{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

Miranda+v+Arizona+_1968_

Miranda+v+Arizona+_1968_ - Miranda 1 Arizona In Escobedo v...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–5. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Background image of page 2
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Background image of page 4
Background image of page 5
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: Miranda 1). Arizona In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Supreme Court reversed a state murder - conviction because the accused had been denied the right of counsel during his interrogation, and because the police had failed to advise him of his constitutional rights (378 U.S. 478 [1964]). During the interrogation, Escobedo had made numerous damaging statements which subsequently led to his conviction when they were used in his trial. The Court expanded its Gideon ruling and applied rigid standards against self-incrimination to overturn the conviction. The Escobedo decision naturally aroused criticism that the Court was “coddling” criminals. In addition, there was a more valid body of criticism which took the Court to task for its failure to establish proper guidelines for interrogation procedures by law enforcement oflicials. In the Miranda case below, the Court re- sponded to both points. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the. Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility 483 U.S. 436 (1966) Miranda v. Arizona 633 The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the de- fendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelli- gence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than specu- lation; a warning is a clearcut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege. . If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that‘the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self—incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigents as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance. The cases before us as well as the vast majority of confession cases with which we have dealt in the past involve those unable to retain counsel. While authorities are not re- quired to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice.’ De- nial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and on appeal struck down in Gideon v. Wainwright. . . . In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent—the person most often subjected to interroga- tion—the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exer- cise it. . . . 632 Rights of the Accused of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the FifthAmendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. . . . The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the ad— missibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In allthe cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, signed statements as well which were admitted at their trials. They all thus share salient featuresv—incommum'cado interroga- tion of individuals in a police—dominated atmosphere, resulting in self- incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. . . . The denial of the defendant’s request for his attorney thus under- mined his ability to exercise the privilege —-— to remain silent if he chose to speak without any intimidation, blatant or subtle. The presence of counsel in all the cases before us today, would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion. It was in this manner that Escohedo explicated another facet of the pre—trial privilege, noted in many of the Court’s prior decisions: the protection of rights at trial. That counsel is present when statements are taken from an individual during interrogation obviously enhances the integrity of the fact—finding processes in court. The presence of an at- torney, and the warnings delivered to the individual, enable the defend— ant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interroga— tion process. . . . Today . . . there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in—custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains in— herently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the ac- cused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored. . . . 634 flights of the Accused This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a “station house lawyer” present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and ‘ that if he cannot aflord one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time. . . . The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings com- mences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries. Under the system of warnings we deline- ate today or under any other system which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to be erected about the privilege must come into play at this point. Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. . . . When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the—scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact—finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of re- sponsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in—custody interrogation is not necessarily present. In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the First Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today. a???” - ,- Miranda v. Arizona 635 To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimina- tion is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warn- ings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence ob- tained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. . . . ...
View Full Document

{[ snackBarMessage ]}