Lecture 14 November 15

Lecture 14 November 15 - Today in Comparative Politics...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–8. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Today in Comparative Politics Majority rule Single peakedness Median voter theorem Chaos in multidimensional problems Non-cycling voting methods
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Preference notation xR i y “x is at least as good as y for voter i” xP i y “x is strictly preferred to y by voter i” xI i y “voter i is indifferent between x and y” xRy “x is socially at least as good as y” xPy “x is socially strictly preferred to y” xIy “x and y are socially indifferent” > > =
Background image of page 2
Intransitive majority preferences A preference relation R is transitive if xRy and yRz imply xRz. When majority preferences cycle, The majority preference relation is intransitive. The outcome under a binary procedure is completely determined by the agenda. Whoever controls the agenda has great power here. Opportunities for strategic voting are numerous.
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Does majority rule always cycle? Majority voting is very commonly used in distributive-politics settings. Saw last time how easy it is for cycles to occur in that case. But there is an important circumstance in which majority rule is well behaved.
Background image of page 4
Single peakedness Assume that all individual preferences are strict. Assume that there is an odd number of voters. Suppose that in every triple of alternatives {x, y, z} there exists one alternative, say x, that every individual agrees is not worst . That is, for all i either xP i y or xP i z Then preferences over {x, y, z} are said to be single peaked .
Background image of page 5

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
If majority preferences cycle, single peakedness doesn’t hold 123 xyz yzx zxy
Background image of page 6
Black’s theorem If the number of voters is odd and preferences are single-peaked, the majority preference relation is transitive.
Background image of page 7

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 8
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 02/20/2012 for the course 790 104 taught by Professor Staff during the Spring '08 term at Rutgers.

Page1 / 48

Lecture 14 November 15 - Today in Comparative Politics...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 8. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online