A2: Nuclear Terrorism - Turkey
-- No theft – storage solves.
(Joshua, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, p.
Ensuring the security of tactical nuclear weapons has been a major concern of many analysts
and commentators. It is frequently claimed that the security of tactical nuclear weapons is
somehow worse than for strategic nuclear weapons and, thus, that special steps are somehow
merited. However, one result of the PNI’s is that [TNW’s
] tactical nuclear weapons are now
as strategic nuclear weapons
. It is now as good—or as bad—and this
is a large chance from the 1990-91 time frame. [TNW’s
] Tactical nuclear weapons in the
nited States and Russia are
in many cases collocated with strategic nuclear weapons in major
nuclear weapons storage facilities that contain multiple bunkers
. Moreover, major changes in
have improved the security situation
for tactical nuclear weapons.
are almost no forward-deployed or dispersal tactical nuclear weapons on land, and there are no
such weapons deployed on U.S. or Russian ships or submarines. The only exception is U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons aircraft bombs in Europe, which are now kept in weapons storage
vaults (WSV) set into the floor of hangers where aircraft can be located. In the case of Russia,
some tactical nuclear weapons may be located in storage areas in the vicinity of an airfield, but
unlike the United States, they are most likely not on the airfield area proper. Lastly, many of the
supposedly smaller and more easily transportable tactical nuclear weapons, such as artillery
shells, may almost be or have been completely eliminated. Thus concerns about them being
stolen are now
(or soon to be)
-- Withdrawal causes dismantlement which increases the theft risk.
(Richard, Distinguished Research Fellow at INSS-NDU, Survival, August, p. 142)
A separate issue is what to do with the warheads. Here, the NPR critics are off-target. To
achieve ‘real’ reductions, they argue, the United States should destroy rather than store all
decommissioned warheads. One of their chief concerns is that storing warheads will encourage
Russia to do the same, thereby increasing the vulnerability of these weapons to terrorist theft or
unauthorized diversion. This concern is misplaced. It is the fissile material from weapons that
have been dismantled or retired
, rather than the warheads themselves, that is the main
proliferation danger. The warhead destruction process generates an increased among of