SCFI - Prolif K - SCFI 2010 Proliferation K Albert...

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Unformatted text preview: SCFI 2010 Proliferation K Albert Alejandres Qaeda ___ of ___ Proliferation Kritik Use the Prolif core file to have the prolif good/bad debate. Enjoy! 1 Andres could teach you, but hed have to charge. SCFI 2010 Proliferation K Albert Alejandres Qaeda ___ of ___ 1NC Shell A) The desire to stop proliferation is nuclear apartheid. It has little to do with weapons and a lot to do with who acquires them Biswas 2001 (shampa, prof of IR @whitman college) "Nuclear Apartheid" as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource? Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 26, 2001 On the face of it, such an argument is hard to dispute. Clearly, both treaties recognize a clear distinction between those able to possess nuclear weapons and those that are not. Further, the unequal burdens placed on those two groups to contribute to a "nuclear-free world" makes one wonder about the criteria that makes any particular group of countries more "worthy" of or more "capable" of or more "responsible" in possessing weapons that seem dangerous when they proliferate to others. Within a national-security problematic, the pressures that impinge on France to acquire nuclear weapons to ward off the dangers of an anarchic world are surely not in any demonstrably clear fashion any greater than those that impinge on India. (41) In the words of the Indian minister for external affairs, "It cannot be argued that the security of a few countries depends on their having nuclear weapons, and that of the rest depends on their not." (42) If security is indeed "high politics," then the question of the affordability of nuclear weapons by an "underdeveloped" country like India should also be moot. If being "secure" is always the foremost priority, then a poor India's expensive nuclear program should make sense--unless the life of poor people is cheap. Moreover, if deterrence is the product of "state rationality," then the horrific calculus of "mutual destruction" should operate as smoothly to prevent nuclear war in the Indian subcontinent (where contiguous territory only magnifies the horror) as it does in the European theater . (43) The creeping suspicion that the accentuated fear of nuclear disaster in South Asia, expressed in different versions of "the South Asian Tinderbox" argument, are reflections of more deep- seated prejudices about the "irrationality" of barbaric peoples in the Third World is hard to avoid. Hence, Pratap Bhanu Mehta attributes the popularity of the tests for Indians to the "politics of cultural representation"--a general perception of the unstated assumption in global nuclear discourse that "the subcontinent is full of unstable people with deep historical resentments, incapable of acting rationally or managing a technologically sophisticated arsenal." (44) However, this is not to discount the significance of issues such as the historical relations between India and Pakistan or the underdevelopment of a command, control, communications, and intelligence system in either country--which add new and important dimensions to the possibility of a South Asian nuclear conflict--...
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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SCFI - Prolif K - SCFI 2010 Proliferation K Albert...

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