Iraq_Supplement - J(E)DI 2010 Naputi/Taylor 1 Iraq...

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J(E)DI 2010 1 Naputi/Taylor Iraq Supplement Fast Withdrawal Good Accelerated withdrawal is best Gompert et al 2010 (David C., Terrence K. Kelly, & Jessica Watkins; “Security in Iraq A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave,” RAND National Defense Research Institute, p. 36, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf ; accessed 6/27/10) Finally, it is important to understand the possible effects on the dangers to Iraq’s internal security and stability if U.S. forces were to leave considerably earlier than provided for in the U.S. administration’s schedule. For example, if an Iraqi referendum rejected the U.S.-Iraq status-of-forces agreement, U.S. forces might have to leave in 2010, as opposed to the end of 2011 . Again, this is unlikely to affect the danger of extremist terror. While it could heighten all of the dangers involving the main opposition groups and the GoI, the effects of earlier withdrawal could vary . Given that JAM strongly opposes U.S. military occupation and, moreover, is already overmatched by the ISF, accelerated U.S. troop departure would have little effect on it. At the other extreme, accelerated withdrawal from contested Sunni-Shi’a or Kurdish-Arab parts of Iraq could deepen the security gap and increase danger.
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J(E)DI 2010 2 Naputi/Taylor Iraq Supplement AT: Emboldens Terrorists Gompert et al 2010 (David C., Terrence K. Kelly, & Jessica Watkins; “Security in Iraq A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave,” RAND National Defense Research Institute, p.xi-xii; http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG911.pdf ; accessed 6/27/10) The prospects for these U.S. interests in Iraq are better now than they have been since the occupation began in 2003. By every measure, Iraq has become more secure and stable following its paroxysm of violence in 2006–2007. Over the past two years, most Sunni tribes have turned against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the U.S. troop surge has helped curb sectarian killing in Baghdad, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army (Jaish al Mahdi, or JAM) has observed a cease-fire, and Iraqi security forces with U.S. support have suppressed militant Iran-backed Shi’a special groups (SGs). The main political factions —Sunni, Kurd, and Shi’a— have largely , though not irrevocably, eschewed violence in favor of political engagement to pursue their agendas, even cooperating to confront their common concerns, including extremist terror. While the thirst of extremists (e.g., AQI and SGs) for violence against Americans and fellow Iraqis is unquenched, they lack (for now) the physical means, popular support, and foreign backing to re-ignite large-scale factional fighting .
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J(E)DI 2010 3 Naputi/Taylor Iraq Supplement Large-scale Shi’a-Sunni violence is unlikely—the political order is decreasing threats to U.S. personnel
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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Iraq_Supplement - J(E)DI 2010 Naputi/Taylor 1 Iraq...

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