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Unformatted text preview: Biology of Being Human TOPIC 7
Paul M. Bingham Joanne Souza "Kinship-independent social cooperation the fundamental, unique human adaptation"
Key Terms and Concepts (see glossary in digital textbook):
Conflict of interest Cheater Free rider Conspecific Selfish herd Group selection fallacy Cost-of-coercion Lanchester's Square Law Proximal killing Remote killing Kinship-independent social cooperation 1 Lecture Outline:
Kinship-independent social cooperation the fundamental, unique human adaptation
I. Kinship-independent social cooperation the fundamental source of human uniqueness II. Kinship-independent social cooperation in non-human animals enforceability, coercion and cost, Part 1 III. The "group selection fallacy" and selfish herds A. The group selection fallacy and why our uniquely human minds are prone to this fallacy B. Selfish herds non-human animal social behavior does NOT conform to our uniquely human intuition C. Human "cooperation" is NOT just selfish-herding IV. Kinship-independent social cooperation in non-human animals enforceability, coercion and cost, Part 2 V. The problem is not cooperation but conflict of interest VI. Proximal killing, remote killing and the cost of coercive suppression of conflicts of interest 2 Key Images for TOPIC 7: How coercion and relatedness interact in hymenopterans to produce large, stable colonies queen 25%
larva12.5% eat the larva 50% the eat In bee and ant species that mate polyandrously (multiple males) colonies consist of many half-sisters (and a few full sisters). Under these conditions the male eggs each worker lays are 50% related to their mother but only 12.5% related to their mothers half-sisters. In contrast, the male eggs laid by the queen are 25% to all the worker females. Thus, each female destroys (eats) the eggs of her half sisters, forcing each female to focus on her second best option, raising her brothers. This "worker policing" produces a stable colony of half-sisters raising their younger sisters, half-sisters and brothers, year after year. These colonies can grow enormous in size over time. NOTE: The combined effects of kinship (Hamilton's Law) and coercion (worker policing) produce highly stable social structures. Humans use social coercion too, but on a vastly larger and more pervasive scale. 3 Quantitative logic of adult coercive violence in humans
ostracizing cooperators free rider
cost willing to pay to resist ostracism cost willing to pay to ostracize Asynchronous (proximal) killer
cost that would be required to ostracize cost that would be required to resist ostracism For proximal killers the cost of coercive enforcement (ccoerc; see next page) is inevitably very high because the cost of coercive violence is high. ostracizing cooperators free rider
cost willing to pay to resist ostracism cost willing to pay to ostracize Synchronous (remote) killer
cost that would be required to ostracize cost that would be required to resist ostracism For remote killers the cost of coercive enforcement (ccoerc; see next page) can be very low because the cost of coercive violence is very low. 4 The cost/benefit logic of coercive enforcement of cooperation between conspecifics with non-kin conflicts of interest
The "non-kin cooperation" or "collective action" problem noncooperation" action" ostracize b > ccoop + ccoerc b - ccoop > ccoerc The "non-kin cooperation" problem is NOT solved in noncooperation" proximal killers NO YES b < ccoop + ccoerc b - ccoop < ccoerc The "non-kin cooperation" problem IS solved in remote noncooperation" killers b > ccoop + ccoerc b - ccoop > ccoerc 5 ...
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This note was uploaded on 02/21/2012 for the course BIO 358 taught by Professor N/a during the Spring '08 term at SUNY Stony Brook.
- Spring '08