1NC Reverse Spending D.A. Shell (1/4)
A. The Future Combat System and F-22 are at the mercy of funding shortages – new costs
have put the programs on their last legs
Eaglen and Allison 6/7/2k10
(Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for
Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Julia
Bertelsmann, Research Assistant for Defense Studies in the Allison Center, assisted with the preparation of this report, “U.S. Defense Spending: The
Mismatch Between Plans And Resources,”
States News Service
, pg nexis)
In turn, increasing costs have reduced acquisition plans even further, perpetuating the dysfunctional cycle at enormous cost and with significant
consequences for the force.
While purchasing more advanced equipment can offset Pentagon decisions
not to replace systems on a one-for-one basis, there are limits to this approach
. At some point, sheer
numbers outweigh the advantages of advanced capabilities because each ship, plane, and vehicle can be in only one place at one time. If the U.S.
intends to continue fulfilling its commitments around the globe, increasing capability alone is not enough. It must be backed by a sufficient quantity
of next-generation systems.
After more than a decade and millions of dollars in funding, only three
DDG-1000s are being built
Recent defense procurement is replete with similar examples of
programs that have been terminated
short of originally planned numbers or that have entered the dreaded defense "death
The Army's F
the program to replace OH-58D Kiowa helicopters, the Marine Corps'
and the F-22 tactical fighter
have been truncated or eliminated
result of unbudgeted cost growth.
Ultimately, all of these programs have suffered
disconnects between the Defense
Department's proposed plans and annual
Acquisition Reform Without Significant Procurement Account Growth. For more than a
century, think tanks and congressional oversight bodies have produced numerous studies on acquisition problems. Regrettably, many of the changes
implemented to streamline the defense acquisition system have instead added layers of regulations and complex requirements that have made the
process less competitive, more costly, and more cumbersome. For the most part, these efforts have failed to rein in costs or alleviate schedule delays.
Instead, additional layers of red tape, combined with a growing number of personnel to oversee a declining number of new programs, have only
exacerbated cost increases and schedule delays without adding accountability to the process.
Delays and cost overruns that were often the result
of government changes, not contractor inabilities, have the added consequence of making weapons systems easy political targets. Meanwhile, the