SCFI - Allied Prolif DA - SCFI 2010 Albert Qaeda Allied...

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SCFI 2010 Allied Prolif Albert Qaeda ___ of ___ Allied Proliferation DA 1 Smells like teen ressentiment.
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SCFI 2010 Allied Prolif Albert Qaeda ___ of ___ ***Argument Notes*** This DA says that if the US withdraws its military/police presence from the topic countries, our allies will not trust our security guarentees, which will cause them to proliferate. This disad also relies on the idea that credibility is essential to keeping our allies happy, thus if the plan hurts credibility, then our allies will again be unsure of their security. This is a mix-and-match dis-ad. While there is a generic shell, you should make it specific for the 1AC you are debating. There are not specific internal links, but they do exist in the literature, so cut them when you go home. Also, it is really important that you INCLUDE AN IMPACT! Andres has already put out a great prolif impact file, so grab a your impact extensions from there. 2
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SCFI 2010 Allied Prolif Albert Qaeda ___ of ___ INC Generic Shell A) U.S. Deterrence is unclear- our allies are looking for a signal that they are secure and protected Schoff 09 (James, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence”, March, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf, p. ix) Extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance is under pressure because it is more complicated than before (thanks largely to missile proliferation, China’s expansion of air and sea power, and nuclear modernization in the region), and this challenge comes at a time when America’s and Japan’s security priorities are diverging. For decades, extended deterrence was thought of in simple terms, characterized by robust U.S. security commitments to its allies overseas and underwritten predominately by the provision of a nuclear umbrella to deter war with the Soviet bloc. The U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little. Today, deterrence is still a primary concern for defense planners, but there is less consensus regarding exactly who is to be deterred and how . U.S. deterrence doctrine has become muddled, as some emphasize the role of defenses, some push for bigger and better conventional options or seek more assertive alliance partners, and others talk about deterrence tailored to fit different situations. I t is time to bring clarity to this important subject, not by simplifying the policy but by realigning priorities and deepening Japan’s understanding of the policy. U.S. verbal assurances to Japan will continue to be useful, but increasingly a more concrete and common understanding about how deterrence functions in East Asia will also be necessary. The United States is deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in supporting extended deterrence, which is acceptable provided Washington works proactively with Tokyo to shore up the multiple other
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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SCFI - Allied Prolif DA - SCFI 2010 Albert Qaeda Allied...

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