FMW Reverse Spending DA

FMW Reverse Spending DA - SDI 2010 Reverse Spending Cores 1...

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SDI 2010 Cores Reverse Spending 1
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1NC Reverse Spending D.A. Shell (1/4) A. The Future Combat System and F-22 are at the mercy of funding shortages – new costs have put the programs on their last legs Eaglen and Allison 6/7/2k10 (Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Julia Bertelsmann, Research Assistant for Defense Studies in the Allison Center, assisted with the preparation of this report, “U.S. Defense Spending: The Mismatch Between Plans And Resources,” States News Service , pg nexis) In turn, increasing costs have reduced acquisition plans even further, perpetuating the dysfunctional cycle at enormous cost and with significant consequences for the force. While purchasing more advanced equipment can offset Pentagon decisions not to replace systems on a one-for-one basis, there are limits to this approach . At some point, sheer numbers outweigh the advantages of advanced capabilities because each ship, plane, and vehicle can be in only one place at one time. If the U.S. intends to continue fulfilling its commitments around the globe, increasing capability alone is not enough. It must be backed by a sufficient quantity of next-generation systems. After more than a decade and millions of dollars in funding, only three DDG-1000s are being built . Recent defense procurement is replete with similar examples of programs that have been terminated short of originally planned numbers or that have entered the dreaded defense "death spiral." The Army's F uture C ombat S ystems program, the program to replace OH-58D Kiowa helicopters, the Marine Corps' Osprey program, and the F-22 tactical fighter program have been truncated or eliminated , largely as a result of unbudgeted cost growth. Ultimately, all of these programs have suffered from disconnects between the Defense Department's proposed plans and annual budgets. Acquisition Reform Without Significant Procurement Account Growth. For more than a century, think tanks and congressional oversight bodies have produced numerous studies on acquisition problems. Regrettably, many of the changes implemented to streamline the defense acquisition system have instead added layers of regulations and complex requirements that have made the process less competitive, more costly, and more cumbersome. For the most part, these efforts have failed to rein in costs or alleviate schedule delays. Instead, additional layers of red tape, combined with a growing number of personnel to oversee a declining number of new programs, have only exacerbated cost increases and schedule delays[32] without adding accountability to the process. Delays and cost overruns that were often the result of government changes, not contractor inabilities, have the added consequence of making weapons systems easy political targets. Meanwhile, the
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at Berkeley.

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FMW Reverse Spending DA - SDI 2010 Reverse Spending Cores 1...

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