Lecture 5 September 22

Lecture 5 September 22 - Read this now Western Europe...

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Read this now! • Western Europe geography quiz today • Notes and books closed • Electronic devices off and stowed • Pencil or pen only on your desk
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Note your section number Section 1 (Mr. Teo): Friday, 9:15 a.m. to 10:35 a.m., Hickman 112 Section 2 (Mr. Humphreys): Wednesday, 11:30 a.m. to 12:50 p.m., Scott 220 Section 3 (Mr. Humphreys): Friday, 11:30 a.m. to 12:50 p.m., Scott 220 Section 4 (Ms. Clancy): Friday, 1:10 to 2:30 p.m., Scott 214 Section 5 (Mr. Humphreys): Thursday, 8:40 to 10:00 a.m., Tillett 105 Section 6 (Mr. Teo): Thursday, noon to 1:20 p.m., Lucy Stone B112 Section 7 (Mr. Teo): Wednesday, 10:55 a.m. to 12:15 p.m., Ruth Adams 110B Section 8 (Ms. Clancy): Wednesday, 12:35 to 1:55 p.m., Loree 115 Section 9 (Ms. Clancy): Wednesday, 3:55 to 5:15 p.m., Hickman 210
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Today in Comparative Politics • Theories of the state, continued • What is a state? • Why do we need them? • How did we get them? • Contractarian v. predatory theories • Backward induction and Nash equilibrium: some connections
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State of nature game (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2
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Does this game have any Nash equilibria? (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2
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Does this game have any Nash equilibria? (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2 Can either player do better by changing strategy?
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Does this game have any Nash equilibria? (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2 Can either player do better by changing strategy?
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Does this game have any Nash equilibria? (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2 Can either player do better by changing strategy? No , so {Steal, Steal} is a Nash equilibrium .
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A pair of strategies forms a Nash equilibrium if they are mutual best replies. (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2
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A pair of strategies forms a Nash equilibrium if they are mutual best replies. (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2 {Steal, Steal} is the unique Nash equilibrium.
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What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in this game? A. (Cooperate; Cooperate) B. (Cooperate; Cooperate) and (Defect; Defect) C. (Cooperate; Defect) D. (Defect; Defect) E. (Defect; Cooperate) 5, 5 0, 10 Cooperate 8, 1 2, 3 Defect Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2
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A pair of strategies forms a Nash equilibrium if they are mutual best replies. (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2 {Steal, Steal} is the unique Nash equilibrium.
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A pair of strategies forms a Nash equilibrium if they are mutual best replies. (2, 2) (4, 1) Steal (1, 4) (3, 3) Forbear Player 1 Steal Forbear Player 2 There is another outcome ({Forbear, Forbear}) that both players strictly prefer to {Steal, Steal}!
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Is there something implausible about this Nash equilibrium? • A strategy is a dominant strategy if it is a best reply against all strategies for the opposing player(s).
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This note was uploaded on 02/20/2012 for the course 790 104 taught by Professor Staff during the Spring '08 term at Rutgers.

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Lecture 5 September 22 - Read this now Western Europe...

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