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MGW10-GS-Drones-NEG-SUPP

MGW10-GS-Drones-NEG-SUPP - MGW 10 GS Lab Drones Neg Drones...

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MGW 10 GS Lab Drones Neg Drones Neg Update 1
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T - Presence 1NC A. Interpretation - Presence requires that the forces be physically stationed within the topic country – anything that strikes from outside of the country in isn’t a military presence Dismukes, 94 – representative of the Center for Naval Analyses to the London staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. (Bradford, “National Security Strategy and Forward Presence: Implications for Acquisition and Use of Forces,” March, http://cna.org/sites/default/files/research/2793019200.pdf) Italics in original, CONUS = Continental United States Another difference between presence and crisis response is that decisions on forces for presence are taken at the strategic level, while those for crisis response are operational and tactical. Presence is a routine activity; the size of the baseline force operating forward changes relatively slowly as the strategic assessment of the situation in the theater evolves . At this level, routine deployments and changes in U.S forces based forward are made through U.S. initiatives, scheduled well in advance, ideally in consultation with allies. Crisis response is conceptually distinct from presence in that it is not a routine activity; the forces needed are reckoned at the operational and tactical levels in response to "tactical warning" of the initiatives of adversaries . Changes are not scheduled in advance and may well be undertaken before consultations with allies can be completed. This means that presence planning should be concerned only with forces forward—whether based, deployed, or there on a rotational basis—and that forces in CONUS, important as they are for the credibility of forces forward, cannot be considered as executing the presence mission. This distinction provides an important boundary for force planners because the need for CONUS-based forces can be safely reckoned exclusively on the basis of the crisis response and warfighting needs of major regional contingencies. Unless this distinction is made, overseas presence cannot be a separate activity if the forces needed for it become those forward and in CONUS when the build- up to an MRC begins. This boundary poses no problems for deciding the needs for all forces except for forces to be used in the Caribbean and for strategic bombers in general. The proximity of the Caribbean means that forces in the southern United States proper (and Puerto Rico, Panama, etc.) are "present" without having to be "overseas"; therefore, the relatively small forces needed for presence and crisis situations there will not be further considered here. Bombers can be employed (that is, used without first being deployed) anywhere in the world quickly and directly from CONUS. Knowledge of this fact by adversaries undoubtedly serves as a deterrent on a routine basis, thus meeting one of the objectives of overseas presence. However, bombers can only deter; they cannot contribute to its other presence goals—e.g., building coalitions, developing interoperability, and so on
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