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Japan Shared Neg - J(E)DI 2010 CramCroweSkennedy 1 Japan...

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J(E)DI 2010 1 CramCroweSkennedy Japan Shared Neg JEDI Japan Shared Neg Hegemony DA Links ................................................................................................................. 2 Politics- Public No ..................................................................................................................... 3 Politics- Congress No ................................................................................................................ 4 Relations Frontline (1/2) ........................................................................................................... 5 Relations Frontline (2/2) ........................................................................................................... 6 Relations High (1/2) .................................................................................................................. 7 Relations High (2/2) .................................................................................................................. 8 East Asian Stability Frontline (1/2) .......................................................................................... 9 East Asian Stability Frontline (2/2) ........................................................................................ 10 SDF Militarization Bad- F-22’s Bad ...................................................................................... 11 SDF Militarization Bad- Cruise Missiles ............................................................................... 12
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J(E)DI 2010 2 CramCroweSkennedy Japan Shared Neg Hegemony DA Links Realignment kills hegemony- signals weakness and cripples readiness- makes transition to passive force structure inevitable Sakaguchi ‘9 , (Daisuke, The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S. , in NIDS Security Report #10 (December 2009), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/e2009.html date accessed 6/23/10) The fourth reason is that the U.S.’ national prowess is in relative decline. The realignment of the U.S. military can be interpreted as a sign of a decline in the U.S.’ national strength. This is because the U.S. will have to expend tremendous energy politically and fiscally to regain a military front once it has retreated from it. Given that it is withdrawing regardless, one can surmise that contrary to military rationality it no longer has the national strength to maintain its forward-deployed capabilities. Pulling back bases to the rear is comparatively easy but deploying new bases forward is difficult even militarily. When considered from a military standpoint, the fact that it has ventured to do this suggests the U.S. has adopted a passive stance. Withdrawal collapses US hege- kills response time, signifies a lack of US resolve, kills deterrence and opens the door for Japan remilitarization Sakaguchi ‘9 , (Daisuke, The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S. , in NIDS Security Report #10 (December 2009), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/e2009.html date accessed 6/23/10) The fifth reason is that regardless of how much the U.S. progresses with military reform and boosts its forward-deployment projection capabilities, withdrawing its offshore bases and forward-deployed troops completely would not be in its best interests. James L. Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command, points out that the advantage of forward deployment is not only that it makes it possible to project military force immediately , but also that it signifies the U.S.’ commitment and deters potential challengers , as well as promoting regional stability via security cooperation within regions.53 In addition to these reasons, those people adhering to the so-called gradualist approach to offshore bases, beginning with O’Hanlon, support the continued existence of offshore bases for reasons such as maintaining air superiority, stationing ground forces offshore and securing safe ports.
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