Game Theory 1-31-12

Game Theory 1-31-12 - GameTheory 1312012

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Game Theory      1-31-2012 Previous class we did iterative elimination of dominated strategies - IEDS o Do this when there is no dominant strategy New game o Rules, distribution is uniform w/ 10% at each location o o Vote for which is closest, if there is a tie distance wise, you split the distance o Are there dominated strategies?     Could draw 10x10 matrix, no need too Ug(Sg, Sr) Ug (1, Sr) < Ug (2, Sr)  Sr _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Let’s look at  , are they dominated by   respectively? B/c of the symmetric nature of the game,  will test only one side. If Romney plays 1 (Sr=1) what are Gingrich’s payoff if he plays 1 or 2? Meaning what percentage of the  vote will Gingrich get? Sr=1
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This document was uploaded on 02/19/2012.

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Game Theory 1-31-12 - GameTheory 1312012

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