distinctive needs of African Americans and other disadvantaged minorities. His~ torically, these legislators have attempted, first and foremost, to be the agents or conduits of minority economic, political, and social advancement. In other words, over the years African Americans in Congress by and large have played the role of race representative, advocating a targeted, race-conscious agenda that, if fully enacted, would likely have resulted in noticeable changes in the social and eco- nomic policy status quo.l . 1 Race representatives emerged and became prominent when there was a rigid system of separation in American society in general and a firm wall of segregation between blacks and whites in housing, education, and in particular, political power.2 Coming firom racially isolated and segregated environments, in which the majority of the inhabitants were economically and socially distressed, race repre- sentatives tended to practice a politics that almost always put matters of race above all others. Race representatives frequently adopted or were cast in the role of “outsiders”—meaning politicians who often do not conform to the norms and tra— ditions of the institutions in which they operate.3 This race representative role was clearly well suited for African Americans in Congress during periods when they were few in number and lacked sufficient allies to help them advance their agenda. For example, Richard Champagne and Leroy Rieselbach argue that at the time of the founding of the Congressional Black Caucus in 1971, black legislators “had few incentives or opportunities to engage in conventional legislative poli- tics . . . . they lacked the ability to bargain from positions of strength and instead were forced to make their views known outside the normal legislative process“) 396 Kerry L. Haynie Thus, as has become increasingly clear over the past twenty years, physical presence (that is, descriptive representation) and symbolic- outsider or protest pol— itics are not enough to guarantee a group meaningful inclusion in deliberations or measurable influence over policy decisions. Several scholars, most notably, Rufus P. Browning, Dale R. Marshall and, David H. Tabb, have persuasively argued that African American officeholders must achieve political incoaa'omtion as a precondi- tion to having a significant effect on government policies and programs. The term “political incorporation” refers to the extent to which a group is represented in important coalitions in policymaking institutions and the degree to which the group has been able to achieve positions from which it can exercise sustained influ— ence over policy agendas.5 Relative to race and representation in governing institu— tions, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s landmark study precipitated among academ— ics, activists, and politicians what can rightly be called a “new politics of inclusion.” This new politics of inclusion shifted attention away from an almost exclusive con~ cern with the number or percentage of a cohesive political subgroup, such as African Americans, present in a legislative body toward an interest in how well such groups are strategically placed in formal institutional positions of power. This new politics of inclusion explicitly recognizes that political incorporation is an important factor in the linkages between descriptive and substantive representation. African Americans in the US. House of Representatives have greatly improved their status in terms of seniority, party leadership positions, and overall institutional power over the past three decadesf’ During this period, there has also been significant growth in the numbers of Hispanics and white women in the Democratic legislative caucus who are potential coalition partners in pressing a progressive legislative agenda. With rising levels of incorporation, black members of the House increasingly find themselves in positions to have a more effectual voice in policymaking debates, within both the Democratic Party and the House as a whole. According to Champagne and Rieselbach, as a result of an increase in their institutional power, African American members “have increasingly been drawn into the maelstrom of bargaining, compromising, and coalition-building politics that characterizes an individualistic House of Representatives.” They proclaim that African American members can now be viewed as “skilled ‘insiders’ in ordinary, Washington—based legislative politics.” 3 This transformation of African American members of Congress from polit— ical outsiders to insiders gives rise to an important question for students of con— gressional politics: Have the gains in black political incorporation come at the expense of the representation of black interests? One of the many ironies of racial grouptpolitics in the United States is that in seeking to advance or enact public policies that serve the interest of racial minorities, minority group representatives must operate in a political system and within institutions—such as the US. Congress—~that are biased against quick or drastic change and in which the advocacy of minority interests may be incongruent with professional advance- ment and policy successes.9 This chapter explores this potential representation dilemma. Using data mostly from the 107th Congress (2001-2002), I examine whether the new politics of inclusion, whic increased African American institutional incorporation, is associated th changes in the behavior of African American in T . embers f C ‘ ' their advocacy and support of black interests. 0 ongress African American Incorporation in the 107th House V When the 107th Congress was vel d t d ' i ' ‘i eight Afiican American memb Allgal c 0 or CI m 2001’ there Wire thirty— ers. were members of the House. Thirty— seven were Democrats, fourteen were women, and they represented twenty* one states Plus the District of Columbia (see Tabl 17—1 _ . state from most ofthc e The twenty one states include a . geographic regions in the country, with onl the M t ' West and the Pacxfic Northwest not represented. Sixteen of the tliirty— eigliltnreaplj resentatives (42 percent) were from the South. The districts from which the black Democrats were elected were both urban and rural and on average had populations in African Americans made up slightly more than 50 percent of the total Surprisingly, ten of the members represented districts that were not ma'ori black. Eight of those, however, had majority—minority populations Sinfdiid Bishop, 2nd District, Ga, and Julia Carson, 7th District, Ind. were. the onl AfflCZIl American House Democrats elected from majority—white districts 1° y I In an earlier study, I developed an African American political incorporation index espec1ally for legislatures.11 The index includes measures for the number of African Americans in the legislature, whether or not African Americans are in the majority party, the percentage of the Democratic Party that they constitute the-number of prestige or power committee assignments they hold the' , seniority, and the number of African Americans in leadership positions. Descri - tive representation is accounted for in this conceptualization of incorporation bit the scale I'CllCS- most heavily on variables that are directly associated with pdwer and influence in legislatures. It recognizes that to achieve the capacity to exert strong and substantial influence in legislatures, African Americans not only need a continuous descriptive presence, but they also must obtain leadership positions and strategic committee assignments. The data in Table 17—2 substantiate the assertion o ' ' American incorporation in the House of Representatives. Fog 22:22:10? ican With data from the 107th Congress the table includes data from the 103id and l04th. The 103rd House (1993-1994) is the last session in which African Amer- ican Democrats were in the majority party. The 104th (1995—1996) marks the first session of the current era of Republican control of the House The 107th (2001—2002) is the most recent Congress for which complete data are available v Black Caucus was formed in 1971, there were just the House. Only one of the thirteen held a lead—- 398 i ' Kerry L. Haynie Table 17—1 African Americans in the 107th Congress (2001—2002) M % Blacks % lVlinorities State District Member in District in District M Alabama 7 Earl Hilliard 62 0 California 9 Barbara Lee 26.4 32 Diane Watson 30.5 68.5 i 35 Maxine Waters 34.7 74.0 I 37 Juanita lVIillender- McDonald 22.5 54.7 Florida 3 Corrine Brown 49.9 57.6 17 Carrie Meek 56.9 67.1 I 23 Alcee Hastings 52.0 62.5 Georgia 2 Sanford Bishop Jr. 44.8 48.5 4 Cynthia McKinney 53.5 64.2 I I 5 John Lewis 56.1 63.0 th01s 1 Bobby Rush 65.5 70.5 2 Jesse Jackson Jr. 62.4 70.3 I 7 Danny Davis 62.0 70.2 Indiana 10 Julia Carson 29.5 35.2 Louisiana 2 William Jefferson 64.1 69.8 Maryland _4 ‘ Albert Wynn 57.3 69.7 I I 7‘ Elijah Cummings 59.1 65.1 Michigan 14 John Conyers Jr. 61.4 67.0 I I I I 15 Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick 60.8 68.2 lwissiSSippi 2 Bennie Thompson ' 63.5 65.0 MlSSOIlI‘l 1 William Clay 49.8 53.5 New Jersey 10 Donald Payne 57.7 71.6 New York 6 Gregory Meeks 53 .9 81.1 10 Edolphus Towns 63.0 79.0 11 Major Owens 61.2 75.1 15 Charles Rangel 34.6 71.8 North Carolina 1 Eva Clayton 50.7 54.6 I 12 Melvin Watt 45.0 52.8 01110 11 Stephanie Tubbs Jones 55.9 60.3 Oklahoma I 4 C. Watts Jr. (R) 6.7 30.3 Pennsylvania 2 Chaka Fattah 61.3 69 2 South Carolina 6 James Clybum 57.0 59'2 Tennessee 9 Harold Ford Jr. 59.7 63: 9 Texas 18 Sheila Jackson— Lee 42.5 62.9 I I i 30 Eddie Bernice Johnson 40.8 61.1 Virginia 3 Robert Scott 56.4 61.4 D.C. NA Eleanor Holmes Norton NA NA M party was in the majority, black Democrats held nine prestigious committee ass1gnments and thirty two leadership positions. They included John Lewis, Ga. one of four chief deputy whips, and John Conyers Jr., Mich, and William Clay: Mo? chairs respectively of the Government Operations and the Post Office and CiVil Servrce Committees. Although the Republican takeover in 1995 resulted in Democrats’ surrendering their institutional leadership positions, the African African Americans and the New Politics of Inclusion 399 Table 17—2 Elements of African American Incorporation, 103rd, 104th, and 107th Congresses 103rd 104th 107th (1993-1994) (1995-1996) (2001-2002) Number of African Americans in House 39 38 36 % of total House membership 8.9 8.7 8.3 % of Democratic Caucus 15.1 18.1 17.6 Number leadership positions3 32 19 22 Number of prestige committee assignmentsb 9 6 10 Average seniority (in years) 6.0 7.9 8.8 Notes: Table includes data for African American Democrats only. There was 1 African American Republican in the 103rd Congress; there were 2 in the 104th, and 1 in the 107th House. lLeadership positions include standing committee and subcommittee chairs, party whips, and membership. on the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. bPrestige Committees are Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means. American legislators were able to maintain some important strategic standing in the House by virtue of maintaining power and influence Within the Democratic Party’s organizational hierarchy. After the change in party control, they became a larger proportion of the Democratic caucus, gained more party Whip positions, and they increased their presence on the Democratic Steering and Policy Com— mittee. In the 107th Congress, for example, John Lewis and Maxine Waters, Calif, were two of the Democrats’ four chief deputy whips, and African Ameri— cans were represented on the Steering and Policy Committee in proportion to their presence in the Democratic caucus (17 percent). Thus while their overall institutional power was noticeably diminished, they remained important and invested players in the bargaining and coalition politics of the House. Regardless of which party is in control, it is likely that future increases in African American influence in Congress will come more from increased political incorporation than from increases in the numbers of African Americans elected. That is, given the current political and legal climate regarding the creation of majority— minority legislative districts and the fact that, even under the best of circumstances, there is a finite number of such districts that can be drawn, it is likely that the number of African Americans receiving prestige committee assign— ments or acquiring leadership positions will increase faster than the number of additional African Americans elected to the House. Greater incorporation may be the most efficient and effective short—term strategy for ensuring the substan— tive representation of black interests in Congress. Yet, as mentioned above, an increased reliance on political incorporation may present African American leg— islators With a profound dilemma. . A One cost of achieving higher levels of incorporation might be that these- Afiican Americans will be required to behave less like race men and women. and, 400 ’ ' Kerry L. Hayniei‘ displayva more overt commitment to the values of the larger institution. For example, to increase their power and influence, black representatives might prior— itize assignments on prestige committees over assignments on committees whose jurisdictions include traditional black interest areas. Similarly, Lucius Barker and Mackjones argue that seeking more institutional incorporation may lead African American legislators to deracialize their agendas.12 They define démcialz'zaz‘ion as “the practice of blacks articulating political demands in terms that are not racially specific so that they appeal to a broader group and presumably do not alienate those who are predisposed to oppose black efforts.” 13 Because it is often linked with attempts at coalition building, deracialization is advocated by many as a use— ful means of integrating African Americans into political institutions and advanc— ing black interests.14 However, Barker and Jones persuasively argue that deracial—' ization may contribute to what they call the “routinization” of black politics, in which the behavior of African Americans becomes more “system supporting” and less “system challenging“; If such tradeoffs become necessary, greater incorpo— ration of African American legislators may be inconsistent with efforts to articu— late and promote the interests of African American constituents. I address this potential tradeoff dilemma by the committee assignment patterns and , roll call voting behavior of African Americans in Congress during a portion of the outsider—to —insider transition period. Committee Assignments and Interest Representation The literature on legislatures has long recognized the importance of stand— ing committees in the policymaking process.”5 Legislative scholars routinely use a typology developed by Steven Smith and Christopher Deering to categorize committees into what have become four well-known committee types— - prestige, policy, constituency, and unrequested.17 Prestige committees are consid- ered the most powerful or most influential. The Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means Committees are in this group. Committees that address important policy domains, such as education, national security, or transportation, make up the policy committee category. Constituency committees are those that provide members with the opportunity to be directly responsive to the particular needs of their constituents and districts. Agriculture, Science, and Veterans’ Affairs are examples of constituency committees. Committees that are not gener— ally coveted by members are labeled “unrequested,” or undesirable. Committees perform vital agenda— setting and gate — keeping functions. That is, committees control the substantive content of bills, as well as determine if and when a piece of legislation will reach the full House. They have the capacity to ‘ prevent legislation—even that which might enjoy the support of the majority of the legislature —from ever being considered. Committees thus can substantially control the set of issues and policy initiatives that are debated in and decided by Congress.18 Committee assignments also have instrumental importance. It is through participation in committees that legislators have their greatest direct African Americans and the New Politics of Inclusion 401 effect on public policy Standing committees can place members of Congress in important strategic positions from which they are able to promote and advance their policy agendas. From the perspective of the representative, however, all com- mittee assignments are not the same. Committees have varying jurisdictions and unique responsibilities, and legislators are better able to advance their agendas and the interests of their constituents if they receive certain committee assignments rather than others. Members of Congress tend to rank committees whose juris- diction is relevant to the interests found in their district high“on their committee assignment request list. Such assignments allow representatives to act, or appear to act, in a manner that is responsive to their constituents.19 Kenneth Shepsle has suggested that because standing committees are juris- dictionally based, their members acquire a stake in their respective jurisdictions. This results in committees that consist primarily of what he calls “interesteds” or “preference outliers.” Shepsle argues that this is agreeable to legislators “because this arrangement permits them to specialize and accumulate power iri'just those areas of special interest to those who must renew their contracts every other year.”20 Because they consist mainly of “interesteds” and “preference outliers”, standing committees are an excellent venue from which to explore the degree to which African American members of Congress advocate for or seek to protect black interests and whether or not increased political incorporation comes at the expense of black interest representation.21 Given that the overwhelming majority of these legislators are elected from majority—black districts with distinctive eco- nomic and social needs, it is reasonable to expect them to be significantly repre— sented on those committees whose jurisdictions include traditional minority interest areas, such as civil rights, education, health care, social welfare, and employment opportunities. Influence potential is a measure commonly used to estimate the significance and instrumental value of particular committee assignments to groups in a legis- lature. It is the percentage of a committee’s members who come from a particu- lar legislative subgroup. Because committees enable their members to specialize and acquire power in the policy areas within their jurisdiction, the degree tc which a cohesive, well—organized group is represented on a committee reflects that group’s potential influence over particular policy areas. Table 17—3 contains data on African American representation on House standing committees. The committees are listed according to their percentage of black members, from high- est to lowest percentage, using 107th House data. Committee assignment infor- mation from the 104th Congress is included for comparison purposes. At first glance it may appear that the African American members have for- saken the traditional black interest committees in favor of constituency and pol- icy committees that have broader jurisdictions. While it is true that black repre- sentatives are increasingly becoming involved and identified with issues that have no overt or direct race—speciflccontent, they have not necessarily turned away from the long—standing black intereSt issues such as civil rights, education, equal employment opportunities, social welfare, and urban development. Changes in 402 ' ' Kerry L. Haynie' \‘ Table 17-3 Afiican American Representation on House Standing Committees, 107th and 104th Congresses 107th 104th Committee Equity . Equity Committee Type“ % Black" Ratio % Black Ratio Government Reform Policy 16.7 8.4 12.0 3.5 V International Relations Policy 12.2 3.9 9.3 0.8 1 r Financial Services Policy 11.7 3.4 12.0 3.5 3 ‘ Judiciary Policy 10.8 2.5 11.4 2.9 7. Official Conduct Unrequested 10.0 1.7 0.0 — 8.5 Small Business Constituency 8.6 0.3 17.0 8.5 Education and Workforce Policy 8.3 0.0 11.6 3.1 . Agriculture Constituency '8.3 0.0 10.0 1.5 , Rules Prestige 7.7 —0.6 0.0 -8.5 ' Ways and Means Prestige 7.3 — 1.0 8.3 —0.2..: Veterans’ Affairs Constituency 6.9 —1.4 12.1 3.6 . Transportation Policy 6.7 — 1.6 6.6 - 1.9 Appropriations Prestige 6.2 —2.1 3.6 -4.9 Select Intelligence Unrequested 5.3 —3.0 6.3 —2.2 Energy and Commerce Policy 5 .3 —3.0 4.3 -4.2 Budget Prestige 4.7 —3.6 2.4 -6.1 Science Constituency 2.1 —6.2 6.0 —2.5 Resources Constituency 2.0 —6.3 0.0 —8.5 Armed Services Constituency 1.7 — 6.6 3.6 ~4.9 aCommittee Type is taken from Steven S. Smith and Christopher]. Deering, Committee: in Congress, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQPress, 1990), 87. "% Black and % Hispanic are percentages of the total committee membership African American or Hispanic. The one African American Republican who served in the 107th House is excluded from % Black data. committee jurisdictions that the Republicans made upon taking control of the House in 1995 mask some of the subtleties in the distribution of committee assignments shown in Table 17-3. For example, the Committee on Government Reform deals with matters pertaining to the District of Columbia, criminal jus— tice, drug policy, and human resources. Housing, community development, and consumer credit are issues that figure prominently on the agenda of the Financial Services Committee. The Small Business Committee’s jurisdiction covers work— force matters and government programs. Among the issues that the International Relations Committee considers is legislation related to U.S. policy toward Afiica. All of these issues are included in most conceptualizations of black interests. , The data in Table 17—3 show that African Americans expanded their repre— sentation on committees fiom a presence on sixteen of the nineteen committees in the 104th House, to having at least one member on every committee in the 107th, In other words, by 2001, African Americans had a seat at the table and a voiceinzthefdeliberations over all the legislation on the congressional agenda. This African Americans and the New Politics of Inclusion had been a goal of the Congressional Black Caucus fiom its inceptiOn..Four mittees whose jurisdictions include many traditional black interests issues,’G , ernment Reform, International Relations, Financial Services, ranked among the top five for Afiican American representation and influence :1 potential. By comparison, in the 104th House, each of the top five committees can be classified as a black interest committee. . _ i "f The fourth and sixth columns of Table 17—3 contain an equity ratio for each I committee. The equity ratio assesses the proportionality of African American representation. Specifically, it is the percentage of Afiican Americans on a come mittee, minus the overall percentage of African Americans in the House. For example, in the 107th House, African Americans constituted 16.7 percent of the Government Reform Committee, and they made up 8.3 percent of the entire House, which yields an equity ratio of 8.4 for this committee. An equity ratio of zero equals perfect proportional committee representation. A positive score indi— cates that African Americans are overrepresented on the committee, and a nega— tive ratio means that they are underrepresented. African Americanswere either proportionately represented or overrepre— sented on eight of the nineteen House standing committees in both the 104th and 107th Congresses. Of the eight, only two are not clearly or directly identified with black interest issues, the Agriculture Committee in both the 104th and 107th and the Official Conduct Committee in the 107th. Given that assignments on prestige committees are among the factors associated with increased institu— tional incorporation, it is interesting that the African Americans were underrep— resented on all four of the prestige committees in both the 104th and 107th Con— gresses. From this examination of their standing committee assignment choices, it appears that African American representatives have not exchanged their con— cern-for, and advocacy of, black interests for increased power and broader institu— tional influence. However, to get a more complete picture of their committee assignment behavior, it is important to consider African Americans’ presence on House subcommittees. Table 17—4 contains data on subcommittee saliency. Salient); is the percent— age of all African American committee assignments devoted to a particular type of committee. This measure provides a more nuanced assessment of the relative importance to African American legislators of the various committee types and the policy areas within their jurisdiction. For example, if African American mem— bers as a group hold a total of ten subcommittee assignments, and four of those assignments are on policy subcommittees, then policy subcommittees would have a saliency score of 40 percent. Iftwo of those assignments are on constituency committees, constituency committees would have a saliency score of 20 percent; and we could say that, based on their subcommittee service, policy matters seem to resonate more with African American legislators than do constituency issues. In both the 104th and 107th sessions of the House, policy subcommittees with broad jurisdictions were the most salient subcommittees to the African American members. The Aviation; the Domestic Monetary Policy, Technology, Ke L. Haynie 404 try Table 17-4 Saliency and African American Membership on House ‘ Subcommittees, by Committee Type, 104th and 107th Congresses __________________.___—_——————— Saliean 107th Subcommittee Type 104th 8 9 2 . Black interestb 26.7 Constituency 44.3 389 Policy . 4-4 Prestige 16.0 “Saliency is the percentage of the total number of black subcommittee assrgnments to that particular committee type. mini ' ' ' ' ' li areas that are of special 5 ' tt 5 are those whose Jurisdiction includes the po cy . I cEiiacilirinidrblszEiZZens. tSite Kerry L. Haynie, Afiimn American Legislators m tbe Amman States (New Yorlc Columbia University Press, 2001), 116. and Economic Growth; the Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit; and th: International Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittees iwere amlqng the Irfno:IS popular policy subcommittee assignments for these legislators. Blac tLntcirles the second-most-salient committee type. The Education. Reform, e ousing and Community Opportunity, and the Civil Serv1ce Census “Subcomrgintte: were among the most popular black interest subcommittees. It is intereslCh g I note that whereas the saliency of policy subcommittees declined betweleirci1 Ie tv:o Congresses, the saliency of black interest subcommittees increased. aaliitive to the other subcommittee types, prestige subcomm1ttees were the least ent o the African Americans in both sessions. Moreover, the saliency of prestige com- mittees declined dramatically from one Congress to the next. I i The committee and subcommittee assignment data presented here indicate that African American legislators now, perhaps more than at any other time in the past, place a more varied array of irons in the public policy fire. Tgese dag alsobsliigl; gest that it is not the case that these representatives have turne away Iom d It interests while achieving higher levels of institutional incorporation. riteabfi— appears that the African American members of Congress. have attempte 1to ‘ 1 _ ance their concern for issues that may be benefiCial to their districts, their. egis a tive careers, or both, with concern and advocacy for traditional black interest issues.22 That is, While they were well positioned on committees to advance or pro tect interests in a broad array of policy areas, they were also well positioned to exert influence in support of a more particularized black interest agenda. Roll Call Votes and Black Interests ‘The roll call voting behavior of black legislators provides us with an additional -' opportunity to assess whether or not acquiring more institutional clout is assocragfd with a decrease in the attention that these legislators give to black interests. As s—_ African Americans and the New Politics of Inclusion 4 cussed above, African American members of Congress have long played the role race representative. They View themselves as the primary advocates for and prote tors of black people and their interests. Related to this, several studies have fou: that African American representatives are more likely than nonblack representarii to seek to ensure that a black-interest perspective is am'culated, understood, a' advanced.23 Below, I use roll call ratings compiled by three interest groups, t American Conservative Union (ACU), Americans for Democratic Action (ADr‘ and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), to assess whether Afric American representatives are less inclined to support the interests of blacks as th acquire more institutional power. The ACU is a conservative, umbrella lobbyii organization that seeks to promote the ideals and advance the causes of consc vatism in government and public affairs. The ACU rates each member of Congre on a scale of zero to 100, based on their votes on a group of bills that are deemi relevant to the core mission of the organization. The higher a member’s rating, t] more conservative he or she is judged to be. Similarly, the ADA is a liberal 10be ing organization that champions progressive ideals and values in the public polii arena. After each legislative session, ADA evaluates members of the House at Senate based on their votes on twenty bills that it considers the most importantf advancing the group’s interests. Legislators are awarded five points, up to a max mum of 100, for each roll call vote that is in agreement with ADA’s position. Tl Leadership Conference on Civil Rights is a coalition of more than 180 liberal prc gressive organizations that advocate for civil rights and economic equity and opp0i tunity for racial and ethnic minorities, women, senior citizens, and the disabled. Tl". LCCR index, which also ranges from zero to 100, measures the proportion of a leg islator’s roll call votes that support the stated position of the coalition. Each of these three indices includes some bills that do not directly corre spond to, or are peripheral to, black interests. However, they are reliable indica tors of liberal (or conservative) voting in Congress.24 Because public opinion poll and surveys routinely show that, collectively, African Americans are one of th most cohesive and consistent liberal political groups in the country, the scales ar reasonable proxies for assessing support for black interests.” Table 17—5 presents the ACU, ADA, and LCCR roll call ratings for blac] and nonblack Democrats Who served in the House in the 104th and 107th Con: gresses. These data show that African American Democrats are decidedly mori liberal than nonblack Democrats. Regardless ofwhether we rely on the ratings 0: the liberal-leaning ADA and LCCR, or those of the conservative oriented ACU the results are the same. African American representatives are easily the most lib- eral politically relevant subgroup in the House. More important for our purposes . here, the three sets of interest group ratings together suggest that between the 104th and 107th sessions of Congress, a period in which they increased their institutional power, African Americans did not, as a group, become noticeably more conservative in their voting behavior. In fact, two of the three indicesgthe ACU and the LCCR, indicate that the black legislators might have become slightly more liberal. As was the case with their committee assignment behavior? 406 ‘ ’ Kerry L. Haynie Table 17—5 Ideology and Roll Call Voting in the House, 104th and 107th Congresses Black Democrats Other Democrat 104th ACU ratings 8.0 . 20.7 107th ACU ratings , 7.6 19.7 104th ADA ratings 90.0 i 69.5 107th ADA ratings 87.5 77.8 104th LCCR ratings 93.8 76.2 107th LCCR ratings 96.7 68.0 Sources: ACU and ADA ratings are from summaries found in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly svepgrt and 0Q Weekly. LCCR ratings were constructed by the author using data found on the LCCR e site. Note: ACU is the American Conservative Union; ADA is Americans for Democratic Action; LCCR is the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Ratings indicate percentage of major votes in which “ members voted in agreement with the organization’s position. we find little evidence here that higher levels of political incorporation are- achieved at the expense of providing significant, substantive representation to African American citizens. ' Conclusions In representative democracies like the United States, legitimacy and trust in the political system are dependent to a significant degree on the system’s ability to ensure that the substantive interests that exist among the citizenry are repre- sented through deliberation and aggregation.26 Deliberation, according to Jane Mansbridge, functions to transform interests and create commonality Aggrega- tion, she argues, aims at “producing some form of relatively legitimate decision in the context of fundamentally conflicting interests.”27 Political institutions are the primary conduits for ensuring that this ideal is met. In the United States, legisla- tures, more than any other political institution, embody these important princi- ples of democracy. For example, William Keefe and Morris Ogul have argued that legislatures provide the government with legitimacy by being responsive and accountable to the people. In the process of repre— senfing the people, the legislature helps to illuminate and resolve conflict and to build consensus. It listens to grievances, addresses public problems, explores alternatives, protects or alters past decisions and policies, consid— ers fiiture requirements, and does what the people are not organized to do for themselves.28 In short, legislatures are What Alan Rosenthal calls “the guts of democracy” 29 As such, they have a profound effect on how various groups and their interests are African Americans and the New Politics of Inclusion 407 included and integrated into the political process and into the society at large. Legislatures are especially important to political subgroups such as African Amer— icans, who once were prevented from participating equally in policyrnalcing and governance and whose interests and views often have not been represented in deliberative and aggregative processes. As the national legislature, the US. Con~ gress is the most significant and the most far~reaching legislature in the country, and it is thus especially important to such groups. After decades of struggle, African American members of Congress appear to be meeting the challenges of the new politics of inclusion. African Americans now are represented in Congress not only by having seats at the table. By virtue of increasing levels of political incorporation, they now'also have a significant voice in deliberations over national policy. They have indeed made the transition from political outsider to consummate insider. In the process of this transition, they have not, as the analysis above indicates, turned away from their traditional role of race representative. African Americans in the House or Representatives remain the primary advocates for, and strongest supporters of, the interests of black citizens. Although this may change in the future, to date it appears that being a race representative and a political insider is not necessarily an either—or proposition. African American members of Congress have found ways to make it both- and, rather than either- or. Notes 1. For a discussion of the race representative concept, see Kerry L. Haynie,African Amer— ican Legislator: in tlJeAmerican States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 4. 2. Elijah Anderson, “The Precarious Balance: Race Man or Sellout?” in Tbe Darden Dilemma, ed. Ellis Cose (New York: Harper-Perennial), 117. 3. Ralph K. Huitt, “The Outsider in the Senate,” American Political Science Review 55 (1957): 566—575. 4. Richard A. Champagne and Leroy N. Rieselbach, “The Evolving Congressional Black Caucus: The Reagan-Bush Years,” in Black: ana’ tbe American Political System, ed. H. L. Perry and Wayne Parent (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1995), 134. 5. Rufus P Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, ProtertIsNot Enougli: Tbe Struggle (y‘Blarler and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politic: (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 6. See Champagne and Rieselbach, “The Evolving Congressional Black Caucus”; David T. Canon, Race, Redistricting and Representation' Tbe Unintended Consequences of Black Majority District: (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Katherine Tate, Black Face: in tbe Mirror: African American: and Tbeir Repreréntativer in tlJe US. Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Kenneth LWhitby, The Color of Repre~ rentation: Congressional Bebaruior and Black Constituent: (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). Champagne and Rieselbach, “The Evolving Congressional Black Caucus,” 133. Ibid., 134. » Lerone Bennett It, “The Politics of the Outsider,” Negro Digest 17 (1963): 5-8; Mervyn M. Dymally, ed., The Black Politician: Iii: S truggle for Power (Belmont, Calif: Duxbury Press, 1971); Sally Friedman, “Committee Advancement of‘Women and >°9°>I Blacks in Congress: A Test of the Responsible Legislator Thesis,” Women and Politics 13 (1993): 27-52. . 10. J. C. Watts, an African American Republican, also represented a district that had a majorityewhite population. 11. Haynie,Afiican American Legislators, 65 ~68. 12. Lucius Barker and Mack Jones, Afiican Americans and tbe American Political System,- 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994). ' 13. Ibid., 321. 14. Charles V. Hamilton, “Deracialization: Examination of a Political Strategy,” First 'World 1: 3—5; Theda Skocpol, “Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable Pole itics to Combat Poverty in the United States,” in lee Urban Underclass, ed. Christo- pher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1991); Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests: Tbe Representation ry'African Amer— icans in Congress (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); William Wilson, “Race-Neutral Programs and the Democratic Coalition,” T/Je American Prospect 1: 74-81. 15. Barker and Jones, African Americans and tire American Political System, 322. 16. The following discussion makes extensive use of Haynie, African American Legislators, 39—50. 17. See Steven S. Smith and Christopher Deering, Committees in Congress, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQPress, 1990), 87. I 18. See, for example, Charles L. Clapp, Tbe Congressman: His job as He Sees It ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1963); Wayne L. Francis, Tlre Legislative Com- mittee Game:A ComparativeAnalysis oftbe States (Columbus: Ohio State Univer— sity Press, 1989); George Goodwin, Tbe Little Legislatures: Committees of Congress (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970); Kevin B. Grier and lVIichael C. Munger, “Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contri- butions,” EconomicInguiry 29 (1991): 24—43; Richard L. Hall, “Participation and Pur- pose in Committee Decision~Making,” American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 105—128; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Congressional Committee Assignments: An Opti— mization Model with Institutional Constraints," Public Cboice 21 (1975): 55—78; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Representation and Governance: The Great Trade— off,” Politi- cal Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 461-483; Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress; and Charles Stewart, “Committee Hierarchies in the Modernizing House, 1875-1947,” American journal of Political Science 36 (1992): 835—856. 19. Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps, “The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Compo— nents of Responsiveness," Legislative Studies Quarterly 2 (1977): 233—254; Richard Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Rep— resentatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process,” American Political Science Review 67 (1973): 889—905; Stewart, “Committee Hierarchies in the Modernizing House.” 20. Shepsle, “Representation and Governance,” 471-472. 21. Unless otherwise specified, “minority group," as used here refers to African Americans and Hispanics. 22. See Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 159—164; and Haynie, Afiican American Legislators, 39-62, for similar findings. 23. Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie, “Agenda- Setting and Legislative Success in State, Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race,” journal of Politics 61 (1999): 65 8-679; Haynie, Afiican American Legislators; Tate, Black Faces in tbe Mirror, and Whitby, Tbe Color of Representation. 24. Richard J. Fleisher, “Explaining the Change in Roll— Call Voting Behavior of South— ern Democrats,” journal of Politics 55 (1993): 327-341; James A Stimson, lVIichael B. Afiican Americans and the New Politics of Inclusion 409 MacKuen, and Robert Erikson, “Dynamic Representation,” American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 543-565. 25. See Charles S. Bullock III, “Congressional Voting and the Mobilization of a Black Electorate in the South," journal of Politics 43 (1981): 662—682; and Kenneth Whitby, “Measuring Congressional Responsiveness to the Policy Interest of Blacls Constituents,” Social Science Quarterly 68 (1987): 367-377 for works that examine correlations among the various interest group scales. 26. Joseph M. Bessette, T/Je Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and Americar National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Bernard Manin T/Je Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997); Jane Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represem Women? A Contingent “Yes,” journal of Politics 61 (1999): 628-657. 27. Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks,” 634. 28. William L. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, Tbe American Le islative Process 1 ‘ Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), 446. g (Eng ewooc 29. Alan Rosenthal, “The Legislative Institution—In Transition and at Risk,” in Tb: State oft/1e States, 2nd ed., ed. Carl E. Van Horn (Washington, D.C.: CQPress, 1993). ...
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