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Unformatted text preview: Samford Debate Institute TNWs Negative Axis of Evil 1 Samford Debate Institute 2010 Samford Debate Institute TNWs Negative Axis of Evil Japan Prolif Links Undermining the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe casts doubt on credibility of the US nuclear umbrella over Japan: David Yost, 2009 (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755780; accessed via EBSCO) The US nuclear weapons presence in Europe as a link to US strategic nuclear forces The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces .37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the worlds first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidencein essence, European doubts about Americas will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilitiesas during the bomber gap and missile gap controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s , and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Given this historical pattern, if a new debate emerged in the United States about the adequacy of the US nuclear force posture for national security, allied experts and officials would probably ask questions about the implications for NATO and for Japan and other beneficiaries of US nuclear guarantees. The recent PerrySchlesinger report suggests that such a debate may be on the horizon.38 A polarizing internal US debate (perhaps stimulated by the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review) could lead to public questions about the reliability of US nuclear forces, and this could undermine allied confidence in US extended deterrence . Japan monitors US decisions about NATO nuclear posture closely as a barometer of US extended deterrence: David Yost, 2009 (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755780; accessed via EBSCO) Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions about...
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.
- Spring '12
- The American