MGW10-GS-A2-Nuclear-Terror - MGW 10 GS A2 Nuclear Terror A2...

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MGW 10 GS A2: Nuclear Terror A2: Nuclear Terrorism 1
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A2: Nuclear Terrorism - Turkey -- No theft – storage solves. Handler, ‘3 (Joshua, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, p. 32) Ensuring the security of tactical nuclear weapons has been a major concern of many analysts and commentators. It is frequently claimed that the security of tactical nuclear weapons is somehow worse than for strategic nuclear weapons and, thus, that special steps are somehow merited. However, one result of the PNI’s is that [TNW’s ] tactical nuclear weapons are now approximately as secure as strategic nuclear weapons . It is now as good—or as bad—and this is a large chance from the 1990-91 time frame. [TNW’s ] Tactical nuclear weapons in the U nited States and Russia are in many cases collocated with strategic nuclear weapons in major nuclear weapons storage facilities that contain multiple bunkers . Moreover, major changes in deployment patterns have improved the security situation for tactical nuclear weapons. There are almost no forward-deployed or dispersal tactical nuclear weapons on land, and there are no such weapons deployed on U.S. or Russian ships or submarines. The only exception is U.S. tactical nuclear weapons aircraft bombs in Europe, which are now kept in weapons storage vaults (WSV) set into the floor of hangers where aircraft can be located. In the case of Russia, some tactical nuclear weapons may be located in storage areas in the vicinity of an airfield, but unlike the United States, they are most likely not on the airfield area proper. Lastly, many of the supposedly smaller and more easily transportable tactical nuclear weapons, such as artillery shells, may almost be or have been completely eliminated. Thus concerns about them being stolen are now (or soon to be) moot. -- Withdrawal causes dismantlement which increases the theft risk. Sokolsky, ‘2 (Richard, Distinguished Research Fellow at INSS-NDU, Survival, August, p. 142) A separate issue is what to do with the warheads. Here, the NPR critics are off-target. To achieve ‘real’ reductions, they argue, the United States should destroy rather than store all decommissioned warheads. One of their chief concerns is that storing warheads will encourage Russia to do the same, thereby increasing the vulnerability of these weapons to terrorist theft or unauthorized diversion. This concern is misplaced. It is the fissile material from weapons that have been dismantled or retired , rather than the warheads themselves, that is the main proliferation danger. The warhead destruction process generates an increased among of
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MGW10-GS-A2-Nuclear-Terror - MGW 10 GS A2 Nuclear Terror A2...

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